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This dissertation contains four studies that contribute to our understanding of the
social and financial consequences of homeownership. The first study examines the effects
of homeownership on residential satisfaction and neighborhood safety. I show that
neighborhoods with higher homeownership rates are safer and that residents are more
satisfied with their neighborhood. In the second study, I provide insight into the decision
making process that households undergo when arranging mortgage financing. Specifically,
I document that those households who are either less risk averse or more financially
literate are more likely to opt for alternative mortgage products such as interest-only
mortgages. The third chapter focuses on the mortgage origination process and inves -
tigates whether provision-based compensation of financial intermediaries affects under -
writing outcomes for households. The results indicate that this, contrary to popular belief,
is not the case when mortgage lenders are exposed to default and reputational risks,
thereby providing them with an incentive to screen mortgage applications and monitor
brokers. The final study investigates the demand for mortgage insurance. Households with
recourse mortgage debt face wealth risks in case they are forced to sell their house
following an adverse income shock. The findings in this study support the hypothesis that
households eligible for insurance who are overconfident are significantly less likely to
obtain mortgage insurance.
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Chapter 1                              
Introduction 
 
The eruption of the subprime crisis in 2008 dramatically shook up financial 
and housing markets and required governments around the world to step in and bail 
financial institutions out. Following its break out, politicians and academics started 
to investigate how this crisis could emerge (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011) and 
which measures should be adopted to prevent it from happening in the future 
(Shiller, 2008). 2  Although financial institutions were severely affected, the 
consequences to homeowners were probably as severe since many of them 
defaulted on their mortgage payments and got foreclosed upon. It is the perspective 
of the homeowner that dominates this thesis and a useful starting point is to 
examine their demand for housing.  
Housing demand by households can be viewed as a combination of demand 
for a consumption good (e.g. shelter from the elements) and an investment good 
(e.g. an asset which can be sold at a different price in the future) (Ioannides and 
Rosenthal, 1994). Viewed as an investment good, it provides a way for individuals 
to accumulate wealth, for example through the generation of capital gains from 
home price appreciation or rental income (Quigley, 2006). As with other financial 
assets, this perspective is consistent with a market wherein individuals participate 
and act to generate returns on their investment. Moreover, the risks of investing in 
housing markets such as house price volatility are of concern to the investor and 
affect his ability and willingness to hold positions. However, Shiller (2008) 
contends that one of the causes of the subprime crisis is due to naïve investors 
flooding the real estate market. The oversupply of capital allocated to real estate 
pushed up its prices to unsustainable levels, which had – in hindsight – far-reaching 
consequences. 
This brings us to the view where housing demand is considered as demand 
for a consumption good.  Observed actions in the housing market can be thought of 
                                            
2 However, there is no consensus on which actions should be taken (see Howden and Bagus, 2009). 
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as reflecting the need of households to fulfill their preferences for the consumption 
of housing services. Empirical evidence indeed suggests that observed demand in 
the housing market appears to be consistent with that for a consumption good rather 
than an investment good (Arrondel and Lefebvre, 2001; Ioannides and Rosenthal, 
1994). An implication of the consumption-based view is that the actions of 
individuals in the housing market are not necessarily driven by return-seeking 
motives but rather the need to find a suitable place to live in. Hence, even absent 
the subprime crisis, we would expect that the average buyer or seller in the housing 
market is relatively ‘naïve’ because the information it processes and the decisions it 
makes are on consumption rather than investment based grounds. 
Governments are aware of the need of their residents to participate in the 
housing market and consequently intervene in residential housing markets through 
subsidies, social housing, land zoning policies and regulation of financial 
institutions, to ensure widespread availability and affordability of housing. One 
non-trivial question that rises is the relevance of the tenure-mode to fulfill this 
demand for housing services.3  Viewed in the light of the subprime crisis, this 
question has yet again gained importance because part of the housing bubble in the 
United States (U.S.) was fueled by policies aimed to increase homeownership rates 
(Hendershott and Villani, 2012).  
Moreover, most households are, once they decide to become a homeowner, 
required to enter the mortgage market in order to finance the purchase of a house. 
Regulators across nations expressed their concerns with the rapid growth of new 
mortgage products that defer or abolish amortization in the past decades (Federal 
Reserve Board, 2007). These concerns are based on indications that households 
have limited understanding of finances in general (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008). 
The consequences of choosing an unsuitable product can have a long-lasting impact 
on the household budget. Moreover, empirical evidence has documented unfair and 
abusive lending practices (Agarwal et al., 2012) in the U.S., which might 
particularly flourish in the presence of borrowers with limited understanding of 
their mortgages (Carr and Kolluri, 2001). The overarching question is whether 
households make informed decisions based on an understanding of the features of 
mortgages and the risks involved. Recently, the role of financial literacy of 
individuals in their decision making started to receive attention, for example to 
decide to participate in the stock market (e.g. Van Rooij et al., 2011), but empirical 
evidence for the mortgage market is lacking so far.  
                                            
3 Tenure-mode in housing markets refers to whether households own or rent their primary residence. 
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Another topic that is related to the previous one is the development of 
underwriting standards among mortgage lenders (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 
2011). As originators increasingly started to securitize and sell mortgages in the 
secondary market, incentives to carefully screen loan applications and prevent 
over-crediting of households diminished (Keys et al., 2010). The ‘Originate-to-
Distribute’ model combined with compensation schemes that incentivize sales 
volume potentially lead to a misalignment of interest between lenders and 
households. These issues appear to be especially acute when brokers are involved 
in mortgage origination (LaCour-Little, 2009). However, it is unclear why lenders 
are willing to fund riskier mortgages when brokers are involved compared to what 
they would lend directly to households if they are exposed to credit and reputation 
risk. In this case it is expected that lending standards remain unaffected and that 
brokers are monitored by lenders. 
So far the discussion focused on the ‘own’ and ‘finance’ component of 
homeownership. In many housing markets, homeowning households hold a 
portfolio wherein real estate is the major asset class and mortgage debt the major 
liability (Campbell, 2006). Standard theories in finance suggest that households 
benefit from hedging or diversifying their risk exposure to real estate (Englund et 
al., 2002). Despite that house-price insurance is largely unavailable, many 
households do not engage in precautionary behavior such as purchasing mortgage 
insurance. Given the impact that the burst of the subprime bubble had on 
household’s wealth, it is interesting to understand why so many decide not to insure 
against the risk and consequences of mortgage default. An exploration of the 
factors affecting the default-option among homeowners is crucial to provide input 
to and examine the effectiveness of changing the mode in which mortgage markets 
operate. 
The answers that this dissertation provides shed more light on the behavior 
of households in the residential real estate market. The subprime crisis brought the 
housing and mortgage market at the center of the political debate and both are 
subject to reforms. A deeper understanding of the behavior of market participants is 
needed to provide input for the effective revision of housing market policies, 
financial sector regulation and the re-allocation of (fiduciary) duties and 
responsibilities. 
This chapter continues with a brief motivation for the research in this 
dissertation in Section 1.1 and its outline in Section 1.2. 
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1.1 Housing and mortgage markets across the world 
 
Housing market research is an established discipline within the finance and 
economics literature. Housing and mortgage markets are at the heart of developed 
nations and their omnipresence lead to a wide range of theoretical and empirical 
work. However, there is a major difference that distinguishes real estate research 
from other research streams in finance. This comes from the substantial differences 
in the governing and functioning of residential real estate markets across nations 
(Neuteboom, 2008). Heterogeneity in institutional context and local culture lead to 
differences in ownership structures, completeness of financial markets, and market 
governance.  
It also affects the way in which market forces can shape (equilibrium) 
outcomes and the behavior of its participants. Therefore it is ex-ante unclear how 
theoretical propositions generalize across contexts. Assuming that results obtained 
in one market can be automatically applied to another one can lead to incorrect 
conclusions and the development of ineffective policies. 
To illustrate this heterogeneity, homeownership rates for eighteen developed 
countries across the world are shown in Figure 1.1.  It can be seen that the majority 
of the Bulgarians and Singaporeans are homeowners while housing markets in 
countries like Denmark, the Netherland, Germany and Switzerland have much 
more rental housing (Voigtländer, 2009).  This heterogeneity in housing stock 
composition and homeownership rates provides a clear indication that the housing 
market is functioning differently across nations.  
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Figure 1.1 ■ Homeownership rates across countries 
This figure shows homeownership rates for eighteen countries (reporting year in brackets): Belgium (2007), 
Bulgaria (2009), Denmark (2010), Finland (2009), France (2008), Germany (2009), Greece (2010) Ireland 
(2010),  Italy (2008), Netherlands (2009), Poland (2009),  Portugal (2009), Singapore (2011), Spain (2008), 
Sweden (2010), Switzerland (2010), Turkey (2002), United Kingdom (2009 and  the United States (2010). 
Source: European Mortgage Federation (2011),Bourassa and Hoesli (2010), Voigtländer (2009). 
 
 
To the extent that homeownership-rates are driven by access to mortgage 
debt, the ratio of residential mortgage debt to country gross domestic product (GDP) 
is shown in Figure 1.2. Despite relatively low homeownership rates, the amount of 
mortgage debt in countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark 
exceeds their gross domestic product. While on the other side of the spectrum 
countries are found where the outstanding amount of mortgage debt is only a small 
fraction of GDP despite high homeownership rates (e.g. Turkey and Bulgaria).4 
This appears surprising: how can high homeownership rates be sustained 
without high mortgage-debt ratios? Households owning their residence in countries 
like the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark, tend to finance their property 
with mortgage debt.  
                                            
4  There is considerable heterogeneity across countries as to what is included in the reported outstanding 
mortgage balance. For example, in the Netherlands and Denmark, amortization and dedicated savings are not 
taken into account in the computation of outstanding mortgage debt. However, even if these were taken into 
account, these countries would still be in the top of the distribution. 
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Figure 1.2 ■ Mortgage debt-to-GDP ratios across countries 
This figure shows the amount of residential mortgage debt relative to national GDP in 2010 for eighteen 
countries across the world. Source: Finaccord (2012), European Mortgage Federation (2011). 
 
 
 
Consequently, mortgage markets in such countries are highly developed and 
competitive. Households in Bulgaria and Greece use other financial resources, such 
as savings and inheritance to acquire a house, subsequently making them less 
reliant on mortgage debt. 
To what extent existing academic findings – often based on the U.S. market 
– have explanatory power in other markets is as such largely an empirical question.  
For example, the choice for an adjustable rate or fixed rate mortgage has received 
considerable attention in the academic literature, but mortgage markets outside the 
U.S. are typically not so easily characterized. As another example, the desire to 
promote and stimulate homeownership in the U.S. has led to questionable lending 
practices, which are magnitude-wise hardly found anywhere else. To gain more 
understanding about the functioning of housing and mortgage markets and the 
generalizability of results asks for empirical evidence at the country level, 
especially because housing markets are not integrated. 
 
 Introduction 7 
This dissertation focuses on the housing and mortgage market in the 
Netherlands. The availability of high quality data helps to examine in detail how 
Dutch households behave in the housing and mortgage market and to what extent 
propositions in the existing real estate literature carry over to contexts outside the 
Netherlands.  
Specifically, the effects of homeownership and the factors relevant to the 
mortgage decision process are probably fairly universal, and results obtained for 
the Netherlands are therefore expected to be reasonably generalizable to other 
contexts. This is less apparent for the mortgage underwriting process, as the 
market-structure of the financial sector and the ease with which financial 
institutions can fund themselves (e.g. through securitization) have an important 
effect on the risks a lender can take and the underwriting standards it will set. Also 
for mortgage insurance decisions the results are critically dependent on the 
structure of the policy and the discretion that households have to purchase them. In 
this respect our setting is unique because it yields a quasi-experimental context that 
allows households to freely choose mortgage insurance. As completely voluntary 
mortgage insurance is absent in most other markets (for example the U.S. and 
Canada), the presented findings for the Netherlands are not at first glance 
applicable to these housing markets. However, the results are probably applicable 
to other insurance markets that evolved around similar types of risk (e.g. disability 
and unemployment risk). In any case, the insights presented in this dissertation 
provide a baseline for further comparative work.  
 
 
1.2 Outline 
 
This dissertation consists of four chapters covering the social and financial 
aspects of homeownership in the Netherlands. Specifically, it starts with examining 
the effects of homeownership, followed by an analysis of the decision making and 
mortgage origination process. Finally, the adoption of mortgage insurance is 
analyzed. I provide a brief overview of the research questions and main findings.  
Different regimes around the world stimulate homeownership through 
subsidies such as the deductibility of mortgage interest expenses. Chapter two 
analyzes a long-standing question in the real-estate literature; namely why 
homeownership should be stimulated. One motivation for these subsidies is that it 
is thought to create positive external effects in neighborhoods. For the city of 
Rotterdam, we examine whether the rate of homeownership is related to external 
8 Chapter 1  
 
effects such as neighborhood safety and residential satisfaction. The evidence 
suggests that this is indeed the case and that there is even a weak causal relation. 
However, our findings also show that there is a concave relationship between 
homeownership and external effects. That is, increases in homeownership yield 
smaller increases in neighborhood safety and satisfaction if current ownership 
levels are higher.  
 Owning a house often involves arranging mortgage financing by the 
household. Chapter three examines the decision-making process of households with 
respect to their mortgage. We analyze how risk aversion and financial literacy 
influence the type of mortgage that households choose. In the aftermath of the 
subprime crisis, the debate started whether mortgages – especially alternative 
mortgage products – where missold to households. Therefore we need to 
understand to what extend households could be reasonably expected to understand 
the products they bought. It is shown that households with lower levels of literacy 
and risk tolerance are significantly less likely to choose alternative mortgage 
products such as deferred-amortization and interest-only mortgages. The results 
indicate that there is a non-negligible influence of these factors in the decision-
process. Moreover, it is found that the role of financial literacy and risk aversion 
persists after allowing for other explanations such as the influence of financial 
advisors, learning effects from peers and experience with prior homeownership. In 
general, alternative mortgage products are chosen by wealthier, older and more 
sophisticated households, who are also more likely to have understanding of the 
risks and the benefits associated with these products. 
 In chapter four, I examine the mortgage origination process. In general three 
actors are involved in the process: mortgage lenders, households and financial 
intermediaries. Households can obtain their mortgage directly with the originator 
(direct written) or through an intermediary. Research in the U.S. has shown that, in 
the presence of commission-based compensation and competition, the involvement 
of intermediaries can lead to a conflict of interest between them and households. 
However, it is ex-ante not clear why originators would not monitor brokers as 
credit risks must be acceptable to them. Removing credit risk from the balance 
sheet or being able to insure credit risk both reduce the monitoring incentives that 
originators have. This chapter shows indeed that the involvement of intermediaries 
does not systematically lead to over-levering of households in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, I do not find that intermediaries have an impact on the underwriting 
process conditional on the mortgage being insured. As mentioned, mortgage 
insurance has the potential to reduce screening incentives because it eliminates the 
risk exposure for originators. From a regulatory perspective, it seems more 
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important to focus attention on lender regulation rather than regulating financial 
intermediaries.  
The demand for mortgage insurance is the topic of the fifth chapter. Many 
homeowning households hold an undiversified asset portfolio concentrated in real 
estate. Recourse mortgages create a wealth risk for households because they are 
liable for repayment of principal beyond what is recovered in a foreclosure.  If this 
occurs, the remaining shortfall has to be covered by other personal wealth. 
Mortgage insurance covers this shortfall in case of an involuntary default. Despite 
the consequences, only 50 percent of the eligible Dutch households obtained 
mortgage insurance during the analysis period. The analysis indicates that 
households are more likely to purchase mortgage insurance the larger their risk 
exposure, consistent with standard economic intuition. However, I also examine the 
impact of behavioral traits of the decision maker. Specifically, I test whether 
overconfidence is able to explain the insurance decision and find this to be the case. 
The evidence suggests that overconfident households are up to 13 percent less 
likely to insure their mortgage, but contrarily to other studies no significant 
differences were found for the gender of the decision maker. Mortgage insurance 
rates shot up to levels over 85 percent following the start of the subprime crisis, 
which acted as a wake-up call for all market participants.  
  
  
 
 
Chapter 2                                           
Safe and Satisfied?                          
External Effects of Homeownership in Rotterdam5 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 To own or not to own your home? The aftermath of the financial crisis has 
shown that this is still an important question. Governments around the world 
subsidize homeownership by mortgage interest tax deductions and first-time home 
buyer subsidies (Megbolugbe and Linneman, 1993). Or as the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development stated “we recognize that 
American families deserve the opportunity to achieve and sustain the dream of 
homeownership”. The Netherlands also supports such a housing policy and 
subsidises homeownership via a mortgage interest deduction. Homeownership in 
the Netherlands is subsidised – net of taxation – at 15 billion euros in 2009, 
equalling almost 3 per cent of Dutch GDP (Statistics Netherlands, 2009).  
 The effect of homeownership has received considerable attention in the 
academic literature. At the individual level, homeownership has been related to the 
performance of children at school (see Jensen and Harris, 2008; Aaronson, 2000 
and Green and White, 1997). The level and number of social connections that 
residents develop with the neighbourhood are positively influenced by being or 
becoming a homeowner (Engelhardt et al., 2010; Kleinhans et al., 2007; 
DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999).  
 This paper focuses on the effects of homeownership at the neighbourhood 
level. We examine to what extent homeownership rates are related to 
                                            
5 This chapter is based on Cox, Brounen and Neuteboom (forthcoming in Urban Studies).We thank Dion 
Bongaerts, Eric Fesselmeyer, Donald Haurin, Melissa Porras Prado, Amanda Ross, Carine Smolders, two 
anonymous referees, the editor Mark Stephens and participants at the Rotterdam School of Management, the 
ERES Annual Meeting 2010, AREUEA International Meeting 2010, CESifo conference on Housing Taxation 
and Regulation and the ARES Annual Meeting 2011 for their valuable comments.  
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neighbourhood safety and neighbourhood satisfaction. Rohe and Stewart (1996) 
find that higher ownership levels decrease neighbourhood turnover and stabilise 
property values. However, a potential downside of homeownership and thus 
decreased turnover is a reduction of labour market mobility (Green and 
Hendershott, 2001). Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) observe that homeownership has 
a negative impact on certain crimes while Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) report that 
residents of apartment buildings face increased street crime because they are less 
connected to the street. Residential satisfaction and, more generally, personal self-
esteem is documented to be positively influenced through homeownership by Rohe 
and Basolo (1997), Rossi and Weber (1996) and Galster (1987). However, there is 
little empirical evidence of homeownership and the impact on neighbourhood 
safety. 
 Most studies so far have focused on U.S. housing markets.  Our research 
makes use of a unique panel dataset for Rotterdam, the second largest city in the 
Netherlands.  With an ownership level of around 30 per cent, Rotterdam is clearly 
below average U.S. and Dutch ownership levels, which are 68 per cent and 55 per 
cent, respectively. We examine whether there are positive effects of 
homeownership on neighbourhood safety and neighbourhood satisfaction in a 
market where homeownership is not dominant and social housing 6  is a viable 
alternative. Moreover, we pay special attention to the causal direction of the effects. 
We also investigate whether external effects are a linear function of the 
homeownership rate. Haurin et al. (2003) suggest there might be diminishing 
returns to scale. Stimulating ownership in neighbourhoods which have already 
attained high ownership levels might be less effective than stimulation in low-
ownership neighbourhoods (see the discussion of Engelhardt et al., 2010). Shlay 
(2006) contradicts that homeownership for low-income households might be an 
effective tool in alleviating neighbourhood distress. Given this debate, we shed 
light on whether policies should aim at increasing homeownership.  
 There are several methodological issues that have to be addressed. Haurin et 
al. (2003), Dietz and Haurin (2002) and Rohe et al. (2001) provide a series of 
review studies on the external effects of homeownership. They conclude that 
empirical approaches taken in earlier papers are sensitive to omitted variables and 
selection issues. They warn that the evidence so far should be interpreted with 
caution. Nowadays, availability of detailed panel datasets and advances in 
                                            
6 In the Netherlands social housing is provided by private housing associations that, up to 1995, received 
government subsidies. Dutch social housing is subject to rent control, and households with an income of up to 
€29,125 are eligible for rent subsidy. As such, the system provides housing for lower-income households. In 
recent years projects have been initiated that allow the renter to buy his/her from the housing association at a 
discount to the prevailing market price. 
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econometric techniques provide the opportunity to deal with these methodological 
challenges in a more rigorous way. 
 Aware of the methodological challenges, we find that there is a positive 
effect of homeownership on neighbourhood safety and satisfaction, but the 
economic magnitude of this effect is small. Our results show that a 10 percent 
increase in homeownership rates, on average, raises neighbourhood safety by 0.6 
percent and satisfaction by 0.7 percent. Additional robustness analyses show that 
the results are not driven by our model specification or endogeneity. We report a 
relation that shows diminishing returns between homeownership and external 
effects. Marginal changes in external effects become small once ownership rates 
reach levels of around 55 per cent. Our results corroborate with evidence found in 
the U.S. The fact that external effects already emerge in low ownership rates and 
are subject to diminishing returns provides input for the reassessment of housing 
market policies both in and outside the Netherlands (see also Chase, 2010). 
 The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the extant 
literature underlying our research questions. In Section 2.3 we present our model 
and discuss our data, while the analysis are reported in Section 2.4. We discuss our 
findings and conclude in Section 2.5.  
 
 
2.2 Socioeconomic effects of homeownership 
 
  The socioeconomic consequences of homeownership have received 
considerable attention in the academic literature. One of the most apparent 
consequences is that homeowners are less mobile than renters e.g. due to 
transaction costs, implying that they are less likely to move (Boehm, 1981). As a 
result, the average tenure of a homeowner is longer compared to a renter. Rohe and 
Stewart (1996) provide evidence of this. Using U.S. Census data, they find that the 
homeownership rates increase the percentage of households who reside at the same 
location for five years or longer. Many studies use the average tenure length of 
neighbourhood residents as an indicator for neighbourhood stability, but Rohe et al. 
(2001) warn that stability does not equal neighbourhood health or stability of 
property values, although they might be related with stability.   
    However, there are other effects related to the increased tenure of 
homeowners. Studies have found that the longer an individual lives in a 
neighbourhood, the higher the probability that he or she will develop a social 
network/capital with other citizens in that neighbourhood (see Kleinhans et al., 
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2007; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). For example, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) 
report that homeowners have an increased number of memberships in 
nonprofessional organizations and are more inclined to help solve neighbourhood 
problems. However, the effect of homeownership decreases substantially when 
they add (individual) fixed effects and tenure length to their model. This provides a 
clear warning that uncontrolled idiosyncratic differences and unobserved processes 
can lead to spurious results.  
 
 
2.2.1 Homeownership and neighbourhood safety 
 
    So if homeownership stabilises neighbourhoods and if homeowners develop 
more social ties with their neighbours and tend to help solve neighbourhood 
problems, does this make neighbourhoods safer? There is relatively limited 
empirical evidence whether homeownership helps to reduce crime rates (Alba et al., 
1994; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999).  Obviously, homeowners have a financial 
incentive to invest in crime prevention. Several studies show that increases in crime 
rates decreases property values, thereby forming a direct cost for homeowners. 
Gibbons (2004) for example shows for London that a one-standard deviation 
increase in crimes leads to a 10 per cent reduction in house prices. Glaeser and 
Sacerdote (1999) examine the relation between city size and crime rates and they 
control for homeownership but do not discuss their reasons for doing so. Reporting 
a negative effect on the level of property and violent crime, it might be tempting to 
conclude that homeownership helps to reduce crime. However, Dietz and Haurin 
(2003) comment that homeowners might be more likely to own alarm systems and 
participate in neighbourhood watch programs. The relation between crime rates and 
homeownership might also be driven by a selection process: homeowners might 
want to live in safer neighbourhoods. In their 2000 study, Glaeser and Sacerdote 
examine whether building structure influences social interactions and crime rates. 
They find a positive relation between multi-unit dwellings (apartment buildings) 
and street crimes such as the number of auto thefts and burglaries. They argue that 
this is due to an increased distance between the residents and the street, leading to a 
reduction in social control. The owner-occupier rate is not significant in their 
regressions.   
     So, at best there is mixed evidence that homeownership might have a 
positive impact on neighbourhood safety. Moreover, increasing homeownership in 
one neighbourhood might lead to displacement of criminal activities to another one, 
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leading to a reduction in safety adjacent neighbourhoods. We also examine whether 
neighbourhood satisfaction is related to homeownership levels.  
 
 
2.2.2 Homeownership and residential satisfaction 
 
Empirical work has focused on various forms of satisfaction such as life 
satisfaction (the satisfaction of individual with his/her life) and residential 
satisfaction (the satisfaction with the property and the surrounding neighbourhood). 
Homeownership might lead to higher residential satisfaction because homeowners 
have more freedom to customize the units to their own taste (Rohe et al., 2001). 
Moreover, they live in environments that provide more amenities catering to their 
needs, thereby raising satisfaction levels with respect to both the residence and the 
surrounding neighbourhood (Galster, 1987). Galster points out that homeowners in 
later stages of the life-cycle tend to be more satisfied with their residential situation 
regardless of dwelling or neighbourhood characteristics.  
 Rossi and Weber (1996) use the General Social Survey to evaluate whether 
homeowners are satisfied with their neighbourhoods. Finding that owners and 
renters do not significantly differ in the satisfaction with their neighbourhood or 
safety perception, they conclude that there is not enough evidence to claim that 
homeownership induces higher neighbourhood satisfaction. Moreover, the physical 
and socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood influences the level of 
neighbourhood satisfaction, but in the light of Galster’s discussion, this might be 
dependent on the age of the homeowner. If the socioeconomic status of the 
neighbourhood is defined in terms of wealth, Watson and Webb (2009) find that 
homeowners are less likely to perceive themselves as being in poverty, because 
owning a home might insure them against future uncertainty. This might alter their 
perception of their socioeconomic position, their well-being, and their residential 
satisfaction.   
   We can conclude that residential and neighbourhood satisfaction is related to 
homeownership but that the underlying reasons are not exactly clear. Rohe et al. 
(2001) point to this concern by mentioning that there might be mediating variables, 
which impact the association between homeownership and social outcomes. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether these effects are subject to diminishing returns or 
have a non-linear relation. Haurin et al. (2003) report that the returns to scale might 
diminish as homeownership rates become higher. Galster et al. (2000) find that 
indicators of neighbourhood distress progressively increase when rental occupancy 
rates reach 85 per cent, implying that increasing homeownership rates in these 
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neighbourhoods might not be effective in alleviating distress. Harkness and 
Newman (2002) report similar results and find that the results of homeownership 
are weakened in distressed neighbourhoods.  
 
 
2.2.3 Negative effects of homeownership 
 
The evidence so far supports the view that effects of homeownership are 
following a non-linear relation, but also indicates the existence of potential 
negative consequences to homeownership. The results of Harkness and Newman 
(2002) point to the “ownership”-trap. Homeowners cannot as easily flee distressed 
neighbourhoods as renters when neighbourhood-conditions change, such as an 
increase in crime rates because of transaction costs etc. As such homeownership 
can act as a ‘trap’, preventing households from leaving undesirable neighbourhoods. 
Another important disadvantage of homeownership is that it reduces labour 
market mobility of households. Green and Hendershott (2001) show evidence that a 
10 percentage point increase in homeownership leads to a 2 percentage point 
increase in unemployment rate. However, Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) find 
that the probability of being unemployed is lower for Dutch homeowners compared 
to renters and they find no negative effect on job mobility. The absence of the 
effect might be due to the population density in the Netherlands, where changing 
jobs is not related to changing residence. 
Moreover, homeownership has an impact on household finances and 
household wealth. To the extent that the dwelling is financed with mortgage debt, 
households are exposed to interest rate risk and negative equity arising when house 
prices decline. The illiquidity of real estate poses another potential negative effect 
of homeownership if households are forced to sell their house on short notice 
against depressed prices.  
Furthermore, ownership requires commitment of a significant amount of 
resources, both in terms of money as well as time, by households to maintain their 
dwelling7. Although, in principle it is in the own interest of households to maintain 
and improve their property for example to raise its value, changes in the personal 
(e.g. aging) or financial (e.g. unemployment) situation might prevent households 
from doing so, thereby destroying equity value. 
                                            
7 Meijer (1993) shows that The average Dutch homeowner spends €1431 a year on technical management, while 
Harding et al. (2007) state that the sizable contribution of maintenance to house price appreciation underscores 
the importance of ensuring that homeowners—and especially low-income homeowners—have sufficient means 
to maintain their homes. 
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2.3 Data description and summary statistics 
 
 To evaluate our research questions empirically, we compiled a dataset that 
contains the complete cross-section of neighbourhoods in Rotterdam for the period 
2000-2008. Data are obtained from the Rotterdam Centre for Research and 
Statistics (COS), the Rotterdam Safety Directorate (SD) the Rotterdam Department 
of Youth, Education and Society (JOS) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS). We 
deleted fifteen neighbourhoods from the analysis because they are located in 
industrial or harbour areas. The resulting sample comprises 78 neighbourhoods in 
13 sub-municipalities.8  Yearly household income data for 2007 were obtained 
from the CBS since these were missing from the COS dataset. Depending on the 
variable, a maximum of 624 neighbourhood-year observations were used. Table 2.1 
shows the variable definitions and measurement units. 
 Our indicators for ownership effects are constructed from various data 
sources. The safety index is based on multiple data records from the Rotterdam 
Police and Fire Department and Roteb, the municipal department responsible for 
waste disposal and maintenance of public spaces. Using data on reported incidents, 
crimes and misdemeanours is only one side of neighbourhood safety, since 
differences in willingness to report among neighbourhoods can lead to understating  
or overstating the actual safety situation (see also Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). 
Therefore the safety data is appended by survey data 9  which measures the 
‘perceived’ safety by neighbourhood residents. In order to further cope with 
(under)reporting issues, neighbourhood context variables are taken into account 
such as the value of the housing stock and reliance on social security by residents. 
The final index score of a neighbourhood is weighted by the size of the 
neighbourhood and the severity of the crime as perceived by residents. The 
resulting index is normalized to a 1-10 scale with 10 indicating the highest safety 
level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
8 The city of Rotterdam is divided into 13 sub-municipalities each with their own council. A comprehensive 
overview of the city-structure is contained in Appendix II Table II.1. 
9  Survey-data often raises selection issues because certain groups of residents might be more willing to 
participate. For confidentiality reasons we were not allowed to analyse the raw survey data and therefore no 
formal tests for selection bias are presented. The COS shares this concern and reports that “specific attention is 
paid to the representativeness of the sample for each neighbourhood with respect to socioeconomic 
characteristics”. 
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Table 2.1 ■ Variable definitions and measurement units 
 
  
The neighbourhood satisfaction measure is constructed in a similar fashion, 
but the resulting scores are the percentage of residents that is satisfied with the 
neighbourhood. The score gives an indication of neighbourhood perception in 
general, thus reflecting factors such as amenities and socioeconomic climate. 
Unfortunately, the data do not contain scores on individual survey questions (see 
footnote 3), which prevents us from carrying out a detailed analysis of satisfaction 
indicators as done by Rossi and Weber (1996). Implicitly, our analysis assumes that 
homeownership is a homogeneous variable. However, when analyzing the real 
market, we observe vast heterogeneity among homeowners and their housing 
careers. For instance, we realize that mortgage behaviour may well vary across 
households. However, our data from the NHG show that the heterogeneity 
regarding mortgage structures amongst new homeowners in the neighbourhoods in 
our sample is relatively limited. The vast majority of the first-time buyers in our 
sample, originated from rental dwellings (social rented sector), and needed to 
borrow the full amount of the sale price from the bank.    
Name Definition
lnown log of % properties that is owner-occupied
lnsocial log of % properties that is social housing
lnsafe log of safetyindex score
lnsatis log of  % satisfaction
lnhhinc log of avg yearly household income in 1000 Euros
citz1217 % of residents aged 12-17
citz1823 % of residents aged 18-23
citz65 % of residents aged 65 or older
immigrant % of residents that has a non-western nationality
overocc % of properties that is over-occupied
singlehh % of single households 
multifam % of properties that belong to a multi-apparment building
prop4room % of properties that feature 4 or more rooms
ten10yr % of residents living in the neighborhood 10 or more years
bltpreWar % of properties built before Second World War
blt194559 % of properties built between 1945 and 1959
blt1960 % of properties built after 1960
welfare % of residents relying on welfare
unemployment % of residents that are unemployed 
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Moreover, feelings of safeness and satisfaction on a neighbourhood level 
may be rather volatile. This may be partly caused by a high turnover rate.10 On first 
hand, this looks high, particularly in the rental sector. However, in Rotterdam and 
elsewhere in the Netherlands, in both sectors still more than 50 per cent of all 
households do live in their dwelling more than 8 years and more than 11 years in 
the same neighbourhood (Woononderzoek 2009). I.e., high turnover rates seem to 
be concentrated in a relative small segment of the housing market (as in certain 
stages of the housing career). Finally, note that it is a-priori not certain whether a 
high turnover rate signals unsafeness and/or discontent with the neighbourhood or 
that a high turnover-rate causes these feelings amongst households.  
 Table 2.1 lists the control variables used in the empirical model.. Ideally, we 
would like to control for education levels as done by Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) 
and DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) but only incomplete and noisy data is available 
for a small sub-period in our sample, thereby greatly reducing the number of 
observations we can use in our estimation. We control for over-occupation of 
dwellings since this is indicative of socioeconomic distress in neighbourhoods. 
Over-occupation is defined by the COS as the number of people that are living in a 
dwelling, adjusted for the size of the dwelling.11 Over-occupation might occur for 
example among low-income households with many children who are not able to 
afford a house of adequate size. Moreover, the municipality of Rotterdam explicitly 
considers over-occupation as a serious hazard to general neighbourhood- and fire 
safety.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
10 As elsewhere, safety and satisfaction of the neighbourhood may also be linked to the ethnicity of new entrants 
in the neighbourhood; however, we do not have adequate information to deal with this subject in our analysis. 
11 More formally a dwelling is over-occupied if 3 persons are living in a 1 room dwelling, 4 persons in a 2 room 
dwelling, 5 or 6 persons in a 3 room dwelling and 7 or more persons in a 4 room dwelling  
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Table 2.2 ■ Descriptive statistics for neighbourhoods in Rotterdam 
Classification of neighbourhoods is based on the sample mean (median) ownership-rate in Panel A (Panel 
B). t-statistics for the equality in means between rental and owner-occupied dominated neighbourhoods are 
reported. Variable definitions are shown in Table 2.1. Significance * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: COS 
 
Panel A: Mean-based Owner-occupied dominated
Mean Median Mean Median t-test Obs
safe 5.95 5.9 7.81 8.2 -12.66*** 589
satisfaction 73.8% 75.0% 83.2% 85.0% -10.67*** 536
hhinc (* K Euro) 21.5 22.0 28.5 28.2 -13.05*** 544
citz1217 6.9% 6.8% 6.1% 6.0% 3.95*** 589
citz1823 9.8% 9.5% 7.5% 6.5% 6.75*** 612
citz65 13.1% 10.9% 15.0% 13.2% -2.96*** 622
immigrant 40.1% 38.0% 15.5% 12.0% 17.47*** 622
overocc 8.4% 8.0% 5.5% 5.0% 8.02*** 622
singlehh 49.3% 47.2% 39.2% 37.0% 9.80*** 621
multifam 54.0% 59.0% 36.0% 28.0% 8.28*** 622
prop4room 37.9% 37.0% 58.4% 61.0% -18.70*** 622
ten10yr 35.3% 35.2% 38.7% 37.8% -3.12*** 622
bltpreWar 37.0% 35.0% 38.0% 38.0% -0.40 615
hsblt194559 14.0% 3.0% 12.0% 7.0% 1.36* 615
blt1960 46.0% 38.0% 49.0% 41.0% -1.35* 615
welfare 8.3% 8.6% 3.0% 2.4% 20.70*** 622
unemployment 8.6% 8.5% 3.8% 3.1% 19.38*** 617
Panel B: Median-based
Mean Median Mean Median t-test Obs
safe 5.79 5.75 7.67 8 -13.20*** 589
satisfaction 72.9% 74.0% 82.5% 84.5% -11.20*** 536
hhinc (* K Euro) 21.1 21.8 27.9 27.4 -13.05*** 544
citz1217 7.0% 7.0% 6.0% 6.1% 5.01*** 589
citz1823 10.0% 9.5% 7.6% 6.5% 7.31*** 612
citz65 12.7% 10.6% 15.0% 13.2% -3.68*** 622
immigrant 42.3% 41.0% 17.3% 14.0% 18.31*** 622
overocc 8.9% 9.0% 5.5% 5.0% 9.71*** 622
singlehh 49.6% 48.0% 40.5% 40.0% 8.90*** 621
multifam 54.0% 59.0% 39.0% 39.0% 6.60*** 622
prop4room 36.9% 36.0% 56.1% 56.0% -17.45*** 622
ten10yr 35.4% 35.1% 38.1% 37.5% -2.46*** 622
bltpreWar 39.0% 40.0% 36.0% 34.0% 1.06 615
hsblt194559 15.0% 3.0% 12.0% 7.0% 1.97** 615
blt1960 43.0% 37.0% 52.0% 47.0% -3.35*** 615
welfare 8.7% 9.1% 3.4% 2.8% 21.95*** 622
unemployment 8.9% 9.0% 4.2% 3.5% 20.08*** 617
Owner-occupied dominated
Rental-dominated
Rental-dominated
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Table 2.2 shows mean and median summary statistics for all variables. The 
sample of neighbourhoods is divided according to the mean (median) ownership 
rate in Rotterdam which is 29 per cent (25 per cent) for the total sample. We 
classify neighbourhoods as rental-dominated when the ownership rate is below the 
mean (median) value and owner-occupier dominated otherwise. The fifth column 
presents t-tests for the difference in means between the two groups. This difference 
is highly significant for most variables with the majority according to expectation. 
Some interesting facts emerge from the statistics. The percentage of multi-family 
(multifam) is significantly higher in the rental-dominated subsample than in the 
owner-occupier subsample. This is due to the fact that 47 per cent of the dwelling 
units in Rotterdam are social (rental) housing and most of these are located in old 
apartment buildings, many of them built in the 50s and 60s. Given this fact, it can 
be seen that neighbourhood safety and satisfaction are significantly lower in the 
rental-dominated sample, consistent with the ‘distance-to-the-street’ hypothesis in 
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000). The presence of social housing also explains the 
significant difference in household income between the two groups and the 
significantly higher unemployment and welfare rates in the rental dominated 
sample. Finally, with respect to mobility, the percentage of households that has 
lived at the same address for ten years or longer (ten10yr) is significantly higher for 
owner-occupier dominated neighbourhoods than rental dominated ones but the 
absolute difference is small with only 3 per cent.  
 
 
2.4 Empirical results 
 
As mentioned before, we use several techniques to examine the impact of 
homeownership on neighbourhood safety and satisfaction. In this section, all 
models take the following general form: 
 
ln(ܱݑݐܿ݋݉݁௜௧) = ߙ +  ߚ ln(݋ݓ݊݁ݎݏℎ݅݌௜௧) +  ߛ(܆௜௧) + ߬௧ + ߤ௜ +  ߝ௜௧   
 ݓ݅ݐℎ ߝ௜௧~ܫܫܦ(0, ߪଶ)                                                                                    (2.1) 
   
Where Outcomeit refers either to the safetyindex or the satisfaction and Xit is 
the vector with explanatory variables contained in Table 2.1. Given the results of 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), we include neighbourhood fixed effects and since 
it is a panel we also introduce time fixed effects to prevent spurious results. In 
addition, we cluster all standard errors by neighbourhood as suggested by Petersen 
(2009), because OLS standard errors become biased when the fixed effect is not 
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constant over time or when there is correlation between the residuals within a 
neighbourhood.  The initial results are presented in Table 2.3.  
Many control variables turn out to be insignificant, but this is due to the 
inclusion of the time dummies. Models 1 to 3 do not include homeownership and 
show relations that are consistent with previous studies. We find support for Galster 
(1987) that residents who are in a later stage in the life-cycle (proxied by citz65) 
tend to be more residentially satisfied. The percentage of immigrants from non-
western countries has a negative and significant impact on the safety level in the 
neighbourhood. This is similar to findings reported in Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999 
and 2000), who find a negative impact of minority groups on crime rates.  
   The size of the dwelling, prop4room, has a positive effect on the level of 
safety, even when controlled for the proportion of apartment buildings (multifam), 
which supports Glaeser and Sacerdote’s hypothesis that crime rates might increase 
when residents are less connected to the street. A substantial portion of the multi-
family buildings in Rotterdam have three-roomed apartments and therefore the 
properties featuring four or more rooms are more likely to be single family houses 
and thus these residents have increased connection to the street 12 . Finally, 
unemployment rates have a significant negative impact on neighbourhood safety 
consistent with the literature on neighbourhood distress (see e.g. Glaeser and 
Sacerdote, 1999). 
   With respect to neighbourhood satisfaction, over-occupation plays a 
significant role as long as neighbourhood safety is not included in the analysis. We 
found no evidence for excessive multicollinearity, and given the results in the other 
models in Table 2.3, it supports the previous argument that over-occupation is a 
safety hazard, which is captured once lnsafe is included in the model. Surprisingly, 
unemployment rates have a positive effect on satisfaction. This seems 
counterintuitive: being unemployed tends to lower life satisfaction (see Duncan and 
Russell, 1998), but apparently it does not necessarily reduce residential satisfaction. 
The favourable labour market13  conditions during our sample period might be 
another reason why unemployment has a positive impact on satisfaction, since it 
was relatively easy to find a job. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to test 
this further.  
                                            
12 Models that include solely multifam or prop4room yield the same results. During reconstruction projects in 
Rotterdam many multi-family buildings with small apartments have been demolished and new multi-family 
buildings with larger apartments have been built, explaining why, in our case, size is significant instead of 
structure type.   
13 During the sample period, the average Dutch unemployment rate was 4.9 percent, which is one of the lowest 
rates among European Union members (Eurostat, 2009). 
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Table 2.3 ■ Fixed effect estimates of ownership rates on external effects indicators 
Dependent variable is the log of safetyindex or satisfaction rate respectively. t-statistics are clustered by 
neighbourhood and reported in brackets. Variable definitions are shown in Table 2.1. Significance *p <0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
lnsafe lnsatis lnsatis lnsafe lnsatis lnsatis lnsafe lnsatis lnsatis
lnown 0.0671* 0.0642* 0.0772*
[1.93] [1.96] [1.95]
lnsocial 0.000 0.085 0.122*
[0.01] [1.43] [1.98]
lnsafe 0.263** 0.248** 0.265**
[2.50] [2.48] [2.47]
lnhhinc -0.192 0.128 0.0815 -0.141 0.164 0.0963 -0.139 0.118 0.0505
[-1.23] [0.85] [0.61] [-0.83] [1.05] [0.72] [-0.73] [0.73] [0.36]
citz65 -1.283 0.458 0.917* -1.651** 0.509 1.107** -1.050 0.545 1.110**
[-1.43] [0.89] [1.96] [-2.31] [0.97] [2.07] [-1.13] [1.07] [2.33]
immigrant -1.402* 0.367 0.479 -1.522* 0.411 0.625 -1.730** 0.337 0.538
[-1.73] [0.66] [0.79] [-1.84] [0.81] [1.08] [-2.09] [0.60] [0.85]
overocc -0.887 -1.213** -0.842 -0.844 -0.921* -0.428 -0.725 -1.183** -0.682
[-1.30] [-2.18] [-1.52] [-1.20] [-1.69] [-0.76] [-1.04] [-2.03] [-1.21]
singlehh -0.156 -0.252* -0.335 -0.325 -0.256 -0.334 -0.374 -0.221 -0.250
[-0.56] [-1.82] [-1.51] [-1.11] [-1.65] [-1.13] [-1.35] [-1.36] [-0.93]
multifam 0.184 0.268 0.0273 0.508 0.295 0.0662 0.854 0.439 0.134
[0.37] [0.51] [0.05] [1.02] [0.51] [0.12] [1.65] [0.82] [0.27]
prop4room 1.770*** 0.453 -0.143 1.326** -0.0182 -0.621 2.251*** 0.675 0.0771
[4.52] [0.96] [-0.29] [2.61] [-0.03] [-0.96] [5.27] [1.22] [0.14]
ten10yr -0.234 0.112 0.150 -0.225 0.268 0.328 -0.248 0.0721 0.120
[-0.91] [0.37] [0.53] [-0.78] [0.83] [1.12] [-0.97] [0.24] [0.44]
bltpreWar -0.200 -0.169 -0.177 -0.0918 -0.137 -0.142 -0.0787 -0.142 -0.156
[-1.00] [-1.41] [-1.62] [-0.50] [-1.05] [-1.22] [-0.48] [-1.18] [-1.39]
blt194559 0.923* 0.334 0.100 0.664 0.219 -0.102 0.811 0.355 0.117
[1.76] [0.45] [0.14] [1.10] [0.25] [-0.12] [1.32] [0.40] [0.14]
blt1960 0.245 0.263 0.302 -0.00859 0.224 0.272 0.159 0.206 0.281
[0.62] [0.94] [1.19] [-0.02] [0.73] [0.95] [0.41] [0.68] [0.95]
welfare -0.577 -0.948 -1.134* -0.248 -0.930 -1.214* -0.802 -1.135* -1.276*
[-0.54] [-1.63] [-1.69] [-0.23] [-1.59] [-1.93] [-0.71] [-1.89] [-1.88]
unemployment -1.854*** 1.122* 1.548*** -1.603** 1.083* 1.500*** -1.384** 1.058* 1.356**
[-2.68] [1.93] [3.03] [-2.25] [1.81] [2.86] [-2.14] [1.84] [2.59]
constant 2.187*** -1.226 -1.213 2.415*** -1.114 -1.070 1.631* -1.285 -1.230
[2.78] [-1.64] [-1.63] [2.73] [-1.44] [-1.39] [1.70] [-1.63] [-1.59]
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 498 444 420 482 433 410 477 431 408
adj. R-sq 0.644 0.432 0.507 0.649 0.458 0.532 0.644 0.436 0.513
neighbourhood 
fixed eff.
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Ownership rates indeed show a positive impact on safety and satisfaction 
levels in the neighbourhood (see models 4-6), but they are only marginally 
significant14. As a matter of counterfactual reasoning, we use social housing rates 
in specifications 7-9 where we would expect social housing to show insignificance 
or a negative sign if external effects can be attributed to homeownership. This is 
observed, except for model 9 which shows that once we control for neighbourhood 
safety levels, social renting becomes marginally positive significant. It is important 
to note that the relation between ownership and neighbourhood satisfaction is 
significantly moderated by the actual safety levels in the neighbourhood. 
 
 
2.4.1 Robustness analysis 
 
     We perform various robustness checks to examine whether the model suffers 
from misspecification, multicollinearity or sensitivity to the way some variables are 
measured. The results of these checks are reported in Table 2.4. The average 
household income is often a strong indicator of the socioeconomic status of the 
neighbourhood. Since it is not significant in any of the specifications presented in 
Table 2.3, we change it to a dummy variable equalling 1 if the average household 
income is below the sample average and 0 otherwise. We also check for multi-
collinearity and sensitivity of the results for welfare and unemployment rates in 
models 4-9. Subsequently, we examine whether the effects of homeownership are 
mere artefacts of tenure length and therefore we exclude our control for tenure 
length ten10yr in models 10-12. Finally, we analyse whether social housing has an 
impact if we use our income dummy instead of the log of household income but the 
results are similar to those in Table 2.3.  
     The main result in Table 2.3 – a marginally positive effect of 
homeownership on safety and satisfaction – is robust to all these alternative 
specifications. Moreover, the income-dummy is significant and shows signs as 
expected. If average income in the -neighbourhood is below the sample average, it 
causes a negative impact on external effects. An interesting result is the consistent 
negative impact of the percentage of single households in the neighbourhood. Van 
Beckhoven and Van Kempen (2003), argue that the neighbourhood plays a limited 
role in the lives of residents, since they engage in many activities outside the 
neighbourhood.  
 
                                            
14 When the year dummies are left out of the specification, lnown becomes highly significant in all models, but 
the results in Table 2.3 are more conservative estimates.  
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Table 2.4 ■ Robustness checks of model specification 
Dependent variable is the log of safetyindex or satisfaction rate respectively. t-statistics are clustered by 
neighbourhood and reported in brackets. Variable definitions are shown in Table 2.1. Significance *p <0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnsafe lnsatis lnsatis lnsafe lnsatis lnsatis lnsafe lnsatis
lnown 0.0700* 0.0564* 0.0608* 0.0709* 0.0593* 0.0634* 0.0714* 0.0594**
[1.83] [1.90] [1.73] [1.82] [1.96] [1.73] [1.89] [2.12]
lnsocial
lnsafe 0.269*** 0.269***
[2.74] [2.70]
income-dummy 0.0464** 0.0263* 0.0310** 0.0460** 0.0215 0.0243 0.0344* 0.0267**
[2.43] [1.80] [2.02] [2.32] [1.52] [1.66] [1.86] [2.09]
citz1217 -0.487 -1.797* -1.889* -0.513 -1.787* -1.970* -0.500 -1.107
[-0.19] [-1.78] [-1.87] [-0.21] [-1.76] [-1.96] [-0.20] [-1.13]
citz1823 2.492 -0.458 -1.653** 2.476 -0.444 -1.722** 2.450 -0.259
[1.26] [-0.76] [-2.12] [1.24] [-0.73] [-2.17] [1.20] [-0.42]
citz65 -0.832 -0.651 -0.217 -0.840 -0.676 -0.278 -0.953 -0.400
[-0.92] [-1.14] [-0.45] [-0.91] [-1.18] [-0.57] [-1.10] [-0.66]
immigrant -1.224 -0.198 0.109 -1.242 -0.296 -0.0311 -1.446* -0.0898
[-1.59] [-0.50] [0.24] [-1.66] [-0.73] [-0.07] [-1.95] [-0.25]
overocc -0.910 -1.031** -0.573 -0.910 -1.091** -0.587 -0.947 -1.059**
[-1.36] [-2.05] [-1.04] [-1.36] [-2.19] [-1.08] [-1.50] [-2.54]
singlehh -0.551*** -0.332** -0.371* -0.551*** -0.379*** -0.372* -0.620*** -0.275**
[-2.96] [-2.60] [-1.84] [-2.98] [-3.24] [-1.77] [-3.40] [-2.37]
multifam 0.207 0.0380 0.0219 0.203 0.0534 0.0207 0.509 0.0462
[0.42] [0.10] [0.06] [0.41] [0.13] [0.06] [1.18] [0.17]
prop4room 1.248* 0.357 -0.0420 1.256* 0.381 -0.00611 1.065* 0.562
[1.67] [0.90] [-0.13] [1.75] [0.93] [-0.02] [1.72] [1.39]
ten10yr -0.190 0.247 0.304 -0.188 0.255 0.315 -0.151 0.190
[-0.74] [1.16] [1.60] [-0.73] [1.20] [1.66] [-0.61] [0.99]
bltpreWar -0.197 -0.260 -0.209 -0.196 -0.248 -0.199 -0.156 -0.238
[-0.87] [-1.58] [-1.48] [-0.86] [-1.44] [-1.31] [-0.80] [-1.46]
blt194559 0.780 0.468 0.247 0.785 0.453 0.260 0.523 0.678
[1.39] [0.82] [0.45] [1.39] [0.78] [0.47] [1.02] [1.15]
blt1960 0.387 0.498** 0.447* 0.389 0.492* 0.449* 0.288 0.472*
[0.82] [2.03] [1.98] [0.82] [1.94] [1.91] [0.69] [1.95]
welfare -0.157 -0.698* -0.924**
[-0.15] [-1.70] [-2.21]
unemployment -1.446** 1.044** 1.235*** -1.450** 1.010** 1.202***
[-2.36] [2.35] [2.86] [-2.37] [2.27] [2.76]
constant 1.954** -0.217 -0.567 1.953*** -0.235 -0.579 1.641** -0.457
[2.65] [-0.53] [-1.34] [2.66] [-0.56] [-1.30] [2.60] [-1.35]
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 538 498 470 538 498 470 543 502
adj. R-sq 0.626 0.449 0.540 0.626 0.447 0.537 0.619 0.430
neighbourhood 
fixed eff.
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Table 2.4 continued
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
lnsatis lnsafe lnsatis lnsatis lnsafe lnsatis lnsatis
lnown 0.0621* 0.0712* 0.0541* 0.0589*
[1.90] [1.89] [1.89] [1.77]
lnsocial 0.0839 0.0614 0.0383
[1.01] [1.34] [0.73]
lnsafe 0.249** 0.264*** 0.286***
[2.57] [2.66] [2.74]
income-dummy 0.0313** 0.0447** 0.0293** 0.0336** 0.0511** 0.0278* 0.0318**
[2.29] [2.30] [2.00] [2.20] [2.47] [1.88] [2.10]
citz1217 -1.400 -1.087 -1.213 -1.000 -1.780 -1.508 -1.754
[-1.44] [-0.46] [-1.00] [-0.84] [-0.89] [-1.27] [-1.36]
citz1823 -1.467* 2.452 -0.377 -1.554** 1.682 -0.949* -1.718**
[-1.90] [1.24] [-0.60] [-2.00] [0.81] [-1.78] [-2.09]
citz65 0.0889 -1.024 -0.457 0.0191 -0.409 -0.463 -0.171
[0.18] [-1.11] [-0.80] [0.04] [-0.48] [-0.85] [-0.43]
immigrant 0.174 -1.223 -0.177 0.109 -1.346* -0.151 0.113
[0.47] [-1.58] [-0.46] [0.25] [-1.83] [-0.30] [0.21]
overocc -0.624 -0.816 -1.142** -0.757 -0.798 -1.231** -0.811
[-1.38] [-1.21] [-2.16] [-1.33] [-1.15] [-2.37] [-1.38]
singlehh -0.261 -0.586*** -0.305** -0.339* -0.490** -0.277** -0.290
[-1.60] [-3.44] [-2.53] [-1.86] [-2.42] [-2.25] [-1.67]
multifam -0.0160 0.265 -0.0531 -0.0795 0.0496 0.0924 -0.0217
[-0.06] [0.55] [-0.14] [-0.23] [0.11] [0.22] [-0.06]
prop4room 0.294 1.165 0.460 0.0895 1.536** 0.722* 0.251
[0.75] [1.60] [1.11] [0.28] [2.14] [1.73] [0.73]
ten10yr 0.226 -0.199 0.0907 0.165
[1.34] [-0.88] [0.41] [0.75]
bltpreWar -0.181 -0.187 -0.277 -0.230 -0.236 -0.253 -0.225
[-1.24] [-0.86] [-1.60] [-1.53] [-1.08] [-1.64] [-1.59]
blt194559 0.569 0.646 0.640 0.459 0.618 0.503 0.376
[0.95] [1.24] [1.12] [0.85] [1.03] [0.87] [0.67]
blt1960 0.409* 0.394 0.498* 0.447* 0.492 0.460* 0.448*
[1.70] [0.84] [1.97] [1.92] [1.05] [1.91] [1.95]
welfare -0.121 -0.730* -0.971** -0.652 -0.978** -1.093**
[-0.11] [-1.77] [-2.37] [-0.59] [-2.52] [-2.46]
unemployment -1.476** 1.049** 1.274*** -1.468** 0.861* 1.112**
[-2.43] [2.33] [2.97] [-2.34] [1.78] [2.44]
constant -0.824** 1.980*** -0.230 -0.585 2.016*** -0.328 -0.751
[-2.23] [2.72] [-0.57] [-1.38] [2.75] [-0.69] [-1.52]
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 474 538 498 470 534 495 467
adj. R-sq 0.513 0.625 0.446 0.535 0.615 0.422 0.517
neighbourhood 
fixed eff.
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Although this might be debatable for certain groups of residents, it offers an 
explanation as to why single households have a negative impact on neighbourhood 
effects. They are less reliant on the direct surroundings of the neighbourhood and 
as such might be less worried about neighbourhood stability and less inclined to 
actively contribute to raise it.   
 
 
2.4.2 Analysis of external effects accounting for endogeneity 
 
Our analysis so far might be driven by endogeneity if explanatory variables are 
omitted from the model, causing results found with OLS-based techniques to be 
biased. Specifying homeownership rates as being endogenous to external effects 
and using instrumental variables is a common strategy, but requires a convincing 
and preferably a strong instrument.  Manturuk et al. (2009) and Green and White 
(1997) use the relative cost of owning versus renting as an instrument for 
homeownership. The underlying rationale for this instrument is that the relative 
cost of owning a home affects the tenure-choice and thus the homeownership rate, 
while it is not related to neighbourhood safety or satisfaction.  
Unfortunately, we do not have data that can reliably proxy for the cost of 
renting and ownership. As an alternative, we follow Hilber’s (2005) approach and 
use a difference-in-differences model and examine whether increases in 
homeownership rate are related to increases in external effects. Given that most 
control variables in our study remain relatively stable over short periods of time 
and that external effects might occur with a delay, we use 3-year differences. This 
specification introduces autocorrelation in the errors, so we cluster them again by 
neighbourhood thereby allowing for serial correlation.  The results are found in 
Table 2.5.  
 The impact of ownership rates on external effects remains similar to that 
presented in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. Again as can be seen in model 3, 
neighbourhood safety is significant mediating the relation. A counterintuitive result 
is the positive sign of bltPrewar in the safety model, but this is probably because 
major restructuring in neighbourhoods (see Kleinhans et al., 2007 for an example) 
lead to a decrease in buildings that were built during or just after the War, thereby 
‘artificially’ increasing the relative amount of Pre-War dwellings (as a percentage 
of the total housing stock). 
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Table 2.5 ■ Difference-in-difference estimates of ownership rates on external effect indicators 
Dependent variable is the third-order difference (Δ = obst - obst-3) of the log of safetyindex or satisfaction 
rate respectively.  t-statistics are clustered by neighbourhood and reported in brackets. Variable definitions 
are shown in Table 2.1. Significance  *p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δlnsafe Δlnsatis Δlnsatis Δlnsafe Δlnsatis Δlnsatis
Δlnown 0.204** 0.180* 0.166*
[2.53] [1.84] [1.88]
Δlnsocial -0.0952 -0.173 -0.001
[-0.69] [-1.32] [-0.01]
Δlnsafe 0.361*** 0.383***
[2.90] [2.84]
Δlnhhinc 0.0640 0.0392 -0.0258 0.0433 0.0737 -0.0250
[0.58] [0.22] [-0.17] [0.35] [0.46] [-0.16]
Δcitz65 0.906 -0.326 -1.252 -1.179 -1.276 -2.444
[0.46] [-0.17] [-0.63] [-0.54] [-0.63] [-1.13]
Δimmigrant 1.118 2.471* 1.635 0.311 1.990* 1.170
[0.67] [1.91] [1.38] [0.17] [1.68] [1.07]
Δoverocc 0.588 0.157 0.765 -0.0324 -0.0276 0.414
[0.80] [0.14] [0.70] [-0.04] [-0.03] [0.39]
Δsinglehh 0.0891 -0.550 -0.440 0.119 -0.629 -0.508
[0.10] [-0.45] [-0.45] [0.13] [-0.46] [-0.49]
Δmultifam 0.0318 0.540 -0.305 0.0130 0.201 -0.655
[0.12] [1.08] [-0.42] [0.05] [0.47] [-1.03]
Δprop4room -0.534 -0.525 -0.425 0.408 -0.330 0.124
[-0.90] [-0.55] [-0.57] [0.45] [-0.34] [0.16]
Δten10yr 0.393 0.644 0.446 0.361 0.619 0.459
[0.99] [1.57] [1.36] [1.20] [1.44] [1.36]
ΔbltpreWar 0.931*** 0.623* 0.319 0.752** 0.419 0.178
[3.23] [1.76] [0.96] [2.40] [1.18] [0.54]
Δblt194559 -1.387 -1.989 -1.044 -0.976 -2.027 -1.040
[-1.28] [-1.46] [-0.79] [-0.81] [-1.45] [-0.80]
Δblt1960 -0.701 0.251 0.386 -0.443 0.597 0.709
[-1.08] [0.31] [0.56] [-0.58] [0.69] [0.96]
Δwelfare -0.479 -1.640*** -1.581*** -0.416 -1.692*** -1.600***
[-1.34] [-3.26] [-3.89] [-1.15] [-3.59] [-4.14]
Δunemployment 0.520 -1.069 -1.629 0.512 -1.122 -1.634
[0.50] [-1.03] [-1.54] [0.52] [-1.09] [-1.62]
constant 0.0295 0.0507 0.0488 0.0179 0.0484 0.0564
[0.58] [0.96] [1.03] [0.33] [0.94] [1.24]
N 269 212 201 270 213 202
adj. R-sq 0.098 0.161 0.334 0.051 0.128 0.308
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As an additional robustness check, we allow for endogeneity via a dynamic 
panel data model and check for autoregressive behaviour. The exact specification 
and execution of this approach is reported in Appendix I. We proceed here with a 
discussion of the results (see Table I.1). The effect of ownership on safety and 
satisfaction remains positively significant and lagged levels of external effects are 
not significant in explaining current levels with the autoregressive coefficient 
ranging from 0.105 (model 7) to 0.385 (model 8). The coefficients of the ownership 
variable are somewhat larger compared to previous analyses. However, the 
economic magnitude of the coefficients remains small: a 10 per cent rise in 
neighbourhood ownership rates increases safety by 1.15 to 1.62 per cent and 
similar results hold for neighbourhood satisfaction.  
 
 
2.4.3 Non-linear effects of homeownership 
 
As mentioned before, Galster et al. (2000) find that neighbourhood distress 
rises at an increasing rate when homeownership falls below 15 per cent, suggesting 
some threshold level before externalities emerge. Engelhardt et al. (2010) argue 
that if expanding homeownership generates externalities, these are likely to arise in 
the lower income and probably renting part of the population since ownership rates 
are already high among middle and upper income households. Moreover, Haurin et 
al. (2003) note that increasing returns to scale are unlikely since this would imply 
that renters and owners would segregate completely, something that is not observed 
in reality.   
Of course this argument assumes perfect market conditions. In the more 
regulated market like the Netherlands and the UK, the dispersion of 
homeownership and rental dwellings on neighbourhood scale is more directed by 
governments and housing associations.  
The ambiguity between the relationship of externalities and homeownership 
cannot be solved merely on theoretical grounds; overall, there is limited empirical 
evidence on the functional form of the relation either. Hence, we need a more 
generalized form of Equation (2.1) to allow for - at least the possibility - of non-
linearity’s in the relationship between externalities and homeownership rate. 
However, given the limitations of our dataset (e.g. a small sample size) we are 
rather restricted in our options to take this into account 
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We estimated several functional forms – controlling for year-effects - by 
including a quadratic polynomial of homeownership rates and quartile dummies. 
Unreported results confirm that external effects are smaller once ownership rates 
are higher, but are insignificant when controlling for year-effects.  
Alternatively, we hypothesize that the externalities to ownership might have 
a functional form that resembles a production externality: 
 
ܻ = ܣܭ௔                     (2.2) 
 
This function is increasing and concave under the following assumptions: A > 
0, K > 0 and 0 < a < 1, where A is a constant, K the ownership rate and Y the 
resulting external effect. Rewriting the equation as a loglinear model leads to (3): 
 
ln(ܻ) =  ln(ܣ) +  ܽ ln(ܭ) +  ߝ   ݓ݅ݐℎ     ߝ~ܫܫܦ(0, ߪଶ )                             (2.3)
  
   Since the relation between Y and K might be driven by omitted variables, 
estimating (2.3) directly would lead to biased estimates for a for the same reasons 
as discussed in the previous section. Therefore, we use a two-stage procedure 
where we start by estimating the model in Equation 2.1 with ownership rate as the 
dependent variable.  In the second stage, we use the fitted values of the ownership 
rate we obtained in the first stage as observations for K and estimate a in Equation 
(2.3) using OLS with neighbourhood fixed effects. Because the ownership rate is 
estimated conditional on all explanatory variables and neighbourhood and time 
effects, it should hold for the fitted values of the ownership-rate it that: 
 
ܧ൛ܭ෡௜௧ߝ௜௧ൟ = 0                       (2.4) 
 
    Table 2.6 shows the estimates of ln(A) and a of Equation 2.3. We estimate 
the models twice. Panel A shows estimations when the logarithmic transformation 
of the original ownership rates is used, yielding results that are subject to omitted 
variables bias. In Panel B, we used the log fitted values of ownership rates 
constructed in the way we discussed.    
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 Table 2.6 ■ Estimation results for diminishing external effects of ownership 
Regression results for the model ln(Y) = ln(A) + a ln(K), where Y is lnsafe or lnsatis. Panel A uses the 
orginal log ownership rates as observations for K. Panel B is estimated using fitted values of a regression 
that explains log ownershiprates from all the other explanatory variables as observations for K. t-statistics 
are clusted by neighbourhood and reported in brackets. Significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
lnsafe lnsatis
Panel A
a 0.313*** 0.106***
[0.0398] [0.0296]
ln(A) 2.329*** -0.108**
[0.0617] [0.0437]
N 567 513
R-squared 0.311 0.125
Number of clusters 72 74
Panel B
a 0.448*** 0.151***
[0.0292] [0.0195]
ln(A) 2.546*** -0,029
[0.047] [0.0305]
N 498 444
R-squared 0.351 0.167
Number of clusters 72 75
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Figure 2.1A ■ Non-linear effects Panel A 
 
The level of external effects as a function of ownership rates for both Panel 
A and Panel B is plotted in Figures 2.1A and 2.1B, respectively. Neighbourhood 
satisfaction, as a percentage, is plotted on the left vertical axis and safety, as a score 
between 1 and 10, is plotted on the right axis. Table 2.6 shows that the coefficient 
for a is almost twice as high for all external effects in Panel B compared to Panel A.  
This implies that panel B predicts a faster increase in the level of external 
effects as ownership rates increase. The estimated function is indeed increasing and 
concave in K since all coefficients a are between 0 and 1 and all A are positive. The 
consequence of the higher estimates for a in Panel B is that the maximum levels of 
safety and satisfaction are reached at 55 per cent and 65 per cent respectively, since 
a further increase in ownership rates only theoretically leads to higher outcomes. If 
estimates in Panel A are considered, increasing ownership rates have an effect even 
if they are in excess of 95 per cent.  
So how do the marginal changes in external effects evolve when 
homeownership is increased? We consider two scenarios. In the first, ownership 
rates increase from 5 per cent to 15 percent. According to Panel A (Panel B) this 
would lead to an increase in safety of 1.7 (2.3) points.  In the second scenario, 
ownership rates go up from 50 per cent to 60 per cent. In this scenario, the same 10 
per cent rise in ownership leads to an increase of 0.5 (0.98) points in safety, 
showing that marginal benefits become smaller once ownership rates become 
higher. A similar result is obtained for neighbourhood satisfaction. 
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Figure 2.1B ■ Non-linear effects Panel B
 
 
    The question which ownership levels are ‘right’ is not the focus of our paper, 
but our results are supportive  of the hypotheses in Engelhardt et al. (2010) and 
Haurin et al. (2003) that incremental changes in external effects of  homeownership 
are largest when current homeownership-rates are low, thus indicating a non-linear 
relation 
 
 
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
 
    In this paper we aim to explain whether homeownership improves 
neighbourhood safety and satisfaction using data from the Netherlands. We 
examine at a neighbourhood level whether external effects of ownership materialize 
in the same way as found by U.S. studies and whether this relation is linear or 
subject to diminishing returns.  
   Using a panel dataset for Rotterdam, we find that homeownership is 
positively related to neighbourhood safety and satisfaction. A negative relation 
between social housing and external effects was not found, suggesting that external 
effects evolve asymmetrically. Moreover, we observe a relation between ownership 
and external effects that is subject to diminishing returns. However, we add two 
cautionary remarks. First, we were not able to control for education, an important 
determinant of an individual’s prospects. However, to the extent that education 
levels are fixed over time we captured it through neighbourhood fixed effects. 
Second, our data did not allow us to create an external instrument such as the 
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relative costs of housing (see Manturuk et al., 2009 and Green and White, 1997) 
limiting the possibilities to control for endogenous selection.  
    Increasing ownership rates that are already high causes fewer external effects.  
Analysis of the marginal homeowner in a neighbourhood could shed more light on 
this issue. In terms of housing market policy, it questions the level of 
homeownership subsidies. Shlay (2006) reports that the effects of homeownership 
might be marginal in neighbourhoods, especially low-income ones. As such, the 
policy question emerges what the ‘feasibility’ range of ownership subsidies is, or 
stated differently, when is direct investment in neighbourhoods more effective than 
(possible) indirect investment through homeownership?  
 Governments around the world are struggling to get public finances back on 
track. The efficiency of subsidising homeownership is currently a relevant topic, 
but with the apparent difficulties in establishing the causal relationship between 
homeownership and external effects the prime question is whether there is a 
defendable rationale for subsidizing homeownership.  
Furthermore, the level of intervention of governments in the housing market 
is up to debate. Should the housing market be left over to market forces, where 
citizens make informed choices, or is a paternalistic role for the government 
appropriate? Although this normative question is not the focus of our paper, it 
offers a potential direction for future research. 
Finally, it is hard to assess to what extent our results can be generalized to 
other markets, given institutional differences between countries. The 
homeownership market in Rotterdam has within the Dutch landscape his own 
peculiarities, but it must be emphasised that the similarities with other cities is quite 
high. Within the Dutch housing market, there is a strong geographical partition of 
homeownership and rental dwellings. In that respect, the stated differences on a 
housing market level between Rotterdam and other submarkets in the Netherlands 
tend to fade away on lower levels, and hence, for our analysis become indifferent. 
Given that the institutional context within the Netherlands is homogeneous, it is 
likely that similar results can be found for other Dutch markets.  
The similarity between our results and those found for other markets, such as 
the U.S. and U.K., strengthens our believe that enhanced neighbourhood safety and 
residential satisfaction as a function of homeownership is universal and therefore 
likely to be observed for other cities and countries as well.  
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2.6 Appendix I Dynamic panel model estimates 
 
 Dynamic panel data models allow for an endogenous relation between 
external effects and ownership rates when exogenous instruments are not available. 
The main idea is to use lagged values of the endogenous variable as instruments for 
this variable. This yields GMM-type  estimators such as in Arellano and Bond, 
(1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In the A&B estimator, valid instruments are 
obtained for ownership rates - provided  εit is not autocorrelated - by using lagged 
levels as instruments for first differences. Since the efficiency of GMM-estimators 
increases if more moment conditions are imposed, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
developed a system estimator, which also includes lagged first differences as 
instruments for levels, thereby obtaining additional moment conditions. The system 
estimator is also less subject to finite sample bias, which arises when T is relatively 
small as in our dataset. We estimate a model with and without autoregressive 
component, using the two-step procedure with the covariance matrix corrected for 
finite sample bias (Windmeijer, 2005). The first four models are similar to 
Equation 2.1, but now we specify ownership rates as being endogenous. Models 5 
through 8 allow for autoregressive behaviour through θ: 
 
ln(ܱݑݐܿ݋݉݁௜௧) = ߙ +  ߠ ln(ܱݑݐܿ݋݉݁௜௧ିଵ)  +  ߚ ln(݋ݓ݊݁ݎݏℎ݅݌௜௧) +  ߛ(܆௜௧) +
 ߬௧ + ߤ௜ + ߝ௜௧  ݓ݅ݐℎ   ߝ௜௧~ܫܫܦ(0, ߪଶ)                                                         (2.5) 
 
 The results for both estimators are reported in Table I.1, and include 
diagnostic tests. One expects first-order serial correlation and no second-order 
correlation in the disturbances (Baltagi, 2008). According to Table I.1, only models 
5 and 7 fail to reject the AR(1) test for first-order autocorrelation in the 
disturbances. All models fail to reject the AR(2) and Hansen test for 
overidentifying restrictions. Since too many moment conditions can bias the 
estimator, we restrict the number of instruments used in the estimation. For the 
B&B estimator we also report the difference-in-Hansen test for the exogeneity of 
instruments, with the null being that the instruments are exogenous.   
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2.7 Appendix II Overview municipal structure of 
Rotterdam 
 
Table II.1 ■ Sub-municipalities of Rotterdam and their neighbourhoods 
Neighbourhoods excluded from the analysis are not reported. 
 
Sub-municipality Neighbourhood Sub-municipality Neighbourhood
Charlois Carnisse Ijsselmonde (c'td) Lombardijen
Heijplaat OudIJsselmonde
OudCharlois Kralingen-Crooswijk De Esch
Pendrecht KralingenOost
Tarwewijk KralingenWest
Wielewaal KralingseBos
Zuiderpark NieuwCrooswijk
Zuidplein OudCrooswijk
Zuidwijk Rubroek
Delfshaven Bospolder Struisenburg
Delfshaven Noord Agniesebuurt
Middelland Bergpolder
Nieuwe Westen Blijdorp
NieuwMathenesse Blijdorpse Polder
OudMathenesse Liskwartier
Schiemond Oude Noorden
Spangen Provenierswijk
Tussendijken Overschie Kleinpolder
Witte Dorp Landzicht
Feijenoord Afrikaanderwijk NoordKethel
Bloemhof Overschie
Feijenoord Schieveen
Hillesluis Spaanse Polder
Katendrecht Zestienhoven
Kop van Zuid Pernis Pernis
Kop van ZuidEntr Prins Alexander Het Lage Land
Noordereiland Kralingseveer
Vreewijk Nesselande
Hillegersberg-SchiebroHillegersbergNoord Ommoord
HillegersbergZuid Oosterflank
Molenlaankwartier Prinsenland
Schiebroek sGravenland
Terbregge Zevenkamp
Hoek van Holland Dorp Stadscentrum C.S. Kwartier
Strand en Duin Cool
Hoogvliet HoogvlietNoord Dijkzigt
HoogvlietZuid Nieuwe Werk
IJsselmonde Beverwaard Oude Westen
GrootIJsselmonde Stadsdriehoek
  
 
  
 
 
Chapter 3                                         
Financial Literacy, Risk Aversion and 
Choice of Mortgage type by Households15  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
For many households, a house is the most valuable asset in their wealth 
portfolio (Campbell, 2006); a substantial number of households need to finance at 
least part of a house purchase with mortgage debt. Mortgage markets have changed 
greatly over the last few decades, with an increasing number of products available 
in addition to extensive customization possibilities (Gerardi et al., 2010b). Driving 
forces behind the innovation of new mortgages were market deregulation, 
securitization, and increased competition.  
However, the increased menu of mortgage designs complicates the choice 
process that households face. Although there is an extensive literature on household 
mortgage choice, a growing body of research indicates that households have only a 
very limited understanding of basic economic principles (Van Rooij et al., 2011; 
Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a+b; Lee and Hogarth, 1999). Such low levels of 
financial literacy impede a rational decision process due to limited understanding of 
the risks and features of financial products.  
The impact of financial literacy on household decision making is 
documented for stock market participation (Van Rooij et al., 2011; Grinblatt et al., 
2011a; Guiso and Japelli, 2005), portfolio diversification and trading behavior 
(Grinblatt et al., 2011b; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008), and retirement planning 
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a); however, evidence on mortgage choice is limited 
(see Coulibaly and Li, 2009; Moore, 2003). This is surprising since the number of 
                                            
15 This chapter is based on a working paper by Cox, Brounen and Neuteboom (2012, under review). We thank 
Dion Bongaerts, Eric Duca, Andra Ghent, Melissa Porras Prado, Avichai Snir, Manuel Vasconcelos, Vincent 
Yao and seminar participants at the Rotterdam School of Management, the AREUEA Mid-Year Meeting 2011, 
the Understanding Society Meeting 2011 and the 3rd ReCAPNet Conference for valuable comments.  
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households with a mortgage is twice the number that participate in the stock market. 
Moreover, the rise of mortgage products that defer amortization—so-called 
alternative mortgage products (AMPs) (Cocco, 2011; LaCour-Little and Yang, 
2010; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011)—has been a growing concern to 
governments and regulators (see Authority of Financial Markets, 2008; Federal 
Reserve Board, 2007; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006). These 
concerns are fueled by the observation that these products have increasingly been 
offered to less sophisticated and less wealthy borrowers, who may not be well-
informed about the risks inherent in these products. 
This paper examines how financial literacy affects the choice of mortgage-
type in Dutch households. The Dutch market offers a recourse debt setting and the 
advantage of homogeneity in mortgage supply (De Haan and Sterken, 2011), and 
underwriting standards. 16 Analysis of an extensive Dutch panel dataset shows that 
higher levels of reported financial sophistication, measured as self-assessed 
financial knowledge and participation in financial markets, increase the probability 
that households choose AMPs, while more risk-averse households opt for 
traditional contracts, as is consistent with LaCour-Little and Yang (2010). This 
indicates that, in the Netherlands, AMP’s  have not systematically been offered to 
those households that are less financially literate. Further analyses show that the 
results are robust to controlling for financial advice, the effect of peers, or 
experience through prior homeownership. Involving professional advisors does 
increase the probability of choosing mortgages that defer amortization, while the 
opposite effect is found when family members or acquaintances are consulted 
instead. Whether the effect of financial advisors is good or bad is difficult to assess 
as maximizing tax-benefits of interest-rate deductibility can explain the observed 
pattern. 
This paper contributes to several literature streams. Its extension of the 
literature on financial literacy and its impact on decision making into the mortgage 
market explicitly accounts for the rising popularity of AMPs. Since mortgages 
constitute a substantial liability on a households’ balance sheet, a better 
understanding of the decision processes common to those mortgages provides 
insights into how households’ wealth portfolios are constructed, as well as 
permitting analysis of the portfolio in the life-cycle setting (e.g., Van Hemert, 2010; 
Cocco et al., 2005; Cocco, 2005; Campbell and Cocco, 2003). The present paper 
also contributes to the literature on financial advice by documenting how the 
involvement of different advisors alters households’ mortgage decisions (Collins, 
                                            
16 Recourse debt holds households for complete repayment of their mortgage in case a foreclosure occurs and 
proceeds fall short of the outstanding balance. 
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2010; Elmerick et al., 2002). This is in contrast to work by Mullainathan et al. 
(2010), Hackethal et al. (2012), and Schum and Faig (2006), who examined 
investment advice.  
Finally, the results provide input for regulatory authorities and educational 
programs, as well as banks and financial advisors. A goal of regulatory authorities 
is to prevent households from buying unsuitable financial products; increased 
financial education can address this by creating a greater awareness among 
households of basic financial concepts. Moreover, financial institutions and 
financial advisors need to be aware of the role and responsibility they have in 
consumer credit markets, including clear description of a product’s features, as 
especially less literate households rely on public sources of information instead of 
professional advice. Unclear presentation of the risks and benefits of financial 
products might be especially harmful to them. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the 
literature on mortgage choice, financial literacy and risk aversion. . Section 3.3 
discusses the dataset, while Section 3.4 through Section 3.7 contain the empirical 
analysis and robustness checks. Section 3.8 presents some conclusions. 
 
 
3.2 Literature review 
 
3.2.1 Mortgage choice 
 
An extensive literature on mortgage choice has emerged the past three 
decades. Most studies have focused on households’ choice between fixed-rate 
mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) as these are the main 
mortgage products in the U.S. (Campbell, 2006). Brueckner and Follain (1988) 
showed that the interest rate differential between ARM and FRM mortgages and 
the level of the FRM rate is an important determinant of mortgage choice. 
Borrowers with shorter expected tenure also tended to prefer ARMs, in order to 
take advantage of lower initial teaser rates (Stanton and Wallace, 1999; Coulibaly 
and Li, 2009). Besides mobility expectations and the ARM–FRM spread, papers 
have also examined the effect of mortgage contract features such as the choice of  
points at origination17 (Chang and Yavas, 2009; Stanton and Wallace, 1998; Kau 
and Keenan, 1987), the rate of the contract (see for example Duca and Rosenthal, 
                                            
17 Discount points are a origination cost and are the percentage discount between the mortgage amount agreed on 
and the amount actually received e.g. a one point discount means repaying a 100.000 dollar mortgage while 
receiving only 99.000 dollar at origination. 
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1994), and the intervals at which ARM rates are adjusted (Sa-Aadu and Sirmans, 
1995; Cunningham and Capone, 1990) on mortgage choice. More recently, Koijen, 
Van Hemert, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) examined the influence of bond risk 
premia on mortgage choice,  finding that these premia are a more accurate predictor 
of mortgage choice than, for example, yield spreads. Other papers have related the 
choice explicitly to borrower characteristics, such as the riskiness, in terms of 
FICO-scores and employment status, of the household (Harrison et al., 2004) or the 
choice for reverse mortgages by elderly homeowners (Fratantoni, 1999).  
 Besides the influence of mortgage characteristics on mortgage choice, recent 
studies have examined households’ optimal mortgage decisions in the context of a 
life-cycle model. Campbell and Cocco (2003), for example, showed that 
households with a risky income, as well as those that are risk-averse, are less 
attracted to an ARM contract since monthly payments are sensitive to changes in 
the interest rate. Van Hemert (2010) examined the interest rate risk for households 
and—using a life-cycle setting—found that, in most cases, the ARM is the 
preferred contract, except for older, less-mobile, and risk-averse borrowers who 
hold FRM debt.18 His findings corroborated those of Campbell and Cocco (2003).  
 The literature on AMPs is only starting to emerge. Alternative mortgage 
products increase the accessibility of homeownership for households by optimizing 
the tax-advantages on interest payments and deferral of amortization charges, 
thereby effectively lowering monthly payments. LaCour-Little and Yang (2010) 
documented that households with a larger tolerance for risk tend to choose non-
amortizing contracts. Moreover, they documented that low-income and borrowing-
constrained households have increasingly turned to these types of contracts. Non-
amortizing contracts entail a larger equity-driven default risk since no principal 
repayments are made. Speculators and aggressive borrowers are attracted to these 
products to reap the benefits of rising house prices. Cocco (2011) used the British 
mortgage market as his laboratory, relying on the life-cycle consumption 
smoothing hypothesis, and concluding that financially constrained households that 
expect their future resources to be higher tend to choose products with deferred 
amortization. This decreases current mortgage payments and, as such, helps smooth 
their current consumption. However, it is questionable to what extent households 
actually understand the features of these new mortgage types including the risks 
that come with them (Authority of Financial Markets, 2008).  
 
                                            
18 The intuition behind this result is that the interest-rates on FRM contracts incorporate a term premium and are 
therefore less appealing to households who are currently borrowing-constrained or are more likely to move in the 
near future. Since they are generally younger, they are expected to choose ARM mortgages ceteris paribus, to 
take advantage of the lower initial interest rate. 
 Financial Literacy, Risk Aversion, and Choice of Mortgage Type by Households 43 
3.2.2 Financial literacy and risk aversion 
 
The literature on financial literacy and its impact on decision making is 
developing rapidly. Studies by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b; 2008) showed that 
financial illiteracy is widespread among households and is not confined to certain 
groups or countries. Financial literacy measurement is not straightforward as it can 
involve a combination of interests, awareness (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005), cognitive 
ability, risk aversion (Dohmen et al., 2010), cultural values, and advice by peers, 
parents, neighbors or professionals (Hackethal et al., 2012; Shum and Faig, 2006; 
Elmerick et al., 2002). Although the psychometric measurements and determinants 
of financial literacy is not the focus of this paper, we do briefly examine the 
indicators that have appeared in other empirical work. 
Van Rooij et al. (2011) devised an extensive module of survey questions that 
measure the understanding of economic concepts like compound interest and 
inflation. They showed that even a very basic understanding of economics is 
limited among households and that low literacy levels deter stock market 
participation. Grinblatt et al. (2010a) reported similar results for stock market 
participation, using IQ as an indicator for cognitive ability and reported as well in a 
related paper that affluent individuals earn larger risk-adjusted returns (Grinblatt et 
al., 2010b). Households that are more sophisticated—that is wealthier, and higher-
educated—are also less prone to investment mistakes, such as underdiversification 
and disposition bias (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008; Calvet et al., 2009). 
Dohmen et al. (2010) examined the impact of cognitive abilities on risk 
aversion. Individuals with lower cognitive test scores are less likely to choose for 
lottery-type payoffs, indicating higher risk aversion. Their results held after 
controlling for educational attainment and income. Individuals with lower cognitive 
abilities were found to be less patient and might therefore take less time to 
understand contract designs. Moreover, risk aversion is found to decrease with 
increases in wealth (see Morin and Suarez, 1983). Morin and Suarez also examined 
the impact of life-cycle effects and documented that risk aversion increases 
uniformly with age.  
Consistent with studies on stock market participation and investment 
behavior, empirical research in mortgage markets has shown that the degree of 
literacy matters in households’ decision-making process. Although the mortgage 
market is quite complex and not perfectly transparent (see Woodward and Hall, 
2010), the popularity of AMPs is widespread and not confined to more literate 
households (Gerardi et al., 2010a). Empirical work so far has mostly dealt with the 
mechanics of refinancing and interest rates, rather than choice of product type. 
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Miles (2004), for example, found that mortgage borrowers have limited 
understanding of interest rate risk and the potential savings arising from refinancing. 
Donker and Van Soest (1999), using survey data, showed that households who 
report to have a higher interest in financial matters take out smaller mortgages on 
their house, while Moore (2003) reported that households with lower financial 
literacy are more likely to hold a high-interest mortgage. Gerardi et al. (2010b) 
examined the role of financial illiteracy on subprime mortgage delinquency. Using 
numerical ability as an indicator for literacy, analysis showed that foreclosure rates 
are approximately two-thirds lower for groups with the highest numerical ability. 
This matches work by Bucks and Pence (2006), who showed that low-income and 
low-educated households tend to underestimate how much interest rates can change, 
which consequently can trigger default. The impact of literacy on mortgage-type 
choice has not been examined so far except for some indirect measures in LaCour-
Little and Yang (2010) and Coulibaly and Li (2009). 
 
 
3.3 Data description 
 
 The data used in this paper are obtained from the DNB Household Survey 
(DHS), a panel dataset comparable to the panel survey of income dynamics (PSID) 
in the U.S. It has been administered by Centerdata among 2,000 Dutch households 
annually since 1993 and contains a wide variety of information on income, work, 
psychological- and wealth-related issues. This paper uses all waves throughout 
from 1994 up to 2009.  
 Administration of the survey takes place via the internet and, in earlier waves, 
through a Netbox providing internet via the television. Participants are recruited by 
phone and based on random selection. Households that do not have an internet 
connection or personal computer are provided one by Centerdata. Moreover, 
participants receive no financial compensation for participation in the household 
survey.  
The survey does not require intervention of an interviewer 19 and panel 
members can fill out the questionnaires at a time that is convenient for them. 
Moreover, since the entire survey is administered at the panel member’s residence, 
the probability of reporting errors is reduced because the member can directly look 
up their annual and bank balance statements. Finally, internet surveys are less 
                                            
19 See for a more elaborate discussion Schober and Conrad (1997). 
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prone to reporting biases than surveys administered via telephone (Chang and 
Krosnick, 2003).  
As responses on household-level issues might be completed by another 
member of the household, the household head is defined as the member that has the 
highest income. This has the advantage that his or her views are likely to have 
greater weight with respect to the financial consequences of decision making. For 
example, the implications of unemployment are largest for the household member 
with the highest income and their risk aversion might influence subsequent 
financial decisions of the household as a whole. 
 Inherent in all consumer surveys is measurement error. To alleviate biases 
due to response errors, we follow (Cocco, 2011) and winsorize all continuous 
variables at 10 percent of their distribution, while obvious response errors (e.g., if 
amounts were asked in thousands of euros and were not reported as such) were 
corrected in the dataset to the extent that they could be logically inferred from the 
other responses of the panel member. Moreover, the introduction of the euro in 
2003 requires us to convert all amounts reported before 2003 to euros.  
This paper analyzes how risk aversion and financial literacy matter in the 
households’ decision of mortgage-type. To rule out variations in unobserved effects, 
we only include observations when the origination year of the mortgage coincides 
with the survey year to counteract endogeneity. E.g. the learning effect from the 
mortgage choice is likely to influence subsequent self-assessments of financial 
knowledge, particularly when the decision and self-assessment are further apart. 
Although this condition reduces the sample substantially, it ensures that the impact 
of distorting factors is minimized. Moreover, questioning respondents ex-post on 
their literacy and risk aversion levels is likely to include learning and experience 
effects, especially when the transaction took place several years ago. In a number 
of cases, it is also impossible, as households have left the panel. Imposing this 
condition yields a sample of 777 mortgage observations.  
Since a large number of different mortgage contracts are available, they are 
sorted into three categories based on the repayment schedule. The three categories 
are traditional amortizing contracts, deferred amortization mortgages and interest-
only mortgages. Our sample includes 292 amortizing mortgages, 137 deferred 
amortization mortgages and 348 interest-only mortgages. Section 3.9 Appendix I 
offers a detailed discussion of the differences between the contracts and the 
evolution of interest and amortization payments over the mortgage term.  
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Table 3.1 ■ Summary statistics 
This table shows weighted mean and median values for control variables by mortgage type. The definition 
of mortgage categories can be found in Table I.1. Data is from the DNB Household Survey and cover 
mortgages originated between 1994-2009.   
 
 
Summary statistics reported in Table 3.1 show that interest-only mortgages 
tend to be chosen by older households and those smaller in size (implying grown 
children). Moreover, deferred amortization contracts are associated both with more 
expensive houses as well as with higher levels of mortgage debt.  A closer look at 
the dummy variables reveals that only 14.2 percent of first-time homebuyers 
(starters) have an interest-only mortgage, while 32.5 percent of them have a 
traditional contract.  This is in line with the idea that older and wealthier are less 
constrained in making a down payment because they have built up assets and 
home-equity during their life. As such they can be expected to be more likely to 
obtain an interest-only mortgage. 
Our measure of wealth is defined analogously to Van Rooij et al. (2011) and 
Morin and Suarez (1983) as the sum of checking and savings accounts, employer-
sponsored savings plans, the value of life insurance, home equity, other real estate, 
and the value of holdings in financial assets minus total debt and is measured using 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median N
Age 39.72 37.00 38.63 37.00 50.54 51.00 44.44 42.00 774
Household size 2.93 3.00 3.17 3.00 2.62 2.00 2.83 2.00 774
Log household income 10.49 10.61 10.48 10.55 10.51 10.60 10.50 10.60 774
Log house value 4.63 4.60 4.89 4.94 4.78 4.84 4.74 4.77 774
Log mortgage debt 4.68 4.70 5.07 5.09 4.69 4.69 4.76 4.79 774
Frequencies of dummy variables
Starter 189
Wealth quartiles
First wealth quartile 338
Second wealth quartile 85
Third wealth quartile 186
Fourth wealth quartile 165
Selfemployed 10
Retired 75
Higher vocational 204
University 104
Male 696
Married 630
1.69%
24.31%
23.56%
10.96%
41.18%
23.75%
29.64%
23.36%
9.53%
37.46%
14.18%
18.98%
14.79%
41.02%
84.60%
91.94%
15.55%
27.32%
10.11%
26.18%
29.97%
81.54%
89.91%
20.31%
26.20%
19.49%
2.59%
13.41%
25.71%
1.96%
0.57%
17.18%
Interest-onlyDeferred amortizationAmortizing Total
84.88%
92.09%
10.74%
45.89%
32.47%
91.38%
96.53%
8.13%
33.02%
2.95%
1.62%
25.21%
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quartile-dummies.20   Households with interest-only mortgages are concentrated in 
the third and fourth wealth quartile in contrast to those with an amortizing contract 
which are more likely to be in the first and second quartile. Other controls reveal 
that households with interest-only contracts are more likely to be retired, or self-
employed, consistent with the observed difference in age. Finally, households with 
a deferred amortization or interest-only product are more likely to be highly 
educated (higher vocational or university).  
 
 
3.4 Analysis of mortgage choice 
 
 This section reports multivariate analysis of mortgage choice by households. 
We first estimate a basic multinomial model and then expand it with indicators for 
risk aversion, financial literacy, and financial advice. We follow the same 
methodology as Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995) and Cocco (2011). Households can 
choose between three alternative mortgage products: amortizing mortgages (j = 1), 
deferred amortization mortgages (j = 2) and interest-only mortgages (j = 3). 
Households’ i choice for a certain mortgage contract j can be viewed as one that the 
maximizes the utility function, where each alternative gives a utility of ௜ܷ௝ for i = 
1,2,….N  and j = 1, 2 or 3. A general function for the utility level can be defined as: 
    
 ௜ܷ௝ =  ߙ௝ + ߚ௝܆௜௝ + ߝ௜௝                                                                                (3.1) 
 
where Xij is a vector of control variables. If the error terms εij have a Weibull-
distribution, then the probability that household i chooses mortgage type j is given 
by: 
 
 ܲ(ݕ௜ = ݆) = ୣ୶୮ (ఈೕାఉೕ܆೔ೕ)∑ ୣ୶୮ (ఈೕାఉೕ܆೔ೕ)యೕసభ                                                                       (3.2) 
 
The vector Xij  contains control variables for household demographics (age, marital 
status, gender level of education, income and household size), labor market 
position (self-employed or retired), and mortgage terms (interest rate and a fixed 
rate period dummy). Additional controls for house value and amount of mortgage 
debt are also included alongside dummy variables for household wealth. In order to 
                                            
20 The number of observations per quartile is not equal to 25 percent of the total because household wealth and 
the corresponding quartile are computed year by year allowing for the possibility of transition to another wealth 
quartile.  
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control for time trends- and supply effects, year-dummies are included in the 
specifications. All models are estimated by maximum likelihood and the 
households are weighted to ensure that the statistics are representative for the Dutch 
population. Reported are Hubert-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
 
 
3.5 Mortgage choice: the base model 
 
Base results are reported in Table 3.2, which include house value in Panel A 
and the amount of mortgage debt in Panel B as a proxy for size. The results indicate 
that deferred amortization mortgage products are used to buy more expensive 
houses and, that those mortgages are on average larger, in line with the descriptive 
statistics.  
We examine how our results change by including various sets of explanatory 
variables, such as mortgage terms, year effects and wealth quartiles.  
Mortgage choice seems to be explained primarily by the age of the 
household head, with older households having a higher probability of choosing an 
interest-only mortgage, and household size, which decreases the probability of an 
interest-only contract. This reflects the capability of households to meet the 
underwriting criteria associated with interest-only mortgages. Typically, banks cap 
the loan to 75 percent of house value, thereby requiring households to make a down 
payment. Naturally, older households who are supposedly wealthier due to equity 
built up in their previous house are better able to meet these underwriting criteria. 
In unreported analysis, we examined differences in loan-to-value ratios, which 
indeed show that these are lower for households with interest-only mortgages. 
University-educated households have a lower chance of having a deferred 
amortization contract, in line with results reported by Cocco (2011). Probably these 
households are aware of the additional costs associated with life-annuity contracts 
and endowment funds, and therefore are less likely to choose this product type.  
Moreover, the choice of a contract is not significantly related to whether a 
household is new to the ownership market, since the inclusion of starter does not 
change our results. Because many of our control variables are insignificant, we 
examine whether collinearity problems are causing insignificance, though our 
explanatory variables are only moderately correlated. An F-test on multiple 
restrictions indicates that the demographic controls are jointly highly significant in 
all specifications while wealth controls are jointly insignificant.  
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Table 3.2 ■ Mortgage choice base model estimations 
This table shows weighted multinomial logit regression results for mortgage choice of households.  
Included are all mortgages originated between 1994 and 2009 with amortizing mortgages being the 
reference category (see Table I.1). Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets.  ***,**,* denotes significant 
at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Data is from the DNB Household Survey. 
 
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Log house value 0.784*** 0.614*** 0.399* 0.346* 0.397* 0.368*
[4.25] [3.81] [1.80] [1.81] [1.76] [1.92]
Starter 0.071 -0.316
[0.23] [-1.16]
Second wealth quartile
Third wealth quartile
Fourth wealth quartile
Log household income -0.103 -0.186 0.439 -0.004 0.438 -0.01
[-0.40] [-0.87] [1.43] [-0.02] [1.42] [-0.07]
Age -0.007 0.077*** -0.001 0.088*** -0.000 0.084***
[-0.61] [7.18] [-0.09] [7.46] [-0.02] [6.69]
Self-employed 0.718 1.332 0.597 1.244 0.596 1.248
[0.58] [1.06] [0.48] [1.02] [0.48] [1.02]
Retired 0.806 0.925* 0.658 0.658 0.659 0.678
[1.00] [1.82] [0.68] [1.16] [0.69] [1.20]
Higher vocational 0.127 -0.022 0.119 0.174 0.114 0.168
[0.49] [-0.10] [0.42] [0.69] [0.40] [0.67]
University -0.867* 0.176 -0.963** 0.260 -0.967** 0.272
[-1.92] [0.62] [-1.99] [0.87] [-2.00] [0.91]
Male 0.296 -0.494 0.513 -0.379 0.504 -0.382
[0.46] [-1.11] [0.66] [-0.84] [0.65] [-0.84]
Married 0.160 -0.056 0.331 0.159 0.328 0.136
[0.34] [-0.15] [0.65] [0.40] [0.65] [0.34]
Household size 0.074 -0.070 0.015 -0.141 0.022 -0.156*
[0.77] [-0.84] [0.15] [-1.56] [0.23] [-1.71]
Constant -3.578 -3.544 -8.363** -4.488* -8.426** -4.109*
[-1.30] [-1.62] [-2.46] [-1.84] [-2.46] [-1.66]
Mortgage terms
Year fixed effects
Joint significance 
demographics  (p-value)
Joint significance wealth 
controls (p-value)
No of Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log-Likelihood -613.5
757
Panel A Model with house value
YesYes
0.221
(1) (2) (3)
0.222
No
Independent Variables
757
NoNo No
-680.7
0.137
757
-614.6
0.0000.0000.000
---
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Table 3.2 Panel A continued
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Log house value 0.384* 0.350* 0.319 0.359* 0.286 0.390*
[1.71] [1.83] [1.35] [1.70] [1.18] [1.84]
Starter 0.134 -0.293
[0.40] [-1.01]
Second wealth quartile 0.752* 0.268 0.564 0.226
[1.81] [0.75] [1.30] [0.61]
Third wealth quartile -0.295 0.101 -0.560 0.003
[-0.93] [0.39] [-1.58] [0.01]
Fourth wealth quartile 0.259 0.200 -0.006 0.189
[0.79] [0.71] [-0.02] [0.61]
Log household income 0.473 -0.014 0.283 -0.272 0.326 -0.295
[1.52] [-0.06] [0.78] [-1.05] [0.88] [-1.13]
Age -0.002 0.087*** 0.001 0.092*** 0.004 0.088***
[-0.16] [7.34] [0.08] [7.16] [0.24] [6.42]
Self-employed 0.448 1.160 0.481 1.007 0.351 0.934
[0.39] [0.97] [0.38] [0.78] [0.29] [0.73]
Retired 0.682 0.671 0.860 0.375 0.855 0.381
[0.71] [1.17] [0.98] [0.62] [0.96] [0.63]
Higher vocational 0.132 0.179 0.211 0.135 0.234 0.124
[0.46] [0.71] [0.70] [0.50] [0.76] [0.46]
University -1.048** 0.254 -0.824 0.257 -0.925* 0.235
[-2.12] [0.84] [-1.50] [0.79] [-1.67] [0.71]
Male 0.429 -0.390 0.410 -0.340 0.319 -0.341
[0.56] [-0.87] [0.52] [-0.72] [0.41] [-0.73]
Married 0.360 0.152 0.374 0.179 0.441 0.154
[0.69] [0.39] [0.67] [0.43] [0.75] [0.37]
Household size 0.005 -0.137 -0.035 -0.227** -0.046 -0.241**
[0.06] [-1.50] [-0.34] [-2.28] [-0.43] [-2.41]
Constant -8.479** -4.430* -5.433 0.115 -5.563 0.402
[-2.47] [-1.80] [-1.30] [0.04] [-1.29] [0.14]
Mortgage terms
Year fixed effects
Joint significance 
demographics  (p-value)
Joint significance wealth 
controls (p-value)
No of Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log-Likelihood
Independent Variables
(4) (5) (6)
-523.2-528.0-610.7
757 660660
0.2310.2240.226
Yes Yes Yes
No YesYes
0.0000.0000.000
0.3350.330 -
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Table 3.2 continued
Panel B Model with mortgage debt
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Log mortgage debt 1.278*** 0.613*** 0.813** 0.016 0.807** 0.045
[4.52] [2.94] [2.36] [0.07] [2.33] [0.20]
Starter 0.0840 -0.541
[0.23] [-1.64]
Second wealth quartile
Third wealth quartile
Fourth wealth quartile
Log household income -0.695* -0.750** -0.349 -0.375 -0.345 -0.408
[-1.88] [-2.55] [-0.82] [-1.21] [-0.80] [-1.30]
Age 0.005 0.079*** 0.002 0.083*** 0.003 0.076***
[0.30] [5.67] [0.12] [5.74] [0.15] [4.98]
Self-employed 0.350 0.718 0.405 1.069 0.353 1.054
[0.33] [0.64] [0.41] [1.00] [0.36] [0.99]
Retired 0.849 1.044 0.828 0.640 0.812 0.669
[0.86] [1.60] [0.80] [0.91] [0.78] [0.98]
Higher vocational 0.115 -0.186 0.239 -0.002 0.230 -0.001
[0.35] [-0.62] [0.69] [-0.01] [0.67] [-0.01]
University -1.379*** -0.015 -1.200** 0.101 -1.213** 0.139
[-2.65] [-0.05] [-2.12] [0.28] [-2.15] [0.39]
Male 0.652 -0.101 0.761 -0.009 0.738 -0.029
[0.93] [-0.24] [0.94] [-0.02] [0.89] [-0.06]
Married 0.101 0.161 0.327 0.348 0.331 0.318
[0.19] [0.41] [0.57] [0.83] [0.57] [0.74]
Household size 0.089 -0.173 0.017 -0.269** 0.027 -0.300**
[0.82] [-1.61] [0.14] [-2.34] [0.23] [-2.55]
Constant -0.370 2.377 -2.306 -1.616 -2.421 -0.767
[-0.10] [0.81] [-0.55] [-0.51] [-0.57] [-0.24]
Mortgage terms
Year fixed effects
Joint significance 
demographics  (p-value)
Joint significance wealth 
controls (p-value)
No of Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log-Likelihood
(3)(1) (2)
Independent Variables
-392.2
0.244
503
-437.0
0.158
503
-390.1
0.248
503
No Yes Yes
No No No
---
0.0000.0000.000
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Table 3.2 Panel B continued
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Deferred 
amor
Interest-
only
Log mortgage debt 0.805** 0.018 0.775* -0.114 0.773* -0.084
[2.29] [0.09] [1.95] [-0.40] [1.91] [-0.29]
Starter 0.102 -0.330
[0.26] [-0.96]
Second wealth quartile 0.277 0.095 0.285 0.223
[0.49] [0.21] [0.50] [0.49]
Third wealth quartile -0.289 -0.069 -0.332 -0.044
[-0.76] [-0.21] [-0.79] [-0.13]
Fourth wealth quartile 0.036 0.131 0.046 0.120
[0.09] [0.38] [0.10] [0.33]
Log household income -0.307 -0.375 -0.495 -0.359 -0.455 -0.369
[-0.72] [-1.20] [-1.10] [-1.07] [-1.00] [-1.09]
Age 0.000 0.089*** 0.008 0.080*** 0.008 0.076***
[0.03] [5.68] [0.43] [4.94] [0.41] [4.50]
Self-employed 0.319 1.026 0.253 0.864 0.150 0.843
[0.33] [0.95] [0.25] [0.72] [0.15] [0.70]
Retired 0.923 0.676 0.551 0.428 0.593 0.461
[0.87] [0.94] [0.53] [0.62] [0.56] [0.67]
Higher vocational 0.237 -0.006 0.289 -0.011 0.284 -0.009
[0.68] [-0.02] [0.81] [-0.03] [0.79] [-0.03]
University -1.262** 0.067 -1.137* 0.181 -1.224** 0.167
[-2.17] [0.18] [-1.90] [0.48] [-1.99] [0.43]
Male 0.741 -0.001 0.615 -0.190 0.569 -0.199
[0.93] [-0.00] [0.76] [-0.39] [0.71] [-0.41]
Married 0.336 0.349 0.234 0.347 0.250 0.337
[0.58] [0.83] [0.38] [0.79] [0.40] [0.76]
Household size 0.007 -0.272** -0.016 -0.322*** -0.018 -0.343***
[0.07] [-2.37] [-0.14] [-2.64] [-0.15] [-2.78]
Constant -2.615 -1.623 -0.077 3.925 -0.201 4.007
[-0.62] [-0.51] [-0.02] [1.13] [-0.04] [1.14]
Mortgage terms
Year fixed effects
Joint significance 
demographics  (p-value)
Joint significance wealth 
controls (p-value)
No of Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log-Likelihood
Independent Variables
Yes Yes
(4) (5) (6)
No Yes Yes
-391.4
0.246
503
Yes
-357.4
0.246
465
-358.9
0.243
465
0.9640.966
0.0000.0000.000
-
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3.6 Mortgage choice: financial literacy and risk aversion 
 
As discussed, a variety of indicators for literacy and risk aversion such as 
holdings of financial assets, financial education, survey data, IQ, and cognitive 
ability tests have appeared in empirical work. No consensus has emerged yet as to 
which measurement protocol yields the most reliable information on household 
financial decision making. The empirical analysis makes use of two indicators for 
financial literacy: one self-reported measure and one based on asset holdings. Risk 
aversion is measured using a comprehensive scale based on six survey questions. 
The exact wording of the questions is reported in Appendix II.  
The first literacy measure (Financial Literacy) asks to which extent 
respondents consider themselves knowledgeable with respect to financial matters, 
ranging from not knowledgeable to very knowledgeable. Our second indicator 
(Financial Active) measures holdings of financial assets by households. The survey 
distinguishes between seven different asset classes, ranging from stockholdings to 
positions in derivatives. We construct a scale ranging from 0 (no holdings of 
financial assets) to 7 (positions in all mentioned assets), rather than looking at 
specific financial assets. There are two reasons for this approach. Firstly, it is not 
clear a priori which asset classes indicate financial literacy and which ones do not. 
Coulibaly and Li (2009), for example, only use stockholdings as a proxy for 
financial sophistication of the household. Secondly, the resulting scale is a measure 
both of the sophistication of the household in terms of diversification (Goetzmann 
and Kumar, 2008; Calvet et al., 2009) as well as awareness in financial markets 
(Guiso and Japelli, 2005).21 
 Obviously, both measures are imperfect proxies for financial literacy. 
Household responses and their actions might be driven by overconfidence rather 
than financial literacy. 22  Overconfidence in self-reported data and in financial 
behavior is reported for example in Barber and Odean (2001). An obvious indicator 
for overconfidence is the ‘better than average’ effect, which occurs when more than 
half of the households report they are better than the average household (see for 
example Nosić and Weber, 2010). Unfortunately, our variable is not suitable to 
assess overconfidence in this way, because households are not asked to compare 
financial knowledge with the average household. However, we do observe that the 
scores on Financial Literacy are close to the scale average (2.5), and that this 
                                            
20 The analysis that follows treats Financial Literacy and Financial Active as a continuous variable, rather than 
creating separate dummies. The results, when measured as dummies, remain similar, but in the case of Financial 
Literacy suffered from collinearity with year-dummies. 
22 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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remains stable over time. If overconfidence was present, we would expect the 
response average to be higher, and potentially varying with the economic climate.   
Moreover, RLA (2011) show (Table 4 in their paper) that objective and 
subjective measures of financial literacy are strongly correlated: people that assess 
their own knowledge as being higher also show higher scores on objective 
questions regarding financial concepts. Although we use the same data-set, the 
measures employed in this paper are slightly different. Therefore we obtained the 
original data from RLA (2011) and analyzed to what extend our measures correlate 
to both their subjective and objective measures. The results are positive and 
significant correlations. Moreover, an one-way ANOVA indicates that RLA’s basic 
literacy score is increasing in our measure and that those differences are highly 
significant (F = 4.31, p = 0.004). 
 Risk aversion is measured using six statements that question to what extent 
households are willing to take risk on investments. Households that are more 
willing to borrow money for investments or are prepared to lose money on 
investments are supposedly more risk-tolerant. After recoding responses on 
questions 3, 5, and 6, the resultant scale shows high consistency with a Cronbach 
Alpha of 0.927. A natural question is to what extent self-reported measures of 
literacy and risk aversion actually predict household financial behavior. Schooley 
and Worden (1996) compared the reported willingness of households to take 
financial risk to the actual riskiness of their portfolio and concluded that portfolio 
allocations are consistent with self-reported risk aversion.  
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Table 3.3 ■ Risk aversion and financial literacy across mortgage types and demographics 
This table shows weighted mean values for risk aversion and financial literacy by mortgage type (Panel A) 
and demographics (Panel B). The exact measurement of risk aversion and financial literacy can be found in 
Appendix II. The definition of mortgage categories can be found in Table I.1. Data is from the DNB 
Household Survey and cover mortgages originated between 1994-2009.  
 
 
 
 
Panel A Literacy and Risk Aversion across mortgage types
Amortizing Deferred 
amortization
Interest-only
Risk Aversion 20.27 18.40 19.85
Financial Literacy 2.22 2.31 2.29
Financial Active 0.24 0.36 0.59
Number of observations 292 137 348
Panel B Literacy and Risk Aversion across demographics
20-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years 51-60 years 61+ years
Amortizing mortgages 46.8% 46.4% 37.2% 26.0% 10.0%
Deferred amortization mortgages 26.7% 26.5% 22.4% 6.0% 4.2%
Interest-only mortgages 26.5% 27.1% 40.4% 68.0% 85.8%
Risk Aversion 18.29 18.55 19.19 22.05 20.98
Financial Literacy 2.51 2.30 2.16 2.38 2.05
Financial Active 0.30 0.32 0.42 0.44 0.75
Number of observations 88 258 194 129 101
Low Medium High
Amortizing mortgages 33.0% 35.6% 40.1%
Deferred amortization mortgages 22.2% 19.9% 13.0%
Interest-only mortgages 44.8% 44.5% 46.8%
Risk Aversion 23.41 24.80 25.50
Financial Literacy 2.26 2.24 2.34
Financial Active 0.27 0.46 0.47
Number of observations 209 410 158
Higher vocational University
Amortizing mortgages 33.36% 30.58%
Deferred amortization mortgages 22.97% 9.94%
Interest-only mortgages 43.68% 59.49%
Risk Aversion 25.68 26.22
Financial Literacy 2.31 2.20
Financial Active 0.41 0.59
Number of observations 204 104466
Income classes
Age categories
Education level
Primary or secondary 
0.38
2.27
23.69
41.95%
19.12%
38.93%
56 Chapter 3  
 
 
 
Weighted descriptive statistics on risk aversion and financial literacy are 
reported across mortgage types (Panel A) and demographic characteristics age, 
income, education and wealth (Panel B) in Table 3.3.23 Households with AMPs 
appear to be less risk averse and have more positions in financial assets than those 
with traditional amortizing contracts (consistent with LaCour-Little and Yang, 
2010), but the level of financial literacy is not very different between mortgage-
types. Holdings of financial assets and risk aversion exhibit patterns that are 
consistent with prior literature (Panel B) as they increase with age, income, and 
wealth (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008; Morin and Suarez, 1983). Financial literacy 
appears to be decreasing in age, especially after the respondent is 60 years old, can 
be reflective of the cognitive aging effect (e.g. decline in memory function and/or 
increasingly acting according to rules of thumb) documented in (Korniotis and 
Kumar, 2011). Literacy leads to increased wealth since literate households save 
more, as documented in Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) and Hilgert et al. (2003). 
Moreover, the share of AMPs, especially interest-only mortgages, is higher among 
older and wealthier households as a result of down payment requirements.  
Table 3.4 reports regression results when financial literacy and risk aversion 
are added to the model, controlling for the variables of specification 6 in Table 3.2, 
Panel A. Unfortunately, the dataset has many missing observations on literacy and 
risk aversion measures, thereby reducing the sample. Since financial literacy and 
risk aversion might be interrelated, we examine their impact simultaneously. It also 
checks whether the inclusion of household wealth in Panel B alters the results, 
since households might privately save in order to pay down their mortgage.  
                                            
23 The increase in average household income is taken into account. Average income amounted to €32,500 in 
2009, compared to only €21,780 in 1994. Low income is defined as households with an annual reported income 
below national average. Medium incomes are defined as households with an average up to twice the average 
income, and high-income are those households whose income exceeds twice the average income. 
Table 3.3 Panel B continued
First QRT Second QRT Third QRT Fourth QRT
Amortizing mortgages 40.29% 35.45% 40.17% 25.55%
Deferred amortization mortgages 18.68% 25.32% 15.10% 19.44%
Interest-only mortgages 41.04% 39.24% 44.73% 55.01%
Risk Aversion 21.45 23.51 26.83 26.01
Financial Literacy 2.21 2.19 2.22 2.39
Financial Active 0.22 0.12 0.33 0.80
Number of observations 338 85 186 165
Wealth quartiles
 Financial Literacy, Risk Aversion, and Choice of Mortgage Type by Households 57 
Panel A shows that households that are more risk-averse are 97 percent less 
likely to choose interest-only mortgages. This result is intuitive, as interest-only 
mortgages are more sensitive to equity-driven default risk, making them 
unattractive for risk-averse households. Coulibaly and Li (2009) mention the 
importance of risk attitude in contract choice, and we do find support for this 
statement. Specifications 2 and 3 include financial literacy and activity; those 
households that consider themselves more knowledgeable on financial matters and 
those that hold financial assets were found to be respectively 55 percent and 68 
percent more likely to choose for interest-only mortgages. No effects were found 
for contract-types that defer amortization and the results do not change in sign or 
magnitude when household wealth is added to the model. 
The inclusion of risk aversion and financial literacy simultaneously in 
specifications 4 and 5 does not significantly alter the results, except that risk 
aversion has now a marginal negative impact on the choice of a deferred 
amortization contract. Examination of the correlation between risk aversion and 
financial literacy (rho = 0.001) and financial activity (rho = -0.033) confirms that 
collinearity in these measures is not an issue. Moreover, the low correlation 
between the measures shows that they measure quite different constructs. A 
moderate correlation was found between literacy and activity (rho = 0.212), 
probably that the asset holdings of the household are more related to ‘awareness’ 
than to ‘literacy’ given the low correlation. 
The results so far indicate the importance of risk attitudes and literacy in 
household financial decision making. However, in contrast with the concerns 
expressed by financial regulators (AFM, 2008), this study found that AMPs are 
generally chosen by households with higher levels of literacy. Although deferral of 
amortization increases riskiness of mortgages, people who are potentially more 
aware of these risks generally tend to choose deferred amortization and interest-
only mortgages. 
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3.7 Robustness checks 
  
This section assesses the robustness of our results considering a variety of 
alternative explanations. One such explanation could be that households that are 
more literate have received more education in economics. Van Rooij et al. (2011) 
controlled for the level and use of economics but found insignificant results on 
stock market participation. Unfortunately, this data is unavailable for most years, 
which prevents us from exploiting this explanation further. However, Mandell and 
Klein (2009) showed that the level of economics education received is of limited 
influence on later levels of financial literacy. 
 Moreover, literacy might be correlated to some unobserved ‘ability’, making 
causal inferences problematic. Although we acknowledge the potential severity of 
this problem, it is not possible to append the dataset with potential exogenous 
instruments (such as information on siblings), for the reasons mentioned in Section 
3.3. Since Van Rooij et al. (2011) relied on the same dataset, the potential severity 
of this bias is likely to be similar. Through an extensive set of robustness checks, 
that study showed that their main results are robust to ‘ability’ endogeneity.  
 Other explanations for our results could include the impact of financial 
advice, peers, and prior experiences with home-ownership. As the dataset contains 
information on these topics, the robustness of the results is checked against these 
explanations. 
 
 
3.7.1 Mortgage choice: the impact of advice  
  
Households that face complex financial decisions affecting their wealth 
portfolio might rely on sources of advice to receive information and increase their 
understanding of financial products. For example, Elmerick et al. (2002) showed 
that older, larger households and those with more financial assets are significantly 
more likely to receive credit and borrowing advice. Several papers show that 
receiving professional advice indeed alters and improves investment decisions of 
households (Hackethal et al., 2012), as well as borrower credit profiles 
(Elliehausen et al., 2007). If difference in information or seeking advice are 
correlated with literacy and risk aversion, than our results so far would suffer from 
omitted variable bias. 
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Table 3.5 ■ Literacy, risk aversion, mortgage types and demographics by source of advice 
This table shows weighted mean values and percentages for literacy and risk aversion (Panel A), mortgage 
types (Panel B) and demographics (Panel C) by source of advice. The exact measurement of literacy and 
risk aversion can be found in Appendix II. The definition of mortgage categories can be found in Table I.1. 
Data is from the DNB Household Survey and cover mortgages originated between 1994-2009. 
 
  
 
 
Panel A Source of advice and literacy and risk aversion 
Risk Aversion Financial Active
Parents,  family and acquaintances 26.40 0.33
Newspapers 30.16 0.78
Financial literature (magazines, guides and books) 27.19 0.71
Brochures from bank or mortgage adviors 29.67 0.39
Advertisements in the media (TV, newspapers etc.) 26.71 0.10
Professional financial advisors 28.77 0.44
Financial computer programs 25.89 0.56
Financial information on the internet 28.33 0.45
Number of observations 423 423
Panel B Source of advice across mortgage types 
Amortizing Interest-only
Parents,  family and acquaintances 22.26% 13.92%
Newspapers 6.64% 11.95%
Financial literature (magazines, guides and books) 8.02% 9.31%
Brochures from bank or mortgage adviors 9.49% 9.07%
Advertisements in the media (TV, newspapers etc.) 2.42% 1.51%
Professional financial advisors 30.71% 28.23%
Financial computer programs 1.30% 0.93%
Financial information on the internet 4.61% 8.39%
Number of observations 152 199
Panel C Source of advice across demographics
20-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years 51-60 years 61+ years
Parents,  family and acquaintances 31.77% 26.09% 14.63% 10.25% 10.38%
Newspapers 2.22% 3.08% 5.66% 14.37% 21.29%
Financial literature (magazines, guides and books) 3.76% 3.39% 10.12% 13.45% 8.52%
Brochures from bank or mortgage adviors 5.57% 5.97% 10.09% 12.93% 7.27%
Advertisements in the media (TV, newspapers etc.) 6.46% 0.00% 1.94% 1.52% 3.76%
Professional financial advisors 17.86% 32.94% 34.46% 33.05% 27.48%
Financial computer programs 0.00% 2.06% 0.97% 0.00% 1.09%
Financial information on the internet 6.92% 5.53% 5.08% 8.70% 8.03%
Number of observations 58 127 95 86 65
Higher vocational University
Parents,  family and acquaintances 22.43% 13.56%
Newspapers 9.14% 13.07%
Financial literature (magazines, guides and books) 7.83% 7.79%
Brochures from bank or mortgage adviors 8.44% 9.27%
Advertisements in the media (TV, newspapers etc.) 1.32% 0.00%
Professional financial advisors 31.57% 34.21%
Financial computer programs 0.73% 0.00%
Financial information on the internet 6.29% 7.91%
Number of observations 119 65
23.85%
Deferred amortization
423
2.50
2.34
2.32
1.78
2.12
2.75
2.31
2.06
Financial Literacy
2.33%
40.23%
2.40%
5.28%
2.10%
1.53%
72
4.79%
Primary or secondary 
Education level
239
6.07%
1.97%
30.21%
Age classes
2.89%
8.35%
7.38%
6.38%
18.29%
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Our dataset contains information on several alternative sources of advice and 
information acquisition (see Table 3.5), ranging from passive forms like 
newspapers to active involvement of family and acquaintances and professional 
financial advisors. 24  Consistent with prior work (e.g., Van Rooij et al., 2011; 
Bluetghen et al., 2008), Table 3.5, Panel A shows that more risk-averse and high- 
literate households tend to rely on professional financial advice, while low-literate 
households rely on public advertisements (TV, newspapers, etc.). Usage of 
financial literature such as books is also more widespread among more literate 
households and those that are more active in financial markets. 
Breaking up the sample according to mortgage types reveals that households 
with interest-only mortgages rely in 14 percent of the cases on parents and family 
and in only 28 percent on professional advisors. These numbers are considerably 
lower compared to households with amortizing and deferred amortization 
mortgages. Consultation of newspapers is popular among households with interest-
only mortgages and those with more financial assets in their portfolio. 
Demographically, it appears that older, higher-educated, and wealthier households 
tend to seek professional advice, which was also found in Elmerick et al. (2002) 
and Hackethal et al. (2012). Conversely, lower-educated households and those with 
                                            
24 Financial advisors are often paid on commission base and might impact the decision process according to the 
incentives provided to them (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009) rather than truthful and honest information disclosure. 
In additional analysis, we find no bivariate dependence between advisor involvement and contract choice. 
 
Table 3.5 Panel C continued
Low High
Parents,  family and acquaintances 24.12% 9.65%
Newspapers 5.99% 9.98%
Financial literature (magazines, guides and books) 1.43% 16.82%
Brochures from bank or mortgage adviors 10.22% 11.52%
Advertisements in the media (TV, newspapers etc.) 7.21% 0.99%
Professional financial advisors 21.10% 32.69%
Financial computer programs 0.00% 2.41%
Financial information on the internet 7.46% 5.38%
Number of observations 96 91
First QRT Second QRT Third QRT Fourth QRT
Parents,  family and acquaintances 19.41% 23.61% 19.30% 14.95%
Newspapers 5.83% 2.68% 8.15% 13.11%
Financial literature (magazines, guides and books) 6.57% 4.55% 4.63% 12.51%
Brochures from bank or mortgage adviors 6.84% 9.09% 9.34% 9.22%
Advertisements in the media (TV, newspapers etc.) 2.47% 4.76% 1.80% 0.47%
Professional financial advisors 26.55% 30.21% 35.00% 32.92%
Financial computer programs 1.31% 0.00% 2.67% 0.64%
Financial information on the internet 3.78% 8.60% 6.75% 7.86%
Number of observations 160 55 126 127
8.29%
20.43%
Medium
Wealth quartiles
Income classes
236
6.54%
1.30%
34.10%
0.61%
6.70%
5.79%
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lower income tend to rely more on advice by parents and acquaintances or public 
media. Internet and financial program usage is not widespread, with less than 8 
percent of households relying on these channels. 
 The multivariate model examines the impact of the most prevalent forms of 
advice: parents, family and acquaintances (18 percent of the respondents), and 
professional financial advisors (30.1 percent of the respondents). The theoretical 
reason for doing this is that face-to-face consultation tends to have a larger impact 
on decision making than passive forms of advice (Quercia and Spader, 2008). From 
a practical point of view, the inclusion of all forms of advice leads to collinearity as 
some forms of advice have only a very limited number of observations available. 
Table 3.6 presents the results after controlling for financial advice. At first 
glance, our results remain virtually unchanged compared to those without inclusion 
of advisors. Risk-averse (literate) households are still significantly less (more) 
likely to choose interest-only mortgages, while no significant impact was observed 
regarding the probability of deferred-amortization contracts. 
  Both models show that the role of advice is a significant determinant of 
contract choice as distinct from literacy and risk aversion. Professional advisors 
increase the probability that households have deferred-amortization contracts. 
Probably, advisors make households aware of the affordability and interest 
deduction benefits of these products, thereby increasing the probability that these 
are chosen.  
Advice by relatives, on the other hand, decreases the likelihood of AMPs 
being chosen. Although we do not know to what extent parents are questioned, a 
generational difference between the advisor and the household can explain why this 
negative coefficient was observed. When the households’ parents chose their first 
mortgage, the popularity of AMPs – especially interest-only mortgages – was 
substantially lower. If the advice by parents is based on their own experience, then 
they might be more inclined to recommend a product similar to their first mortgage, 
thereby reducing the probability that they recommend their children an interest-
only product.  
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3.7.2 Mortgage choice: the impact of peer effects 
  
In order to shed more light on the impact of advice and the robustness of risk 
aversion and literacy as determinants of mortgage choice, the impact of peer effects 
on mortgage choice was considered. Peers are defined as those individuals with 
which households socially interact (friends and relatives).  As argued in several 
studies (Hong et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2008), the impact of peer effects is not 
negligible in portfolio choice, as households might learn from the experiences of 
others. In this study, we used the level of education and income of the households’ 
peers to assess this hypothesis, since these are related to financial sophistication in 
general. Table 3.7A examines the impact for literacy and risk aversion and Panel 
3.7B does the same for financial advice. 
Including the education level of peers (Panel A) decreases the explanatory 
power of risk aversion and literacy substantially. Peers of the household that 
attained higher education increase the probability that the household chooses an 
interest-only mortgage. There appears to be a learning effect present, but the risk-
aversion and literacy measures remain significant overall.  
Moreover, Panel B suggests that the education of peers is a closer substitute 
for literacy and risk aversion than the level of income. Peer income does increase 
the probability that interest-only products are chosen, but the main effects for the 
household are less affected compared to the inclusion of peer education levels.  
The previous section found that advice by relatives decreases the probability 
of interest-only products being chosen. We argued that this might be due to a 
generation gap, which is driven by the ‘mortgage career’ of parents, for example. 
However, if households know this, they might rely mainly on peers who are 
supposedly from the same generation, instead of on parents or family, since they 
are more aware of the current market standard. If this is the case, then controlling 
for peer effects would potentially render insignificant effects for advice by family. 
Table 3.7B shows that even after controlling for peer effects, the sign and 
significance of advice by professionals and relatives remain unaffected. Households 
rely on various sources of advice when choosing a mortgage product and 
apparently these sources are compliments rather than substitutes.  
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3.7.3 Mortgage choice: the impact of prior homeownership 
  
So far, we have examined learning and information effects due to interaction 
with peers and advice. However, learning-by-doing might be very effective. This 
section examines whether experience with prior home-ownership is driving 
mortgage choice rather than literacy or risk aversion. Experienced homeowners 
might be more aware of the mortgage market as well as the risks and features of 
certain mortgage products, subsequently altering their literacy and risk aversion 
levels.  
Table 3.8 includes a dummy (prior home-ownership) measuring whether the 
household owned his previous house. It is implicitly assumed here that home-
ownership is equivalent to having a mortgage, which is not necessarily true. Our 
dataset does not permit us to distinguish whether households had a mortgage and 
which type; however, over 85 percent of Dutch households take out a mortgage 
when purchasing a home so the majority of them have prior experience with the 
mortgage market. Our main results are not quantitatively and qualitatively affected: 
risk aversion and literacy remain significant in explaining mortgage choice. The 
magnitude of the effects is virtually equal to that found in Table 3.4.  
 
 
3.7.4 Additional checks  
  
Since Dutch mortgage debt is recourse, households remain liable for any 
outstanding balance in case of foreclosure. As mentioned, AMPs have a higher 
repayment risk than conventional contracts. However, the availability of mortgage 
insurance enables households to hedge the repayment risk away. As such, the 
availability of mortgage insurance might alter the choice of mortgage type at the 
expense of risk aversion. This potential explanation was examined, but the results 
on risk aversion measures were not altered. The insurance dummy shows a strong 
negative effect for interest-only mortgages, but this reflects the insurance terms as 
the insurance terms do not permit households to insure a 100 percent interest-only 
mortgage. 
Finally, the impact of house price expectations and the financial situation of 
the household were examined, as these could be the main reasons for choosing 
AMPs (see Cocco, 2011). 
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 The choice for AMPs, especially interest-only mortgages, might be 
explained by optimistic expectations about house price appreciation rather than 
literacy or risk aversion. Our model was appended with a measure for house price 
expectations, but the results remain unaffected. 
A household’s level of risk aversion might be influenced to the extent that 
they are financially constrained. For example, households might want to take more 
risks to improve their current situation or less risk to avoid problems from 
emerging. In terms of mortgages, households with a budget deficit might opt for 
AMPs, despite their level of risk aversion, as they are ceteris paribus cheaper than 
traditional contracts. Although income is a proxy for the financially constrained, 
our dataset also includes a question asking whether the household’s budget shows a 
monthly deficit or surplus. No support was found for this alternative explanation, as 
the results remain similar.  
 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
  
This paper has demonstrated that financial literacy and risk aversion have a 
significant impact on the choice for alternative mortgage products. Households that 
are more risk averse and less literate are significantly less likely to choose interest-
only mortgages; our results, however, are insignificant for deferred amortization 
contracts.   
Although psychometric measurement of literacy is neither the focus of this 
paper nor as refined as measures used in other work (e.g., Van Rooij et al., 2011), 
we do find that both direct and indirect measures of financial literacy and 
awareness help in explaining the mortgage-type choice by households. Furthermore, 
the results are robust against alternative explanations, such as financial advice, the 
effects of peers, prior home-ownership, and price expectations.  
 Policy-wise, our results are not supportive of the concerns expressed by 
financial authorities, for at least the Netherlands, as we document that in general 
more sophisticated households choose AMP contracts. As such, it is more likely 
that these households have at least basic understanding of the product 
characteristics, although support for this claim is limited by the data available to us. 
Households with limited literacy levels and lower education tend to rely more on 
public media when choosing their mortgage. A clear exposition of the contract-
features and inherent risks in these media is warranted as it can prevent households 
from choosing mortgage-types that are unsuitable for them. Although the rapid 
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growth in popularity of AMP’s might be of concern, the benefits associated with 
them can be substantial in terms of income smoothing and portfolio diversification 
(Cocco, 2011), provided that households purchase these products with this 
intention. Future research could shed more light on this issue. 
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3.9 Appendix I Mortgage products in the Netherlands 
 
This appendix examines the differences between available mortgage types in 
the Netherlands in detail. First of all it is important to note that repayments on 
mortgages are not tax-deductible. Maximizing benefits of tax-deduction therefore 
entails that any amortization charges are not directly deducted from the outstanding 
principal. The two categories that provide this feature are deferred amortization 
mortgages – where a household saves for a balloon payment at the term of the 
mortgage – and interest-only mortgages.25   
No typical ARM-FRM distinction is present in the Netherlands, and 
mortgages normally have a 5 or 10 year fixed rate period irrespective of the type of 
contract. Secondly, Dutch mortgage debt is recourse, leaving the responsibility of 
repayment of the mortgage to the household.  Although hybrid mortgages are 
available in the Netherlands (e.g., a combination of an annuity and endowment 
mortgage), they constituted only a minor part of the sample (less than 5 percent) so 
they are classified here as one type based on the size of the principal of the 
individual mortgage relative to total outstanding mortgage debt. The classification 
of the different contracts is reported below Table I.1. 
We quantitatively compare the yearly payments on three different mortgage 
types in Table I.226 A traditional amortizing contract immediately starts repaying, 
and this repayment constitutes an increasing proportion of the total expenses as can 
be seen in the bottom half of the table. The outstanding balance decreases steadily 
until the mortgage is completely paid off at maturity. Consequently, the tax-benefit 
of interest payments decreases as they fall in tandem with the repayment of the 
principal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
25 Negative amortization contracts and typical ‘subprime’ mortgages (e.g. 2/28 ARM’s) are unavailable in the 
Netherlands.  
26 We have chosen an endowment mortgage as an example of a deferred amortization-type. Life-annuity and 
investment mortgages work in a similar way. 
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Table I.1 ■ Mortgage-types in the Netherlands based on DNB Household Survey 
 
 
In the case of an AMP the repayment of the principal is deferred towards the 
future. The example in the table assumes an endowment mortgage. Instead of 
directly subtracting the amortization-payments from the principal, the repayment of 
the principal is converted to an annuity and the payments go to an endowment fund. 
In this case the 200,000 euro liability due after 30 years is annuitized, assuming 
that the endowment-fund will yield an average return of 6 percent over the term, 
with the yearly endowment in this case amounting to 2,530 euro. As the 
outstanding balance is not repaid, the benefits of tax-deduction are not decreasing, 
but instead the mortgage is paid off at maturity with the proceeds of the endowment 
fund. 
 
 
Mortgage product Tax benefits of interest payments Repayment charges prior to maturity
Amortizing mortgages
Annuity mortgage
Yes, tax benefits decrease over 
time Yes, increasing principal repayments over time
Linear mortgage Yes, tax benefits decrease over 
time
Yes, principal repayment in equal installments 
over maturity of the mortgage
Savings mortgage Yes, tax benefits do not decrease 
over time
Yes, through life-insurance contract which 
equals mortgage balance at maturity
Deferred amortization mortgages
Endowment mortgage Yes, tax benefits do not decrease 
over time
Yes, at maturity through life insurance 
contract. Contract value depending on 
investment results
Traditional life mortgage Yes, tax benefits do not decrease 
over time
Yes, at maturity through life-insurance 
contract. Contract value depending on 
investment results but a minimum is guaranteed
Mortgage with life-annuity Yes, tax benefits for both interest 
payments and annuity premiums
Yes, at maturity through the life annuity. 
However the payments of the life annuity are 
taxed
Life mortgage with life 
cover
Yes, tax benefits do not decrease 
over time
Yes, at maturity through life insurance 
contract. Contract value depending on 
investment results
Interest-only mortgages
Interest-only mortgage Yes, tax benefits do not decrease 
over time, low payments because 
no provisions for principal 
repayment are included
No repayment facility
Credit mortgage Yes, tax benefits do not decrease 
over time
No repayment facility, optional repayments can 
be made prior to maturity 
76 Chapter 3  
 
Table I.2 ■ Payment schedule for different mortgage types 
This table compared the yearly charges for three different types of mortgages: a traditional amortizing 
mortgage, an endowment mortgage and an interest-only mortgage. Assumed are a 200,000 euro intitial 
principal, a 4.5 percent interest rate, a 6 percent return on investments in the endowment fund and a tax-rate 
of 42 percent. 
 
 
 Finally, the interest-only mortgage – as implied by its name – only features 
interest-expenses until maturity. At maturity the proceeds of a sale of the collateral, 
private savings, or a refinancing of the mortgage, should suffice to pay off the 
principal. Again, this construction maximizes the benefits of tax-deductibility. It 
can also be seen that the net-yearly charges are highest for traditional amortizing 
contracts (8.498 euros), followed by endowment (7.750 euros) and interest-only 
mortgages (5.220 euros), hence the name ‘affordability’ mortgages. 
 The downside of the affordability argument is the increased repayment risk 
of AMP’s, assuming that households make their payments till maturity. If the 
return on the endowment fund is lower than the anticipated 6 percent, the terminal 
value of the fund will be insufficient to repay the mortgage at maturity (i.e. a 5.5 
percent return will lead to a shortfall of more than 16,000 euro at maturity). 
However, the mortgagor has relatively limited exposure to a negative price 
development of the collateral. For interest-only mortgages the risk is – all else 
equal– even higher as the mortgagor is very dependent on the value of his collateral 
at maturity.  
Strong housing and labor market conditions in the Netherlands contributed 
to the rising popularity of these products the past two decades. But with current 
house prices in the Netherlands on the decline this risk increased substantially as do 
low-returns in financial markets put pressure on the terminal value of endowment 
funds.  
Amortizing Endowment Interest-only
After year 1
Net interest payment 5,220€                    5,220€                  5,220€                      
Amortization payment 3,278€                    -€                     -€                         
Endowment payment -€                       2,530€                  -€                         
Outstanding balance 196,772€                 200,000€              200,000€                   
Value endownment fund -€                       2,530€                  -€                         
After year 15
Net interest payment 3,442€                    5,220€                  5,220€                      
Amortization payment 6,344€                    -€                     -€                         
Endowment payment -€                       2,530€                  -€                         
Outstanding balance 125,519€                 200,000€              200,000€                   
Value endownment fund -€                               58,883€                -€                                  
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3.10 Appendix II Measurement of Risk Aversion and 
Financial Literacy 
 
For the analysis of the impact of financial literacy, risk aversion, and 
opinions about the current and future situation on mortgage choice, several 
questions from the DNB Household Survey were used. The exact wording of these 
questions is presented here. 
 
Risk Aversion measures 
All questions could be answered on a seven-point scale ranging from 1, totally 
disagree with the statement to 7, totally agree. 
 
Risk Aversion 1: 
“I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed 
returns, than to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible 
returns” 
 
Risk Aversion 2: 
 “I would never consider investments in shares because I find this too risky” 
 
Risk Aversion 3: 
“If I think an investment will be profitable, I am prepared to borrow money 
to make this investment” 
 
Risk Aversion 4: 
 “I want to be certain that my investments are safe” 
 
Risk Aversion 5: 
 “I get more and more convinced that I should take greater financial risks to 
 improve my financial position” 
 
Risk Aversion 6: 
“I am prepared to take the risk to lose money, when there is also a chance to 
gain money” 
 
The resultant scale was constructed by recoding the responses on risk 
aversion measures 3, 5, and 6 and adding them up together, thereby creating one 
scale that can range from 6 (very risk tolerant) to 42 (very risk averse). Analysis of 
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the scale using the Cronbach Alpha measure shows that the scale could not be 
improved by deleting items and the coefficient of 0.927 exceeds the 0.90 level that 
Nunnally (1978) suggested as a threshold for scales used in decision-making 
processes.  
 
Financial Literacy measures 
 
Financial Literate: 
Respondents were asked to respond to the following statement: 
“How knowledgeable do you consider yourself with respect to financial 
 matters?” 
 
With response categories:  
1. 1. Not knowledgeable  
2. 2. More or less knowledgeable 
3. 3. Knowledgeable 
4. 4. Very knowledgeable 
 
Financial Active: 
Financial activity is measured using the following seven questions: 
 
1. “Did you, on 31 December [year], have investments with MUTUAL 
FUNDS? Do not include investments in growth funds, investments 
(shares, bonds) in companies, or insured saving (i.e., saving through a 
life-insurance) here.” 
 
2. “Did you, on 31 December [year], have any BONDS and/or 
MORTGAGE BONDS? Do not include bonds through mutual funds here. 
These have already been reported on.” 
 
3. “Did you, on 31 December [year], own any SHARES? Do not include 
shares of your own private limited company here, nor bonds through 
MUTUAL FUNDS. These have already been reported.” 
 
4. “Did you, on 31 December [year], have one or more PUT-OPTIONS?” 
 
5. “Did you have any written PUT-OPTIONS outstanding on 31 December 
[year]?” 
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6. “Had you, on 31 December [year], bought one or more CALL-OPTIONS, 
FALCONS27, or WARRANTS?” 
 
7. “Did you have any written CALL-OPTIONS, FALCONS or WARRANTS 
outstanding on 31 December [year]?” 
 
Responses are recorded as a dummy variable equaling 0 (= no) if the 
household did not hold the security at 31 December and 1 (= yes) if the household 
did hold the security. Final scores were obtained by counting the total number of 
yes-responses, resulting in a scale that ranges between 0 and 7, where 0 indicates 
that the household does not hold financial assets at all, while 7 indicates that the 
household holds all mentioned securities. 
                                            
27 Fixed term agreement for long term call option on existing securities, which is an option or warrant with an 
extended maturity.  
  
 
  
 
 
Chapter 4                                      
Screening Incentives in the Presence of 
Mortgage Insurance28 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The involvement of financial intermediaries (for example, mortgage 
brokers) 29  in the mortgage origination process increased over the last decade 
(Kerste et al., 2011; LaCour-Little, 2009; Kleiner and Todd, 2007; LaCour-Little 
and Chun, 1999) with the growing importance of insurance companies and pension 
funds as originators of mortgage debt. Typically, these originators do not have an 
extensive branch network, which makes them reliant on intermediaries to sell 
mortgages to households (Hassink and Van Leuvensteijn, 2007). Although banks 
still rely to a large extent on direct writing, they are also increasingly using 
intermediaries to sell mortgages as competition in consumer credit markets puts 
pressure on interest rates and profitability (De Haan and Sterken, 2011; Toolsema, 
2002). 30  Originators benefit from using intermediaries because sales expenses 
(commissions) become contingent on product sales instead of being a fixed cost 
(see Rose, 2012). On the other hand, borrowers benefit from the market knowledge 
of intermediaries, which reduces borrowers’ search costs (Vissing-Jörgensen, 2003). 
However, the interests between mortgage brokers and households are not 
necessarily aligned, which concerns regulatory agencies across the globe (Bernanke, 
                                            
28 This chapter is based on a working paper by Cox (2012, under review). I thank Dion Bongaerts, Dirk Brounen, 
Marsha Courchane, Mathijs van Dijk, Jane Dokko, Peter Neuteboom, Lars Norden, Bertrand Renaud, Albert 
Saiz, Peter Zorn, and seminar participants at the ERES Annual Meeting, 2012, ARES Annual Meeting 2012, 
AREUEA International Meeting 2011, and Rotterdam School of Management for their valuable comments. This 
project is financially supported by NHG. The author is grateful to the National Institute for Household Budget 
Education (NIBUD) for the provision of data. 
29 Throughout the paper, the terms mortgage broker and intermediary are used interchangeably.  
30  A survey conducted among executives from financial institutions shows that reducing origination and 
distribution costs and raising sales productivity is regarded as the most important opportunity to cope with the 
market challenges (World Retail Banking Report, 2009). 
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2007; Authority of Financial Markets, 2007). Hassink and Van Leuvensteijn (2007) 
argued that sales commissions might prevent intermediaries from providing 
exhaustive information and instead encourages them to recommend products that 
yield the highest profits. Moreover, competitive mortgage markets and sales-based 
compensation potentially lead to the improper sale of financial products because 
intermediaries seek to sell a product following the effort exerted in searching for a 
prospective customer irrespective of the suitability for the customer (Inderst and 
Ottaviani, 2009). Pressure on underwriting standards emerges if the sales 
commission is not contingent on subsequent performance of the mortgage, and 
increases when lenders hedge credit risks (Keys et al., 2010). Empirical work by 
Berndt et al. (2010), LaCour-Little (2009), Jiang et al. (2009), Alexander et al. 
(2002), and LaCour-Little and Chun (1999) showed that loans originated through 
intermediaries are more likely to fall into default, be prepaid, and are costlier to 
households. Low-entry barriers for mortgage-brokers (Barwick and Pathak, 2011) 
and loose or inadequate regulation (LaCour-Little, 2009; Apgar et al., 2007) allow 
the problem to persist. However, the effectiveness of regulation in mitigating these 
problems has not received unanimous empirical support (Kleiner and Todd, 2007; 
Kleiner, 2006). 
This paper examines this misalignment of interest by analyzing whether 
underwriting outcomes (for example mortgage type, loan-to-value ratio and debt-
service ratio) are systematically different between direct-written and brokered 
mortgages. In contrast to, for example, LaCour-Little (2009), the dataset herein 
discriminates between direct-written and brokered loans funded by the same lender. 
The expectation is that originators will align the interest of intermediaries with their 
own interest through the compensation structure. Why mortgages sold through 
brokers would be systematically riskier (Rose, 2012) when lenders have risk 
exposure is unclear, because retained credit risk creates incentives to screen loan 
applications and monitor brokers. That is; the lender could have sold a mortgage 
with similar risk characteristics directly to the customer without the intervention of 
an intermediary.  
But the presence of an originate-to-distribute model in the mortgage market, 
changes the incentives as Keys et al. (2010) demonstrate. They find empirical 
evidence that the easiness of securitization has an adverse effect on monitoring and 
screening incentives for lenders, as those loans have a higher probability of 
defaulting. Securitization separates the loan originator from the ultimate investor 
who bears the credit risks. If brokered loans are systematically more often 
securitized than direct written loans, the (potential) interest misalignment between 
brokers and households is able to materialize. Mortgage insurance, in the absence 
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of a co-insurance arrangement, can cause a similar weakening of screening 
incentives. Suppose there are three different mortgage classes: insured mortgages, 
non-insured mortgages eligible for insurance, and non-insured mortgages not 
eligible for insurance. We hypothesize that originator’s screening incentives are 
weakened for insured mortgages as this transfers credit risks to the insurer (Keys et 
al., 2010; Avery et al., 1996), especially in the absence of coinsurance between the 
lender and mortgage insurer. On the other hand, we expect screening incentives to 
be unaffected for the other two categories as lenders are exposed to credit risks.31 
Subsequently, one can expect that mortgage brokers have more freedom to increase 
their commission income for insured mortgages, for example by increasing 
households leverage (e.g. the loan-to-value ratio). The hedged credit risk for 
insured mortgages could induce the lender to be less critical in accepting the 
mortgage. Although lenders can act in a similar fashion, the higher reputational 
costs involved and the value of relationship with their customers (Puri and Rocholl, 
2008) might prevent them from doing so. Conversely, no systematic effect of 
intermediaries for uninsured mortgages is anticipated as originators will only fund 
mortgages that meet (internally) set credit risk standards, regardless of whether the 
mortgage is sold directly by them or through a broker.  
Based on our data, we define two underwriting outcomes at origination: the 
first one is the initial loan-to-value ratio (LTV) as a measure for the indebtedness of 
the household and a proxy for the loss-given-default for the originator (Qi and 
Yang, 2009; Avery et al., 1996; Clauretie, 1990).32 Our second variable is the debt-
service ratio (DSR) which proxies for the affordability of the mortgage. Mortgages 
with a lower DSR are easier to serve out of current income by the household and 
less sensitive to an income shock. From an originator perspective, the DSR can be 
viewed as the probability of default; a higher ratio implies that a default is more 
likely to occur following an income shock for the borrower. For the broker, both 
are proxies for volume-based commission incentives; higher LTV/DSR ratios at 
origination imply larger mortgages, keeping the value of collateral or household 
income constant. As such, a systematic positive impact of intermediaries on these 
ratios would be indicative of a conflict of interest between them and the household 
(for non-insured mortgages) or with the insurer (for insured mortgages). 
                                            
31 This assumes the absence of a securitization alternative. In the next section we discuss the Dutch context of 
our analysis at length and show that only a small fraction of the mortgages is actually securitized, and that those 
that are securitized are actually insured mortgages. Moreover, the mortgage insurance policy in this paper has no 
coinsurance/deductibility arrangement with the lender, implying that lenders are fully reimbursed for losses on 
insured mortgages. 
32 Data from the National Mortgage Guarantee (the mortgage insurer) show that the LTV ratio is significantly 
related to the probability that households become delinquent. However, differences in delinquency rates between 
directly written and brokered credit cannot be distinguished based on their data.  
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Our results do not provide evidence that either the LTV or DSR ratio of the 
mortgage is systematically affected, when the mortgage is originated through an 
intermediary compared to those directly written, after controlling for lender fixed 
effects.  
Furthermore, we find no support for the hypothesis that lending standards 
vary systematically conditional on the mortgage being insured. Brokers must work 
within underwriting standards set by the insurer and have limited freedom to 
maximize their commission income. The absence of this effect is probably 
explained by the reputational costs that lenders face. Consequently, we also find no 
evidence for “unsuitable” lending (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009). The results are 
robust against endogenous selection by households (Collins et al., 2010; 
Elliehausen et al., 2007), regional heterogeneity, and differences in risk preferences. 
Auxiliary results show that the involvement of brokers does not alter the pricing of 
mortgage credit (see LaCour-Little, 2009).   
Our results indicate that intermediaries have limited room to pursue their 
own interest (increasing commission income) when lenders have credit risk 
exposure and reputational capital at stake. As such, changing the compensation 
structure of brokers from commission-based to for example hourly billing 
diminishes their volume incentive, but also has the potential to create new 
misalignments of interests with customers (see Robinson, 2007). Moreover, it is not 
clear whether this strategy is effective in eliminating a misalignment of interest 
with households. Furthermore, mortgage insurers, rather than households, are 
potentially the ultimate victims of a conflict of interest, absent co-insurance with 
lenders. Although insurance parties can be expected to price this risk in their 
premiums, prosperous housing market conditions during our analysis period might 
have disguised both the probability and severity of these risks (Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert, 2011). The insurance provider in this paper is a public company 
financially backed by the government (similar to the FHA, see Hendershott and 
Villani, 2012). Changing the insurance contract to a co-insurance format between 
the insurer and the lender is similar to requiring lenders to hold an equity-position 
in securitized mortgages. The co-insurance ensures that lenders will incur (part of) 
the losses on the loan-portfolio instead of them being solely borne by the insurer. 
Although this paper does not document evidence that lenders take advantage of the 
current setup, the proposed change restores screening and monitoring incentives 
and assists in prevent this from occuring in the future. 
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This paper continues with a discussion of the Dutch mortgage market which 
served as the laboratory for these research questions in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 
discusses the dataset and presents descriptive statistics. The empirical analyses and 
robustness tests are reported in Section 4.4, while Section 4.5 concludes the 
research.  
 
 
4.2 Dutch Mortgage Market  
  
The level of competition, transparency, and market structure in Dutch 
mortgage and consumer credit markets has been examined by De Haan and Sterken 
(2011), Hassink and Van Leuvensteijn (2007), Sterken (2007), and Toolsema 
(2002). Ongoing consolidations in the financial sector lead to a market where 57 
percent of the newly originated mortgages in 2009 were sold by the five largest 
banks (Kerste et al., 2011). Despite this oligopolistic characteristic of the mortgage 
market, recent evidence by De Haan and Sterken (2011) revealed a continuing, 
strong competitive pressure among originators as they are more readily adjusting 
mortgage rates in response to funding costs decreases than to increases.     
The competitive pressure is further illustrated by declining gross interest 
margins on mortgages in recent years (see the World Retail Banking Report, 2009). 
Originators and intermediaries have limited room to extract rents from their 
customers through elevated interest rates. Broker or lending officer compensation 
in the form of overages – a form of commissions – and yield spread premiums – 
where interest rates are set above par – are uncommon in the Netherlands. 
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Figure 4.1 ■ Mortgage types and market shares in the Dutch mortgage portfolio 1994-2009 
Source: DNB Household Survey. 
 
 
Competitive pressure among financial institutions also fuels product 
innovation through the introduction of new mortgage types. Figure 4.1 depicts how 
the market share of traditional fully amortizing contracts, such as annuity and linear 
mortgages, decreased and were replaced with so-called alternative mortgage 
products (AMPs) or affordability mortgages.33 While interest-only mortgages were 
virtually non-existent in 1994, their market share ha grown to more than 50 percent 
by 2009. The market share of deferred amortization mortgages – such as savings 
and endowment contracts – stabilized after 2001 at levels around 20 percent.  
Dutch mortgage debt is recourse, implying that when the borrower defaults it 
is liable for the complete repayment of the mortgage. This makes strategic default 
unattractive for borrowers. However, households can insure the risk that 
foreclosure proceeds fall short of the outstanding mortgage balance through 
purchasing mortgage insurance with the public insurance company ‘National 
                                            
33 Alternative mortgage products defer amortization charges partially or completely towards the future and were 
designed to profit optimally from deductibility of mortgage interest payments (see Cocco, 2011; LaCour-Little 
and Yang, 2010; Charlier and Bussel, 2003). 
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Mortgage Guarantee’ (henceforth: NHG). NHG repays any shortfall fully to the 
lender in case of foreclosure.34 
The main objective of the insurance policy is to lower the barriers to 
homeownership at the lower end of the housing market and NHG is financially 
backed by the Dutch government. Private mortgage insurers are non-existent in The 
Netherlands. The insurance policy of NHG is designed without risk sharing 
between the insurer and lender – that is, no deductibles or coinsurance applies. This 
implies that lenders are assured to receive the entire principal back in case of a 
borrower defaults. Consequently, Dutch insured mortgage debt is regarded as a 
high quality security in financial markets (Dirkx-Westerhof, 2009), but in contrast 
to the U.S., only 15 percent of the Dutch mortgage debt is securitized (Mayer et al., 
2009; Aalbers, 2008). Most of the securitized Dutch mortgages are insured, 
implying that the uninsured debt and associated risk exposure remain with the 
originator.  
In the Netherlands, mortgages are sold through two channels and both 
lenders and intermediaries can originate insured and uninsured mortgages (see 
Figure 4.2). A mortgage is considered directly written if the prospective borrower 
interacts directly with the lender. This mode of origination is mainly used by banks 
that employ their own loan officers who solely sell the products offered by their 
employer.  
Brokered mortgages, on the other hand, do typically have an insurer or 
pension fund as the funding institution, although this channel is also becoming 
increasingly popular among banks as a result of debranching. The mortgage broker 
works independently from the lender and can recommend products from a variety 
of lenders. Typically, intermediaries are compensated on a volume basis – 
measured as yearly production – and a product-type basis, both of which are paid 
by the lender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
34 Mortgages are eligible for insurance (in 2009) if the initial loan-to-value ratio does not exceed 112 percent, if 
the total balance is less than 265.000 euros, if the mortgage is the first lien on the primary residence and if (in 
case of a hybrid product) no more than 50 percent of the balance is financed with non-amortizing debt (e.g. 
interest-only debt).The policies covers losses that are triggered by income-shocks caused through divorces, 
involuntary employment, or death. 
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Figure 4.2 ■ Mortgage origination process in The Netherlands 
 
  
Due to the scarcity of information on commission schedules, this paper relies 
on a report issued by Ecorys (2004) for information on the compensation structure 
(see Table 4.1). Although intermediaries are not obliged to sell products from one 
specific lender, commission incentives can induce them to do so (Inderst and 
Ottaviani, 2009; Hassink and Leuvensteijn, 2007). Specifically, originating a larger 
mortgage following the acquisition effort and selling mortgages from a limited 
number of originators in order to receive volume bonuses can be profitable. 35 
Additionally, the product-dependent compensation favors AMPs. Despite the 
growing popularity of internet as a sales channel, the vast majority of mortgages 
are still originated through a channel where either an intermediary or a loan officer 
meets face-to-face with a (prospective) customer. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
35 A broker can sell 2.2 million euros worth of mortgages either by selling 11 mortgages of 200K each or 10 
mortgages of 220K each. However, the latter case saves the search and screening costs of one additional 
borrower. 
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Table 4.1 ■ Commission structure financial intermediaries 
This table shows a typical commission scheme for mortgage intermediaries. 'Bonus' refers to the 
commission that is received based on the total sales amount irrespective of type. The commission per 
mortgage depends on the mortgage type and the production per mortgage type. All commissions are 
calculated based on principal. Source: Ecorys (2004). 
 
  
As mentioned, originators (banks, insurers, and pension funds) fund roughly 
three different categories of mortgages: mortgages that are insured, uninsured 
mortgages that are eligible for insurance (conforming mortgages), and mortgages 
that are not eligible for mortgage insurance by NHG. The latter two categories 
expose the lender to credit risk, which requires screening and broker monitoring on 
the lender side to determine whether the risks are acceptable. It is therefore ex-ante 
unclear why originators would relax screening standards for brokered loans if they 
could originate the exact same loan directly. However, for insured mortgages, 
screening incentives diminish, analogous to the securitization argument in Keys et 
al. (2010), because the credit risk is no longer born by the lender. Both 
intermediaries and originators can exploit this reallocation of risk by originating 
larger or riskier mortgages, thereby increasing the commission income and 
profitability of the product, leaving the losses with the mortgage insurer. 
One could expect this behavior to be more prevalent for intermediated 
mortgages than direct-written ones, because brokers are more reliant on 
commission income (Woodward, 2008). First, the customer-originator relationship 
is likely to be valuable to the lender because it can generate multiple transactions 
(Puri and Rocholl, 2008).  Second, originators can generate additional revenue 
through the sales of other services, such as insurance policies and credit cards, 
while brokers are more likely to have a single transaction relationship with their 
customer. Thirdly, reputational risks are likely to be higher for lenders than 
intermediaries.  
 
 
 
 
Mortgage production (€/year) € 0 - € 2.5 million € 2.5 - € 5 million € 5 - € 10 million
Bonus 0% 0.20% 0.25%
Linear mortgage 0.75% 0.95% 1.00%
Savings mortgage 2.50% 2.50% 2.50%
Endowment mortgage 2.25% 2.45% 2.50%
Life-insurance mortgage 2.25% 2.45% 2.50%
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Table 4.2 ■ Underwriting outcomes per mortgage category and channel 
This table shows mean loan-to-value and debt-service ratios per origination channel for (NHG) insured 
mortgages, eligible mortgages that are not insured, and mortgages that are not eligible for insurance. Data is 
from the DNB Household Survey and cover mortgages originated between 2001 and 2009. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the mean values of the two main variables of interest: the 
loan-to-value and debt-service ratio across mortgage types and origination channels. 
Consistent with prior findings, LTV and DSR ratios are higher (6.7 percent and 4.3 
percent, respectively) for insured mortgages when the loan is originated through a 
broker compared to direct written mortgage loans.   
As expected, the differences become smaller – both in absolute and 
economic sense – for eligible mortgages that are not insured. Surprisingly, for non-
eligible mortgages (which are consequently not insured), the table shows a 
difference in LTV and DSR ratios of 12 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively, 
between origination channel, while a negligible difference is expected if originators 
employ homogenous underwriting criteria. Of course, other factors such as 
borrower characteristics and underwriting heterogeneity are likely to be at play so a 
multivariate analysis is conducted in section four. We continue first by discussing 
the dataset. 
 
 
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
  
The dataset used is constructed from the Dutch Household Survey (DHS), a 
panel survey yearly administered by Centerdata among a representative sample of 
2,000 Dutch households, starting from 1993 onwards. The survey is administered 
through the internet, and respondents do not receive (financial) compensation for 
participation in the survey. Participants fill out the internet questionnaires at home 
at their own convenience. Another advantage of this survey method is that 
households have access to their bank statements and other financial data, thereby 
Mean N Mean N Mean N
Loan-to-value ratio
Intermediated 98.5% 131 87.4% 115 100.0% 424
Direct written 91.8% 84 87.7% 98 88.0% 318
Debt-service ratio
Intermediated 28.0% 109 28.4% 97 22.4% 549
Direct written 23.7% 70 25.6% 83 18.4% 395
Non-eligibleEligible/not-insuredInsured
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reducing report errors. Chang and Kronick (2003) showed that internet surveys are 
less sensitive to reporting biases than those administered by telephone. 
 However, reporting errors are an issue in self-reported survey data, so all 
numeric variables are winsorized at 10 percent of their respective distribution. 
Obvious outliers are excluded from the analysis or corrected whenever these could 
be logically inferred (for example, reporting income as 25,000 euros when asked to 
report income in thousands of euros).36  After 2003, the Dutch guilder was replaced 
by the euro, so all monetary amounts reported before 2003 were converted to euro 
amounts.  Only first-lien mortgages originated from 2001 onwards are used, 
yielding 1,732 and 1,538 suitable observations for the debt-service ratio and loan-
to-value respectively.37 Because the questionnaire did not ask whether a mortgage 
was originated through an intermediary prior to 2002, observations prior to 2001 
were excluded from the analysis.38 To ensure the sample is representative of the 
Dutch population, all observations are weighted by their population frequency. 
 Descriptive sample statistics are reported in Table 4.3 and split according to 
origination channel. Consistent with differential access to a branching network, 
banks are significantly more likely to engage in direct writing (86.7 percent) 
compared to insurers and other originators (for example, pension funds and insurers) 
(Hassink and Van Leuvensteijn, 2007). The group of directly written mortgages 
carries a 10 basis point rate premium over intermediated mortgages, which might 
indicate some form of yield-spread premium compensation (Rose, 2012). However, 
the percentage of insured mortgages is also substantially larger (36.8 percent versus 
28.6 percent), and insured mortgages typically receive a 10–30 basis point discount 
on the contract rate from the originator. Consistent with incentives in Table 4.1, the 
descriptive statistics show that brokered mortgages are significantly more likely to 
be of the deferred amortization type, while directly written mortgages are 
predominantly of the amortizing or interest-only type. More importantly, brokered 
mortgages are significantly larger, while the value of the collateral shows no 
significant difference between channels. This implies that differences in LTV and 
DSR ratios are primarily driven by the amount of mortgage debt and not the value 
of the underlying property or the contract rate.  
 
 
                                            
36 LTV ratios above 150 percent and DSR ratios exceeding 40 percent were excluded from the sample (see 
Cunha, Lambrecht, and Pawlina, 2009).  
37  This condition excludes all second liens used to cash out home equity, finance home improvements or  
refinancing loans. 
38 Because the survey has an ex-post character, mortgages originated in 2001 end up in the 2002 survey-wave, 
thereby making them suitable to include in the analysis. 
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Table 4.3 ■ Descriptive statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics for directly written versus intermediated mortgages, including a t-test 
for the equality of means. Fixed-rate period, NHG-guarantee, Retired, Higher-vocational, University, Male, 
and Married are measured as dummy-variables. Data is from Dutch Household Survey (DHS) and cover all 
mortgages originated between 2001 and 2009. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Other demographic characteristics reveal that households with a direct 
written mortgage are on average 4.5 years older, more highly educated (measured 
as completed higher vocational or university studies), and smaller. Moreover, these 
households are significantly wealthier; 34.5 percent of them are in the fourth wealth 
quartile compared to only 25.4 percent for households with intermediated mortgage 
debt.39 Wealthy households likely rely on a loan officer because they receive a wide 
array of other services (such as, for example, a brokerage account and personal 
banking) from their originator. 
                                            
39 Our measure of wealth is defined analogously to Van Rooij et al. (2011) and Morin and Suarez (1983) as the 
sum of checking and savings accounts, employer-sponsored savings plans, the value of life insurance, home 
equity, other real estate, and the value of holdings in financial assets minus total debt and is measured using 
quartile-dummies. 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev N
Mortgage originator:
Bank 86.7% 0.35 742 33.5% 0.47 1153 25.91***
Insurer 0.1% 0.09 742 7.7% 0.25 1153 -6.33***
Other 12.3% 0.32 742 56.6% 0.49 1153 -19.41***
Interest rate 4.7% 0.01 660 4.6% 0.01 1025 2.76***
Fixed rate period (1 = yes) 88.8% 0.32 741 90.3% 0.30 1151 -1.02
NHG-insured (1 = yes) 28.6% 0.45 742 36.8% 0.48 1153 -3.70***
Mortgagetype:
Amortizing 32.3% 0.47 742 23.2% 0.42 1153 4.38***
Deferred amortization 14.0% 0.35 742 30.9% 0.46 1153 -8.50***
Interest-only 53.6% 0.50 742 45.9% 0.50 1153 3.30***
Log (propertyvalue) 4.87 0.68 737 4.85 0.63 1144 0.68
Log (household income) 10.50 0.43 742 10.40 0.46 1152 4.44***
Log (amount of mortgage) 4.86 0.66 589 5.01 0.53 865 -4.60***
Age 49.97 14.79 741 44.54 12.51 1152 8.58***
Retired (1 = yes) 21.5% 0.41 741 10.9% 0.31 1152 6.37***
Higher-vocational (1 = yes) 28.3% 0.45 741 27.9% 0.45 1152 0.22
University (1 = yes) 17.0% 0.38 741 16.5% 0.37 1152 0.29
Male (1 = yes) 90.0% 0.30 741 89.3% 0.31 1152 0.48
Married (1 = yes) 79.1% 0.41 741 79.1% 0.41 1152 0.00
Household size 2.60 1.31 741 2.76 1.37 1152 -2.63**
Household wealth:
Quartile 1 22.5% 0.42 742 27.9% 0.45 1153 -2.63**
Quartile 2 14.4% 0.35 742 16.3% 0.37 1153 -1.10
Quartile 3 28.6% 0.45 742 30.4% 0.46 1153 -0.82
Quartile 4 34.5% 0.48 742 25.4% 0.44 1153 4.27***
Direct written Intermediated T-stat for 
mean diff.
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4.4 Empirical Analysis 
  
The multivariate analysis is split into three parts. The first constitutes an 
OLS-analysis examining the impact of intermediaries on mortgage-debt ratios, 
using the following model: 
            
 ܴܽݐ݅݋௜ =  ߙ +  ߚ݀ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݉݁݀݅ܽݎݕ௜ + ߱௧ܻ݀݁ܽݎ௧  +  ߛ ௜ܺ  + ߟ௜                   (4.1) 
 
Where the dependent variable Ratioi denotes the loan-to-value and debt-
service ratio of household i’s mortgage. The main variable of interest is the 
dummy-variable dIntermediaryi, which equals 1 when the household’s mortgage 
was originated through an intermediary and 0 when it was directly written. In order 
to control for unobserved time effects, year dummies are included in all models. 
The vector Xi contains both control variables for mortgage terms (interest rate, 
fixed-rate period and dummies for mortgage insurance and mortgage type) and 
household characteristics (log of property value and household income, age, 
household size and dummies for marital status, gender, education, labor market 
position, and wealth quartiles).  
 The second analysis examines whether a mortgage is suitable given the 
household’s income and the value of the collateral. Intermediaries significantly 
increasing the likelihood that mortgages exceed generally accepted underwriting 
standards indicates that an agency conflict created through commissions leads to 
improper selling or predatory behavior (Inderst and Ottoviani, 2009; Ehrenberg, 
2001). To examine this hypothesis, two indicators for suitability were defined. The 
first variable measures excessive mortgage debt levels relative to collateral value. 
The mortgage insurance threshold of 112 percent was used as the cut-off point to 
determine excessive indebtedness:  
  
 ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܮܶ ௜ܸ = ቄ 1 ݂݅ ܮܶ ௜ܸ > 112 ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐ 0 ݋ݐℎ݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁                                                                       (4.2)                      
 
 Secondly, we evaluate whether households spend an excessive amount of 
income on mortgage payments by comparing the debt-service ratio (DSR) of 
household i to underwriting criteria yearly published by the Dutch National 
Institute for Household Budget Education (NIBUD). Since the debt-service ratio is 
dependent on prevailing market interest, average mortgage interest-rates for new-
contracts reported by the Dutch Central Bank are used to determine the appropriate 
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norm for year t.40  The resulting indicator equals 1 when the household’s i debt-
service ratio in year t exceeds the NIBUD-norm in year t, given interest-rate r: 
  
 ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܦܴܵ௜,௧,௥ =  ൜1   ݂݅ ܦܴܵ௜,௧ > ܰܫܤܷܦ − ݊݋ݎ݉௧,௥ 0 ݋ݐℎ݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁                                                                  (4.3)                    
  
Because both variables are binary, a logit model is estimated including all 
aforementioned control variables. Based on the compensation structure (see Table 
4.1) and the descriptive statistics (see Table 4.3), a significant effect of 
intermediaries on the type of mortgage that households have is expected. The 
commission structure favors sales of deferred amortization and interest-only 
mortgages over traditional amortizing contracts. In order to examine this hypothesis, 
a multinomial-logit model is estimated using Mortgage typei as the dependent 
variable. Mortgage type is herein defined as: 
 
ܯ݋ݎݐ݃ܽ݃݁ ݐݕ݌݁௜ =  ቐ
1 ݂݅ ܽ݉݋ݎݐ݅ݖ݅݊݃ ݉݋ݎݐ݃ܽ݃݁                                
2 ݂݂݅݀݁݁ݎݎ݁݀ ܽ݉݋ݎݐ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊ ݉݋ݎݐ݃ܽ݃݁         
3 ݂݅ ݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ − ݋݈݊ݕ ݉݋ݎݐ݃ܽ݃݁                        
     (4.4) 
  
 
4.4.1 The impact of intermediaries  
 
Table 4.4A shows regression results for the models of Equations 4.1–4.3. 
The first two regression equations constitute the base-line model. Most coefficients 
are consistent with standard economic intuition. An increase in interest rates 
decreases the amount of mortgage debt that households can obtain while increasing 
the level of payments (DSR ratio). Households with mortgage insurance tend to 
have significantly higher LTV ratios even after controlling for a wide variety of 
other characteristics such as age, house value and mortgage type.  
  
                                            
40 The interest rate for new mortgage contracts depends on the fixed-rate period. The DSR measures were 
computed using a rate of five percent. The number of excesses increases (or decreases) when a higher (or lower) 
interest rate is used, but the main findings remain unaffected. 
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Table 4.4A ■ Analysis of involvement of intermediaries on mortgage debt ratios 
This table shows results of an OLS-model for involvement of intermediaries on mortgage-debt ratios 
(Model 1–4) and a logit-model explaining excessive debt levels (Model 5–6). Debt-service ratio (DSR) is 
calculated as the annual mortgage payments divided by annual household income. The loan-to-value ratio 
(LTV) is the value of the house relative to the amount of mortgage debt. Amortizing mortgages are the 
reference category for mortgage type. Data is from the Dutch Household Survey (DHS) and covers all 
mortgages originated between 2001 and 2009. Excesses are defined as exceeding the NHG (LTV) or 
NIBUD (DSR) underwriting norms. Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***,**, and * indicate significance at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LTV DSR LTV DSR ExcessLTV ExcessDSR
Intermediated (1 = yes) 0.037** 0.000 0.331** -0.235
[2.21] [0.02] [2.15] [-1.15]
Interest-rate -1.654* 2.379*** -1.637* 2.339*** -2.740 31.46***
[-1.76] [7.22] [-1.71] [7.02] [-0.32] [2.86]
Fixed rate period (1 = yes) -0.016 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.124 0.118
[-0.52] [-0.54] [-0.15] [-0.24] [0.46] [0.33]
NHG-guarantee (1 = yes) 0.032** -0.023*** 0.029* -0.023*** 0.155 -0.474**
[2.05] [-3.99] [1.86] [-3.82] [1.05] [-2.20]
Mortgage type:
Deferred amortization 0.116*** 0.031*** 0.109*** 0.031*** 0.788*** 0.476*
[6.26] [4.03] [5.48] [3.79] [3.92] [1.86]
Interest-only 0.024 -0.006 0.0173 -0.005 0.536*** -0.006
[1.18] [-0.65] [0.82] [-0.60] [2.80] [-0.03]
Log(value of house) -0.233*** 0.065*** -0.232*** 0.064*** -1.922*** 1.809***
[-15.29] [12.27] [-14.86] [12.21] [-11.68] [7.92]
Log(household income) 0.084*** -0.229*** 0.087*** -0.227*** 0.584*** -3.310***
[4.26] [-17.67] [4.24] [-17.24] [3.21] [-12.39]
Age -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.002** -0.029*** -0.027***
[-9.02] [-5.08] [-8.45] [-4.81] [-3.38] [-2.73]
Retired (1 = yes) 0.035 0.004 0.035 0.005 0.110 -0.835*
[0.94] [0.35] [0.92] [0.42] [0.36] [-1.66]
Higher-vocational (1 = yes) 0.0426** 0.0307*** 0.047** 0.032*** 0.539*** 0.371*
[2.34] [4.44] [2.55] [4.64] [3.25] [1.68]
University (1 = yes) 0.093*** 0.046*** 0.091*** 0.044*** 0.998*** 0.360
[4.50] [5.98] [4.29] [5.68] [4.85] [1.38]
Male (1 = yes) -0.0219 0.0220* -0.0229 0.0209* -0.321 0.343
[-0.64] [1.92] [-0.64] [1.79] [-1.09] [0.77]
Married (1 = yes) 0.069** 0.018* 0.073*** 0.016* 0.218 1.010***
[2.53] [1.95] [2.59] [1.71] [0.85] [2.73]
Household size -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.147** -0.237**
[-0.51] [0.54] [-0.45] [0.86] [2.19] [-2.46]
WealthQRT 2 -0.007 -0.014 0.001 -0.010 -0.007 -0.014
[-0.30] [-1.55] [0.05] [-1.21] [-0.27] [-1.05]
WealthQRT 3 -0.027 -0.013* -0.031 -0.012 -0.023 -0.013
[-1.46] [-1.66] [-1.59] [-1.49] [-0.88] [-1.20]
WealthQRT 4 -0.047** -0.010 -0.0418* -0.008 -0.040 -0.011
[-2.11] [-1.20] [-1.82] [-0.93] [-1.43] [-1.01]
Constant 1.630*** 2.192*** 1.539*** 2.235*** 1.266*** 1.929***
[7.66] [17.06] [6.93] [17.45] [4.19] [12.03]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1394 1586 1333 1521 1333 1521
R2-adj/Pseudo R2 0.302 0.512 0.303 0.509 0.164 0.303
Log-Likelihood - - - - -700.6 -402.0
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 Moreover, those households with a higher income or higher education tend 
to have higher LTV-ratios. Although the result for income is intuitive (see, for 
example, Follain and Dunsky, 1997), for education the result is less obvious. The 
mechanism that is likely at play is originators willing to lend more to households 
with good future income prospects.41 Moreover, the wealthiest households tend to 
have lower LTV-ratios, probably because they take a larger equity stake through a 
down-payment when buying a house.42 
Adding the intermediary to the model leaves the coefficients on control 
variables largely unchanged. The regression results of model 3 show for the full 
sample that involvement of an intermediary tends to increase the LTV-ratio by 3.7 
percent. These results support the idea that intermediaries tend to originate larger 
mortgages to households (volume incentive). However, the affordability of the 
mortgage remains unaffected because the coefficient of the intermediary is highly 
insignificant in the debt-service ratio. This result is explained by the tendency of 
intermediaries to sell AMPs rather than amortizing debt, thereby increasing 
leverage without proportionately increasing the (monthly) payments. Generally, the 
results provide limited support for that commission-compensation of intermediaries 
has adverse effects on levels of indebtedness and affordability. 
Next, we examine whether intermediaries originate unsuitable mortgages as 
defined by Equation (4.2) and (4.3). Excessive underwriting constitutes a risk for 
the originator and insurer as well as the household (Qi and Yang, 2009; Clauretie, 
1990). Because all loans in the sample were granted, the ‘excesses’ were acceptable 
to both originator and household at the time of origination. Results of the logit 
model in (5) show indeed that intermediated mortgage debt is significantly more 
likely to be ‘excessive’ in terms of debt level than directly written credit. An 
increase in excessive payment obligations is not observed because the presence of 
an intermediary is insignificant and high LTV debt is more likely to defer 
amortization.43  
Consistent with the type-based compensation that intermediaries receive on 
these products (see Table 4.1), results in Table 4.4B show that mortgages 
originated through intermediaries are more than twice as likely to be of the deferred 
amortization or interest-only type. Moreover, older and higher income households 
                                            
41  Circumstantial evidence suggests that these practices occurred in The Netherlands as one of the largest 
mortgage banks was fined for improper underwriting to young and highly educated households.  
42 Dutch mortgage lenders in general do not require down payments. Even transaction costs can be financed with 
mortgage debt, with initial LTVs exceeding 100 percent. 
43 Originators do typically not grant interest-only debt in excess of 90 percent LTV. So the mortgage should be 
the ‘deferred amortization’ type to retain affordability. This is indeed the case: mortgages with LTV levels in 
excess of 90 percent are four times more often a deferred amortization type than those with LTV-ratios under 90 
percent.  
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are, as expected, more likely to have an interest-only mortgage because the LTV-
cap is less likely to be binding for them. The result that larger households are more 
likely to have a deferred amortization mortgage is also intuitive. As these 
households incur high costs for example for the upbringing of children, they benefit 
optimally from an affordability mortgage, while they are simultaneously less likely 
to qualify for interest-only debt.   
The results of Table 4.4B do not necessarily reflect a misalignment of 
interest between households and brokers. A higher share of AMPs might also 
reflect the fact that intermediaries assist households in choosing the optimal 
mortgage in terms of affordability and tax benefits given their current income. 
Moreover, data from the National Mortgage Guarantee indicate that AMPs are no 
more likely to become delinquent than traditional mortgage types.  
So far the results did not control for heterogeneity in underwriting among 
originators. The reported effect of intermediaries is expected to diminish if our 
hypothesis holds that the same lender does not employ differential acceptability 
criteria for brokered debt. In other words, LTV and DSR ratios do not 
systematically differ – controlling for other factors – between a direct written and 
brokered mortgage once the lender effect is taken into account. 
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Table 4.4B ■ Multinomial logit analysis of mortgage-type choice 
This table shows multinomial logit results for mortgage type choice by households when intermediaries are 
involved. Amortizing mortgages are the reference category. Data is from Dutch Household Survey (DHS) 
and covers all mortgages originated between 2001 and 2009. Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***,**, and * 
indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively. 
 
  
Deferred amor. Interest-only Deferred amor. Interest-only
Intermediated  (1 = yes) 1.365*** 0.746***
[7.86] [4.86]
Interest-rate -8.322 -48.04*** -3.078 -46.52***
[-0.85] [-5.32] [-0.30] [-4.95]
Fixed rate period (1 = yes) -0.475 -0.209 -0.295 -0.157
[-1.56] [-0.67] [-0.90] [-0.48]
NHG-garuantee (1 = yes) -0.646*** -1.327*** -0.660*** -1.384***
[-4.12] [-8.22] [-4.02] [-8.46]
Log(value of house) 0.0407 0.130 0.146 0.153
[0.27] [1.01] [0.96] [1.18]
Log(household income) 0.368** -0.0337 0.484** 0.0895
[1.96] [-0.19] [2.47] [0.49]
Age 0.001 0.092*** 0.008 0.098***
[0.12] [11.43] [0.86] [11.45]
Retired (1 = yes) -0.556 -0.506* -0.441 -0.487
[-1.23] [-1.69] [-0.97] [-1.61]
Higher-vocational (1 = yes) -0.210 -0.158 -0.147 -0.158
[-1.20] [-0.93] [-0.80] [-0.90]
University (1 = yes) -0.833*** -0.671*** -0.934*** -0.770***
[-3.65] [-3.22] [-3.91] [-3.73]
Male (1 = yes) -0.884** -0.608** -0.745* -0.535*
[-2.33] [-2.01] [-1.87] [-1.76]
Married (1 = yes) 0.371 0.343 0.368 0.395
[1.22] [1.28] [1.16] [1.44]
Household size 0.238*** -0.049 0.241*** -0.075
[3.50] [-0.65] [3.34] [-1.06]
WealthQRT 2 0.047 0.013 0.084 0.103
[0.20] [0.05] [0.33] [0.40]
WealthQRT 3 -0.165 -0.397** -0.144 -0.321
[-0.83] [-2.00] [-0.70] [-1.58]
WealthQRT 4 -0.746*** -0.274 -0.786*** -0.244
[-3.38] [-1.38] [-3.33] [-1.18]
Constant -2.109 -0.248 -5.709** -2.126
[-1.02] [-0.13] [-2.53] [-1.03]
Year dummies
N
Pseudo R2
Log-Likelihood
Chi-Square 534.7
-1412.6
0.216
1754
558.2
-1317.5
0.236
1677
(2)(1)
Yes Yes
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4.4.2 Intermediaries and originators 
 
Table 4.5 shows sample descriptive statistics split according to originator 
type. Given the oligopolistic structure, bank-lenders and non-bank lenders are 
distinguished, with the latter being primarily insurers and pension funds. In line 
with Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, mean LTV and DSR ratios are documented to be 
higher for intermediated credit than direct written debt conditional on the type of 
originator. This finding is counter to intuition as we would expect differences to be 
smaller per originator. Consistent with Table 4.3, the percentage of NHG-insured 
mortgages is substantially higher when the debt is originated through an 
intermediary. Conforming to the insurance terms increases the acceptability of the 
mortgage to the originator, thereby increasing the likelihood that the broker can 
close the deal. 
With respect to household characteristics, those with directly written debt are 
on average older and wealthier, while those households using an intermediary tend 
to be larger.  
The multivariate analysis in Table 4.6 Panel A confirms that, after 
controlling for the originator, the role of the broker is limited. The decreasing 
magnitude of the coefficients and the insignificance both confirm that the 
underwriting criteria do not vary between channels conditional on the originator. 
As such, prior significance of the intermediary is largely explained by 
heterogeneity in underwriting standards among originators. Underwriting 
heterogeneity is fueled by competition among lenders for market share and new 
entrants in the market who cater to riskier borrowers, irrespective of the 
involvement of a broker.  
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Table 4.5 ■ Descriptive statistics by lender type 
This table shows mean values for directly written versus intermediated mortgages split according to 
mortgage originator (banks versus non-bank). Debt-service ratio (DSR) is calculated as the annual 
mortgage payments divided by annual household income. The loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is the ratio of 
property value to mortgage debt. Excesses are defined based on NHG (LTV) or NIBUD (DSR) 
underwriting criteria (see Equation 4.2 and 4.3). Data is from the Dutch Household Survey (DHS) and 
covers all mortgages originated between 2001 and 2009. 
 
  
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Mortgage characteristics
LTV 91.1% 521 102.8% 281 94.2% 72 101.4% 595
DSR 21.0% 551 24.3% 327 19.7% 104 23.2% 679
ExcessLTV 24.3% 521 38.7% 281 33.3% 72 36.8% 595
ExcessDSR 14.8% 551 15.6% 327 9.6% 104 14.7% 679
NHG-guarantee (1 = yes) 29.9% 632 34.6% 379 20.9% 110 37.9% 774
Mortgagetype:
Amortizing 32.1% 632 22.2% 379 33.6% 110 23.8% 774
Deferred amortization 12.5% 632 32.5% 379 22.7% 110 30.1% 774
Interest-only 55.4% 632 45.4% 379 43.6% 110 46.1% 774
Household characteristics
Log (household income) 10.50 632 10.43 378 10.45 110 10.39 774
Age 49.65 631 44.23 378 51.82 110 44.69 774
Retired (1 = yes) 21.1% 631 11.9% 378 23.6% 110 10.3% 774
Higher-vocational (1 = yes) 26.3% 631 26.7% 378 40.0% 110 28.4% 774
University (1 = yes) 17.6% 631 18.3% 378 13.6% 110 15.6% 774
Male (1 = yes) 89.7% 631 89.2% 378 91.8% 110 89.4% 774
Married (1 = yes) 77.8% 631 77.5% 378 86.4% 110 79.8% 774
Household size 2.58 631 2.66 378 2.72 110 2.82 774
Household wealth:
Quartile 1 22.9% 632 33.5% 379 20.0% 110 25.2% 774
Quartile 2 14.2% 632 15.3% 379 15.5% 110 16.8% 774
Quartile 3 27.8% 632 27.7% 379 32.7% 110 31.7% 774
Quartile 4 35.0% 632 23.5% 379 31.8% 110 26.4% 774
Banks Non-bank
Direct Intermediated Direct Intermediated
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Table 4.6 ■ Analysis of mortgage debt-ratios by lender 
This table shows results for OLS-models (panel A) and Logit-models (panel B) explaining mortgage-debt 
ratios controlling for the involvement of intermediaries. Mortgages are originated by banks or non-banks. 
Debt-service ratio (DSR) is calculated as the annual mortgage payments divided by annual household 
income. The loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is the ratio of property value to mortgage debt. Excesses are defined 
based on NHG (LTV) or NIBUD (DSR) underwriting criteria (see Equation 4.2 and 4.3). Data is from the 
Dutch Household Survey (DHS) and covers all mortgages originated between 2001 and 2009. Robust t-
statistics in brackets, ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
  
Panel B of Table 4.6 reports logit-results for excessive underwriting. 
Consistent with prior expectations, all coefficients are insignificant regardless 
whether the originator was a bank or non-bank. The lack of significance indicates 
that, despite that a proportion of the mortgages exceed either the LTV or DSR 
norms (see Table 4.5), no systematic relation with the involvement of an 
intermediary is observed. As such, no evidence is found for predatory behavior of 
intermediaries, and the exceptions are more likely to arise on a case-by-case basis 
rather than resulting from a systematic misalignment of interest between brokers 
Panel A: OLS analysis of debt-ratios
LTV DSR LTV DSR
Intermediated (1 = yes) 0.019 0.008 0.045 -0.005
[0.92] [1.10] [0.94] [-0.32]
Controls (see Table 4.4A) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 731 812 602 709
R2-adj 0.339 0.493 0.260 0.536
Panel B: Logit analysis of excessive debt-ratios
ExcessLTV ExcessDSR ExcessLTV ExcessDSR
Intermediated (1 = yes) 0.334 -0.107 0.096 0.231
[1.50] [-0.36] [0.24] [0.46]
Controls (see Table 4.4A) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 731 812 540 642
Pseudo R2 0.251 0.351 0.130 0.345
Log-Likelihood -330.8 -202.6 -301.6 -156.7
Chi-Square 139.7 139.5 61.15 115.1
Banks Non-Banks
Banks Non-Banks
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and households. These results also support the view that predatory lending in the 
Netherlands is virtually non-existent. 
So far, the underwriting outcomes for the complete portfolio of mortgages are 
examined. However, brokers are expected to have more freedom to increase their 
income if the mortgage is insured because they need not to worry about acceptance 
by the originator. Furthermore, the fact that the mortgage is insured will also 
increase the probability that the household will not object. As discussed, these 
effects should be smaller or absent for non-insured mortgages because the credit 
risks faced by the originator. In Table 4.7, we repeat the analysis and include an 
interaction-term between the intermediary and mortgage insurance.  
Intermediary coefficients for all originator-type subsamples show that their 
involvement increases the LTV-ratio for the household, but that the effect becomes 
statistically insignificant. A similar picture emerges from the DSR-ratio, as it shows 
that the economic and statistical magnitude of the effect becomes negligible. The 
interaction term in all specifications is insignificant; there is no marginal effect of 
the intermediary conditional on mortgages being insured, neither for the full sample 
nor for the lender type-based subsamples. As such we find no evidence that 
screening or broker monitoring by originators are lowered when mortgages are 
insured.  
The negative effect of mortgage insurance on the DSR is likely caused by a 
rate discount that households receive upon insuring their mortgage (see Section 
4.3). In an unreported regression we include an interaction between mortgage 
insurance and the interest-rate. The effect of the interaction term confirms this 
assertion as it is significantly negative, while main insurance effect becomes 
insignificant. 
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Table 4.7 ■ Analysis of debt ratios for the interaction intermediary and mortgage insurance 
This table shows results of an OLS-model for involvement of intermediaries on mortgage-debt ratios when 
interacted with mortgage insurance. Columns 1 and 2 contain the full sample of mortgages while column 3 
(5) and 4 (6) contain the subsample of bank (or non-bank) originated mortgages. Debt-service ratio (DSR) 
is calculated as the annual mortgage payments divided by annual household income. The loan-to-value 
ratio (LTV) is the value of the house relative to the amount of mortgage debt. Amortizing mortgages are the 
reference category for mortgage type. Data is from the Dutch Household Survey (DHS) and covers all 
mortgages originated between 2001 and 2009. Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***,**, and * indicate 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
LTV DSR LTV DSR LTV DSR
Intermediated (1 = yes) 0.035 -0.006 0.008 0.007 0.037 -0.016
[1.61] [-0.74] [0.29] [0.71] [0.66] [-0.85]
Mortgage insurance (1 = yes) 0.024 -0.036*** 0.021 -0.038*** -0.010 -0.058**
[0.90] [-4.02] [0.76] [-4.03] [-0.10] [-2.07]
Intermediary*Mortgage insurance 0.009 0.021* 0.032 0.006 0.039 0.051*
[0.27] [1.78] [0.81] [0.39] [0.38] [1.76]
Interest-rate -1.629* 2.359*** -0.012 2.819*** -3.850** 2.006***
[-1.69] [7.09] [-0.01] [5.81] [-2.46] [4.46]
Fixed rate period (1 = yes) -0.005 -0.003 0.011 -0.005 -0.047 -0.001
[-0.16] [-0.28] [0.28] [-0.36] [-0.94] [-0.04]
Mortgage type:
Deferred amortization 0.109*** 0.031*** 0.107*** 0.028** 0.117*** 0.036***
[5.47] [3.76] [4.09] [2.53] [3.69] [2.98]
Interest-only 0.017 -0.006 0.020 -0.006 0.034 -0.011
[0.81] [-0.65] [0.70] [-0.51] [1.04] [-0.67]
Log(value of house) -0.232*** 0.065*** -0.234*** 0.055*** -0.230*** 0.082***
[-14.82] [12.22] [-11.47] [8.29] [-9.30] [9.64]
Log(household income) 0.087*** -0.227*** 0.109*** -0.197*** 0.060** -0.263***
[4.25] [-17.25] [3.98] [-12.56] [1.97] [-12.71]
Age -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.002*
[-8.41] [-4.83] [-7.40] [-5.54] [-5.20] [-1.95]
Retired (1 = yes) 0.034 0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.095 0.005
[0.92] [0.36] [-0.02] [0.38] [1.51] [0.24]
Higher-vocational (1 = yes) 0.046** 0.032*** 0.071*** 0.034*** -0.001 0.023**
[2.54] [4.59] [2.93] [3.70] [-0.01] [2.20]
University (1 = yes) 0.090*** 0.043*** 0.141*** 0.039*** -0.004 0.044***
[4.23] [5.55] [5.08] [3.20] [-0.14] [4.29]
Male (1 = yes) -0.022 0.0212* -0.0325 0.046*** -0.018 -0.004
[-0.64] [1.82] [-0.66] [2.95] [-0.36] [-0.23]
Married (1 = yes) 0.072** 0.015 0.084** -0.002 0.050 0.032**
[2.56] [1.63] [2.15] [-0.16] [1.32] [2.50]
Household size -0.003 0.002 -0.006 0.004 0.003 0.001
[-0.44] [0.90] [-0.61] [0.96] [0.29] [0.12]
WealthQRT 2 0.001 -0.013 -0.006 -0.014 0.006 -0.006
[0.06] [-1.14] [-0.25] [-1.04] [0.17] [-0.46]
WealthQRT 3 -0.030 -0.011 -0.020 -0.013 -0.034 -0.009
[-1.56] [-1.40] [-0.77] [-1.16] [-1.08] [-0.76]
WealthQRT 4 -0.041* -0.007 -0.038 -0.011 -0.029 0.002
[-1.80] [-0.84] [-1.34] [-0.96] [-0.75] [0.13]
Constant 1.538*** 2.236*** 1.256*** 1.927*** 1.986*** 2.531***
[6.91] [17.48] [4.14] [12.07] [6.10] [13.37]
N 1333 1521 731 812 602 709
R2-adjusted 0.303 0.509 0.339 0.492 0.259 0.538
Full sample Banks Non-banks
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4.4.3 Robustness analysis  
 
A potential concern with the preceding analysis is that households might 
actually endogenously choose to obtain a mortgage through an intermediary (see 
Collins, 2010; Elliehausen et al., 2007) because, for example, they anticipate to 
obtain a larger mortgage, or because they can better negotiate with a broker than 
directly with the lender. On the lender side, endogeneity might arise if lenders leave 
certain groups of borrowers to brokers, for example, for reputational reasons. 
To examine whether the results are driven by endogeneity, an instrumental 
variables approach is presented in Table 4.8 where the intermediary is instrumented 
by the region where the household lives. The motivation for this instrument is that 
the presence of intermediaries varies to a larger extent with the degree of 
urbanization in the country than (bank) branches. The accessibility of the 
intermediary is related to the probability that households use an intermediary while 
it is exogenous to the outcome of the underwriting process. Unlike the U.S., where 
considerable regional variation exists in the housing market, the Dutch housing 
market is more homogenous. The correlation of local variations with the outcome 
of the underwriting process (e.g. local house price appreciation rates) is low and 
unlikely to be the main driver of our results.44 The first stage regression (Table 4.8, 
Column 1) confirms that the instrument is significant in explaining intermediary 
choice with the second stage results remaining quantitatively similar. 
Intermediaries do have a marginally positive impact on LTV-ratios of mortgages 
but the effect on affordability remains insignificant. We also re-estimated the model 
and instrumented the interaction effect between intermediaries and mortgage 
insurance. Again, we find no statistical evidence that there is an effect of 
intermediary involvement conditional on the mortgage being insured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
44 In unreported analysis, we rerun all models including region-dummies in the specification to examine the 
effect of regional variation in housing market conditions on the outcomes. The results are unaffected and the 
involvement of the intermediary and its interaction with mortgage insurance remain insignificant. 
 Screening Incentives in the Presence of Mortgage Insurance 105 
Table 4.8 ■ Instrumental variable analysis of mortgage debt ratios 
This table shows results of a 2SLS IV-model where the intermediary-dummy is instrumented by the region 
where the household lives: one if it lives in the western part of the Netherlands and zero otherwise. 
Columns 1 shows estimation results from the first-stage and column 2 and 3 second-stage results with the 
LTV and DSR ratio as the dependent variable. Debt-service ratio (DSR) is calculated as the annual 
mortgage payments divided by annual household income. The loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is the value of the 
house relative to the amount of mortgage debt. Amortizing mortgages are the reference category for 
mortgage type and non-bank lenders are the reference category to the bank-lender dummy. Data is from the 
Dutch Household Survey (DHS) and covers all mortgages originated between 2001 and 2009. Robust t-
statistics in brackets, ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
First stage LTV DSR
Instrument: western 0.073***
[2.95]
Intermediated (1 = yes) n.a. 0.600* -0.009
[1.71] [-0.10]
Interest-rate -2.869* -0.509 2.366***
[-1.69] [-0.29] [5.06]
Fixed rate period (1 = yes) -0.032 -0.009 0.009
[-0.63] [-0.22] [0.80]
NHG-guarantee (1 = yes) 0.097*** -0.038 -0.007
[-2.93] [-1.03] [-0.69]
Mortgage type:
Deferred amortization 0.289*** -0.039 0.026
[6.66] [-0.38] [0.89]
Interest-only 0.199*** -0.094 -0.002
[4.76] [-1.29] [-0.10]
Log(value of house) 0.026 -0.254*** 0.108***
[0.93] [-10.28] [14.59]
Log(household income) -0.060 0.142*** -0.243***
[-1.43] [3.64] [-15.41]
Age -0.009*** -0.002 -0.002**
[-5.97] [-0.64] [-2.16]
Retired (1 = yes) 0.008 0.022 -0.005
[0.13] [0.48] [-0.38]
Higher-vocational (1 = yes) -0.053 0.059* 0.032***
[-1.49] [1.81] [3.11]
University (1 = yes) 0.044 0.053 0.039***
[1.07] [1.45] [4.21]
Male (1 = yes) 0.052 -0.047 0.019
[0.85] [-0.84] [1.37]
Married (1 = yes) -0.068 0.104** 0.014
[-1.35] [2.19] [1.19]
Household size -0.018 0.011 0.001
[-1.23] [0.79] [0.05]
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Another explanation is that households are heterogeneous in their risk 
preference and that those more willing to take risks opt for larger mortgages, rather 
than brokers pushing higher debt levels. The dataset contains survey questions on 
the respondents’ willingness to make risky investments.  
To examine whether differences in risk aversion can confound previous the 
results, the analysis in Table 4.7, are repeated and controlled for risk preferences 
and are reported in Table 4.9. Again, we find no effect of intermediaries and/or the 
interaction with mortgage insurance on LTV or DSR-ratios, except for the 
subsample of mortgages originated by banks. In this case, the involvement of an 
intermediary - conditional on mortgage insurance - raises the LTV-ratio by 10 
percent. Consistent with economic intuition, risk aversion has a negative effect on 
the LTV-ratio. Households with less appetite for risks opt for lower mortgages, 
although the effects are insignificant for the models with debt-service ratio as the 
independent variable. Furthermore, brokers might have an adverse impact on the 
price of credit as noted in LaCour-Little (2009), but (unreported) analysis of this 
hypothesis returns no evidence that broker involvement affects the interest rates on 
the mortgage contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 continued
WealthQRT 2 -0.027 0.034 -0.013
[-0.54] [0.89] [-1.30]
WealthQRT 3 0.081** -0.069* -0.015
[2.14] [-1.65] [-1.39]
WealthQRT 4 -0.015 -0.034 -0.013
[-0.32] [-0.95] [-1.21]
Bank lender (1 = yes) -0.543 0.270* 0.846
[-21.84] [1.68] [0.87]
Constant 1.466 0.503 1.622*
[3.33] [0.81] [1.79]
Yeardummies Yes Yes Yes
N 1152 1152 1152
(Pseudo) R-square 0.399 0.312 0.343
Chi-square 311.43 880.69
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Table 4.9 ■ Results after controlling for risk aversion of the household 
This table shows results for OLS-models explaining mortgage-debt ratios controlling for the involvement 
of intermediaries and risk aversion of the household. Risk aversion is measured using a set of six survey 
questions that are combined in one scale. Debt-service ratio (DSR) is calculated as the annual mortgage 
payments divided by annual household income. The loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is the ratio of property value 
to mortgage debt. Data is from the Dutch Household Survey (DHS) and covers all mortgages originated 
between 2001 and 2009. Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 
5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Some limitations apply to the extent that we can control for all determinants 
of the outcome of the underwriting process. The most obvious limitation to this 
study is that it cannot control for the credit history of the household by means of a 
FICO-type credit score. The credit score of the household possibly acts as an 
omitted variable. Unlike the U.S., no uniform credit score data is available and 
transparency on how these measures are constructed is lacking (see also Cocco, 
2011). Household income and its wealth position (which subtracts all debts from 
the assets it possesses) are likely to be highly correlated to the credit score and 
these are already included in all models. Moreover, the effect of a credit-score 
variable should prevail for non-insured credit because application screening is most 
important to lenders for mortgages where they have credit risk exposure. In this 
case we would expect to find a significant effect of the intermediary caused by an 
omitted credit score variable if riskier borrowers get matched to a lender with lower 
credit standards. The inclusion of lender fixed effects in the analysis should 
reasonably proxy for this heterogeneity among lenders and the intermediary should 
as a result be insignificant. Similarly, for insured mortgages, the mortgage-
insurance dummy captures the effect of the omitted credit score variable, leaving 
LTV DSR LTV DSR LTV DSR
Intermediated (1 = yes) 0.034 -0.004 -0.004 0.010 0.014 -0.025
[1.32] [-0.51] [-0.15] [0.89] [0.22] [-1.14]
Mortgage insurance (1 = yes) 0.024 -0.029*** 0.023 -0.030*** -0.164 -0.064*
[0.80] [-3.02] [0.74] [-2.97] [-1.30] [-1.88]
Intermediary*Mortgage insurance 0.033 0.014 0.102** 0.018 0.207 0.055
[0.86] [1.12] [2.12] [0.90] [1.62] [1.56]
Risk aversion -0.004*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.003 0.001
[-3.13] [-0.72] [-2.95] [-1.56] [-1.30] [0.35]
Control variables (see Table 
4.4A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 992 1153 550 623 442 530
R2-adjusted 0.316 0.497 0.384 0.473 0.239 0.543
Full sample Banks Non-banks
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again our main variable of interest (the dummy for intermediary involvement) 
insignificant. 
Furthermore, we do not observe default or delinquency rates on loans, as these 
data are not publicly available in the Netherlands. Foreclosure rates are, despite 
high initial LTV-ratios and low amortization rates, low in the Netherlands (in 2009, 
around 0.06 percent of the insured loans defaulted). Analysis of the data of the 
mortgage insurer, revealed that most of the actual defaults where clustered in the 
Southern part of Rotterdam (the second largest city in the Netherlands), where 
housing boards have been selling off houses to their renters. The dataset does not 
contain information on the involvement of mortgage brokers in this process, but the 
region controls should reasonably control for this particular case in Rotterdam. 
Finally, we use self-reported data for a relatively low amount of respondents. 
Naturally, the amount of new mortgage loans that enter the survey each year is 
relatively low. This hinders the establishment and inference of a causal relationship 
between broker involvement and underwriting outcomes. However, the availability 
of a wide variety of background information on borrowers and the fact that we can 
compare brokered loans funded by the same lender while simultaneously 
controlling for heterogeneity among lenders, adds to our understanding of lending 
behavior despite us not being able (in the strictest sense) to establish causality.  
Moreover, the Dutch context provides, through the absence of co-insurance 
between lenders and mortgage insurers and low securitization rates, a quasi-
experimental setting to examine the impact of mortgage insurance on lender’s 
screening incentives. 
  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This paper examines whether commission-based pay leads to a misalignment 
of interest between households and intermediaries. We expect that lenders have an 
incentive to screen mortgage applications and monitor intermediaries when they are 
exposed to credit risks. Consequently, we hypothesize that intermediaries have 
limited freedom to maximize commission income at the expense of households. 
Defining the loan-to-value and debt-service ratios as outcome variables for the 
underwriting process, we find that there is an effect of brokers on these ratios. 
However, inclusion of lender fixed-effects shows that this effect is largely 
explained by heterogeneity in lending standards among lenders, rather than the 
involvement of the intermediary. We do find that the involvement of intermediaries 
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increases the likelihood that borrowers have an alternative mortgage product, but 
argue that this in itself is not necessarily to the disadvantage of borrowers.  
We continue by examining whether there is an effect of intermediaries on the 
LTV- or DSR ratio when mortgages are insured. Mortgage insurance transfers the 
credit risk from the originator to the mortgage insurer and reduces the incentive for 
the lender to monitor the broker and screen mortgage applications. Our results do 
not lend support for this hypothesis, even after accounting for endogenous selection, 
regional variations and risk preferences of borrowers.  
Although the compensation structure of brokers is up for debate, including 
decreasing incentives for sales volume, it is not clear which problem it solves. 
Alternative compensation structures come with their own challenges (see Robinson, 
2007), while the effectiveness of licensing requirements for brokers has not 
received uniform support (Todd and Kleiner, 2007). Based on the results of this 
paper, regulation and monitoring of lending institutions seems to be the effective 
route towards preventing over-levering households. Furthermore, it is advisable to 
redesign the mortgage insurance policy in this paper, towards a coinsurance-
structure with the lender. This ensures that screening and monitoring incentives 
remain present even if the lender funds an insured mortgage. Though no evidence 
was found that either lenders or brokers take advantage of this caveat in the current 
structure, the U.S. securitization market has shown, in hindsight, the importance of 
lenders keeping a position in their credit portfolio.   
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Chapter 5                                             
The Demand for Mortgage Insurance45 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Financial leverage of households’ increased markedly over the past decade 
in developed economies across the world. Mortgage debt used to finance 
homeownership is generally the largest liability on the households balance sheet 
(Guiso and Sodini, 2012; Tufano, 2009; Campbell, 2006), and the indivisibility of 
housing leads to asset holdings concentrated in real estate (Flavin and Yamashita, 
2011; Yao and Zhang, 2005).  
When house prices start to decline, households’ wealth is put at risk due to 
the evaporation of home equity. Negative equity arises when the mortgage liability 
exceeds the market-value of the property, while recourse mortgage debt holds 
households liable for repayment beyond what is recovered from sales- or 
foreclosure proceeds.46 Households can avoid incurring these losses by adopting a 
‘wait-and-see’ strategy when selling their property (Shiller, 2009). However, an 
adverse income shock caused by a divorce, involuntary unemployment, or death 
can trigger foreclosure and entitle the lender to be instantly repaid. In that case, 
households can no longer delay repayment and the shortfall has to be covered out 
of personal wealth (e.g. savings). 
This paper examines whether households insure this wealth risk with 
mortgage insurance (Bourassa et al., 2009). Although the undiversified nature of 
the households’ portfolio suggests that it is wise to have mortgage insurance 
                                            
45 This chapter is based on a working paper by Cox (2012, under review). I would like to thank Dion Bongaerts, 
Dirk Brounen, Roger Brown, Zhao Daxuan, Peter Neuteboom, Melissa Porras Prado, Henri Servaes, Jim Shilling, 
Mark Van Achter, Maarten van Rooij, Dominik Rosch, Manuel Vasconcelos and seminar participants at the 
European Retail Investment Conference (2013), AsRES-AREUEA International Meeting 2012, ERES Annual 
Meeting 2012, ARES Annual Meeting 2012 and Rotterdam School of Management for helpful comments. This 
project was partially executed during the author’s research visit at National University of Singapore.  
46 Although legally this opportunity absent for recourse debt, the stigma, reduced access to credit, cost of 
relocation and moral issues prevent households from strategic defaulting or just walking away from their home 
when mortgage debt is non-recourse (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2012). 
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(Englund et al., 2002), we are not aware of empirical research that examines which 
factors distinguish households with mortgage insurance from those who are 
uninsured. Potential explanations for these differences are unawareness of the risk, 
pricing of the insurance policy, or liquidity motives (e.g. the ability to pay the 
insurance premium) (Rampini and Vishnawathan, 2010; Johnson et al., 1993; 
Slovic et al., 1977).47 However, Cole et al. (2012) demonstrate that also non-price 
factors such as behavioral traits play a significant role on insurance demand. 
Based on an extensive Dutch panel dataset, we document results consistent 
with the ‘overconfidence’ hypothesis. This hypothesis states that households 
underestimate risk exposure with respect to driving, health and finances and 
subsequently do not take precautionary action such as insuring - reflected in low 
demand for these policies - or holding precautionary savings against those risks.48 
Prior work documented that the demand for unemployment and life insurance 
policies (longevity risk) can be partially explained by overconfidence (Sandroni 
and Squintani, 2004). Using an overconfidence proxy derived from self-evaluated 
financial knowledge (Greenwald, 1980) and one based on expressed propensity to 
spend current income (Wilcox, 2007; Ludvigson, 2004), we find that a one standard 
deviation increase in overconfidence lowers mortgage insurance adoption rates by 
11 to 13 percent. In contrast to earlier empirical work by Barber and Odean (2001), 
we find no difference of overconfidence across gender or marital status. These 
results are robust to alternative model specifications such as the inclusion of 
regional dummies and non-linear functions of income and age. 
We consider a variety of alternative explanations. We extend our model by 
including prior homeownership to examine the impact of an awareness, familiarity 
or experience-related explanation for insurance demand. One could expect that 
households who owned their previous house have an increased level of awareness 
of the risks associated with homeownership.49 This can affect demand for mortgage 
insurance, although we do not find evidence for this. We also allow for the 
interaction between overconfidence and housing market experience but find no 
systematic effect. This suggests that overconfidence is not varying with experience 
consistent with previous empirical findings (Jonsson and Allwood, 2003). 
Optimistic expectations regarding house price developments potentially lowers 
insurance demand as those decrease expected payouts. A specification that includes 
                                            
47 We come back to the importance of these explanations for this paper in the next section where we discuss the 
institutional background in this paper at length.  
48 In general this literature is concerned with underinsurance against low-probability/large consequence risks 
such as natural disasters or disability risk. 
49 Strictly speaking, a prior mortgage default would be a better proxy for experience and awareness of the risk 
and policy, but our dataset does not contain this information. Moreover, the low foreclosure rates in the 
Netherlands during our sample period limit the effect of survivorship bias. 
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house price expectations yields the anticipated negative effect on insurance demand 
(albeit marginally insignificant), but it does not affect earlier findings. 
We continue by testing the robustness of our results against alternative 
measures for the households’ risk profile. Instead of using the loan-to-value ratio as 
an indicator for the short-fall risk, we define alternative proxies based on the loan-
to-income ratio, debt-service ratio, and mortgage-debt-to-wealth ratio. These 
measures intend to control for the ability to pay and the degree of portfolio 
diversification but are not found to materially alter the results. In addition, we 
examine whether the household head has a permanent employment contract and 
whether his/her partner has paid employment, but again our results remain 
unaffected. Inclusion of the length of marriage as a proxy for marital stability and 
the number of children living at home does not yield different findings either. 
Next, we consider the role of peer and advisory effects. Cole et al. (2012) 
and Guiso et al. (2008) show that trust is an important factor in the decision process 
especially when households are unfamiliar with the product or its vendor. Learning 
via trusted peers about the features of the product can decrease the hurdle to 
purchase insurance thereby raising adoption rates, while financial advisors can raise 
awareness by actively recommending such a policy. No effect of peers where found, 
and the involvement of a professional financial advisor decreases insurance 
adoption, This might either indicate the outcome of the advisory process 
(recommendation to remain uninsured) or households mistrusting financial advisors 
and acting contrarily to what is recommended to them (see Bhattacharya et al., 
2012).  
Our results contribute to two literature streams. First, we contribute to the 
behavioral and household finance literature. Campbell (2006) argues that 
households make serious mistakes when it concerns the diversification of risky 
portfolios. Although the degree of diversification in investment portfolios has 
received empirical attention (for example in Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008), 
hedging behavior with respect to real estate assets has received limited attention so 
far. This is surprising given their weight in the asset portfolio for the average 
household (Guiso and Sodini, 2012; Campbell, 2006). Moreover, the richness of 
our dataset also allows us to shed more light on the influence of peer (Hong et al., 
2004) and advisory effects on household decision making. 
Second, our empirical evidence is based on an extensive survey data-set. We 
show that diffusion of insurance products is affected by overconfidence of 
households. This offers additional insight in the longstanding ‘insurance-puzzle’, 
which postulates that households fail to purchase coverage for low-
probability/high-consequence events (Kunreuther, 1978). Empirical evidence found 
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that households overinsure on air travel (Eisner and Trotz, 1961) while they 
underinsure on disaster-type risks (Kunreuther, 1978). This is surprising, because 
the consequences of a disaster (e.g. flooding) are far more severe and far-reaching 
than the insolvency of a flight carrier, both in monetary and non-monetary terms. 
Much theoretical and experimental work has aimed to explain this behavior, but 
survey based evidence has as of yet been scarce.50 
Our results have implications for policy makers. Underinsurance can be 
countered by pursuing originators and regulators to adopt it as an industry standard. 
Leaving the decision to households, adoption rates can be raised by educating 
(prospective) homeowners on the risks and availability of hedging products. 
However, as Willis (2008) argues, this strategy might have limited effect if basic 
education just raises the level of confidence without substantially increasing the 
ability to make informed decisions. Selling insurance policies in bundles as 
proposed for example in Kunreuther and Pauly (2004) is often forbidden and as 
such ineffective in increasing adoption rates. It also impedes the freedom of choice 
for households to choose to insure risks as they wish.  As a final way to raise 
adoption, one could simply make insuring the default-option. 
We continue this paper with an in-depth discussion of mortgage insurance in 
the Netherlands in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses the dataset and construction of 
measures. Section 5.4 presents our results and robustness checks, while Section 5.5 
concludes.   
 
 
5.2 Mortgage insurance in the Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands offers a unique institutional setting to analyze mortgage 
insurance demand. In this section we discuss the organization and governance of 
the mortgage market, the characteristics of the insurance policy, and the general 
economic development of the Netherlands during our period of analysis.  
 
 
  
                                            
50 See for example the experimental evidence in: Laury et al., 2009; Hsee and Kunreuther, 2000 McClelland et 
al., 1993; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1995; Ganderton et al., 2000; and theoretical work by Kunreuther and Pauly, 
2004; Kunreuther et al., 2001; and Gollier, 2003; Meyer and Meyer, 1998. 
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5.2.1 The Dutch mortgage market 
 
The Dutch mortgage market is well developed and, measured as a percentage of 
national GDP, one of the largest in the world. Dutch mortgage lenders have full 
recourse on their borrowers and actively pursue them to get repaid in case of 
default. The recourse provision and the priority in bankruptcy claims create a 
strong position for mortgage lenders, and limits the customer’s bargaining (or 
credible threatening) power to renegotiate on the mortgage terms in case of 
financial distress. When an originator decides to foreclose the property and a 
household is unable to fully repay, then the household faces the risk of personal 
bankruptcy. Upon entering bankruptcy, outstanding debt has to be repaid in three 
years while living on welfare level. Households typically have to reduce 
consumption levels during this period and are forced to relinquish control over their 
finances to a trustee.51 Despite these institutional settings, Dutch mortgages are 
characterized by high initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratios − often exceeding 100 
percent − and low amortization rates (Charlier and Bussel, 2003). The increasing 
popularity of mortgage products that defer amortization since the mid-90’s, further 
increased the outstanding mortgage debt balance. Moreover, neither a down-
payment, nor mortgage insurance is required by lenders for high LTV-loans.52 Low 
amortization rates and high initial leverage ratios increase the risk that households 
have negative equity even if house prices decrease only modestly and warrants for 
mortgage insurance. Nevertheless, mortgage default rates in the Netherlands are 
low as will be discussed in Section 2.3, but we first continue with a discussion of 
the mortgage insurance policy and its provider. 
 
 
5.2.2 The mortgage insurer and insurance policy 
 
Mortgage insurance for shortfall risk has been available in the Netherlands 
for over fifty years, and is since 1995 sold under the National Mortgage Guarantee 
(henceforth NHG) label. The insurance is in essence a standard indemnity contract, 
with NHG as its sole vendor. Although private alternatives have tried to gain 
ground over the years, none of them achieved or sustained a meaningful market 
share. Competition-related explanations for adoption-rates caused by differences in 
pricing and contract features (e.g. deductible levels), or adverse selection on the 
insurer’s side such as insuring ‘good’ risks are irrelevant to our study. Another 
                                            
51 This type of bankruptcy is similar to filing bankruptcy under “Chapter 13” in the U.S. 
52 This makes the system fundamentally different from the U.S. or Canada where it is either the ‘industry 
standard’ or legally required to have mortgage insurance for loans that have a LTV-ratio exceeding 80 percent. 
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distinguishing feature is that NHG is financially backed by the Dutch government 
and local municipalities. This limits the risk that NHG will not be able to honor its 
obligations in case that the payout-ratios are unexpectedly high and financial 
reserves become depleted (Doherty and Schlesinger, 1990). 
The policy sold by NHG is in some aspects comparable to mortgage 
insurance provided by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in the U.S. For 
example, NHG targets the lower and middle price range of the housing market 
where it intends to lower barriers to homeownership for households. A second 
similarity to FHA is that NHG does not originate mortgages but that it insures the 
lender against a loss of principal and the household against a wealth loss in case of 
foreclosure. After deduction of foreclosure proceeds, a shortfall is covered provided 
that the reason for default is outside the household’s control (e.g. loss of income 
due to involuntary unemployment, divorce and death). The credit record of the 
household will reflect a foreclosure for five years, but the impairment of access to 
future credit is not as severe as in a personal bankruptcy. Following a foreclosure, 
households are again eligible to obtain mortgage insurance, although in practice, 
access to credit is dependent on the willingness and internal credit standards of the 
originator to lend to a borrower that has been previously foreclosed. 
Mortgages must meet several criteria in order to qualify for insurance and 
can only be insured at origination.53 NHG imposes restrictions on the size of the 
mortgage (not to exceed 265.000 euro), the initial LTV ratio (not to exceed 112 
percent),54 usage of the mortgage (only first liens on the primary residence), and 
amortization type (no more than 50 percent non-amortizing debt) in order to be 
eligible for the policy.  
Provided that mortgages meet these criteria, households can purchase 
insurance for a one-time fee of 0.55 percent of the outstanding balance. This fee is 
irrespective of the initial LTV-ratio with no other subsequent fees being charged. 
Upon insuring, households receive a rate discount averaging 30 basis points from 
the lender, which is enjoyed over the entire mortgage term. The insurance premium 
is tax-deductible at the marginal income tax-rate in the year the property is acquired, 
and financeable within the mortgage.  
 
 
 
                                            
53 All numbers mentioned are applicable in 2009. The eligible mortgage size and insurance premium both show 
an increasing pattern during the analysis period (1995-2009), but we account for this in our analysis.  
54 Household can purchase a house worth 236,000 euro and finance 28,000 euro of transaction costs (notary fees, 
taxes, etc.) for a total of 264,000 euro with an initial loan-to-value ratio of 112 percent. 
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Figure 5.1 ■ Mortgage insurance adoption rates 
This figure shows the percentage of insured mortgage insurance adoption rates as a fraction of the 
mortgages eligible for insurance between 1995 and 2010. Data are from the DNB Household Survey. 
 
 
These attractive financial terms decrease the likelihood that price or liquidity 
related factors are explanations for (low) adoption rates (see also Cole et al., 2012; 
Rampini and Vishwanathan, 2010). 55  Market research reveals that among 
uninsured households; 8 percent mention ‘costs’ as a reason not to insure, while 40 
percent indicates this is due to ‘other reasons’ (Authority of Financial Markets, 
2010). Roughly 50 percent of the respondents indicate that they are not eligible for 
mortgage insurance. Awareness of the policy’s existence is also widespread, as 97 
percent of the uninsured households indicate to be aware of the availability of 
mortgage insurance.  
Figure 5.1 illustrates the percentage of insured mortgages relative to the pool 
of eligible mortgages over time. Even after allowing for a diffusion period in the 
first years that the policy was sold under the NHG label, only half of the eligible 
mortgages are insured. Although we defer the discussion and development of our 
overconfidence measures to Section 5.3.2, it is worth mentioning that we do not 
find a time pattern in overconfidence and only a slight decrease in intended 
spending after 2008. 
                                            
55 There is an opportunity cost to obtaining mortgage insurance as financing with interest-only debt maximizes 
the (present) value of the mortgage interest tax-deductibility. However, this effect is partially countered by down 
payments that banks demand on such loans leading to a lower LTV-ratio and a loss on interest-income that 
savings yield. 
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Figure 5.2 ■ House price index and unemployment rate development 
This figure shows the house price index and unemployment rate development in the Netherlands between 
1995 and 2010. Source: Bureau of Census Statistics.  
 
 
5.2.3 General economic development in the Netherlands 
 
To put Figure 5.1 in more perspective, the development of unemployment 
rates and house prices in the Netherlands during 1995-2010 is shown in Figure 5.2 
as these directly affect the probability of default and the shortfall risk. Figure 5.2 
indicates that house prices in the Netherlands almost tripled from 1995 until 2008, 
while unemployment rates were amongst the lowest in Europe. As a consequence, 
foreclosure rates are low compared to for example the U.S. In 2009 for example 
only 0.04 percent of the Dutch properties were foreclosed compared to 2.21 percent 
in the U.S. (RealTrac, 2012), with the average shortfall being 22,500 euros.56 The 
favorable economic climate of the nineties made originators exert little pressure to 
insure on households as the value of the collateral was stable. This limited the risk 
that losses occurred in their mortgage portfolio.57   
 
                                            
56 The average amount of savings a household had in 2009 was 46,100 euros. However, households use them to 
avoid default on their loans or mortgages. Once they enter foreclosure, savings are often depleted and a shortfall 
immediately creates negative net worth. 
57 We thank employees from mortgage lenders in the Netherlands for sharing insights in the origination process. 
NHG-insurance was not actively sold up to 2009, when both the crisis struck global capital markets and national 
regulators increased oversight and criteria for mortgage lending and advising. Consequently, adoption rates went 
up to 85 percent in 2010 and 2011. 
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However, in itself these macroeconomic factors affect all homeowners, and 
as such they provide no direct answer why certain households insure and others do 
not. Moreover, in contrast to the rural Indian sample of Cole et al. (2012), our 
Dutch sample is from a developed Western economy where residents receive a high 
level of education and consequently exhibit high levels of literacy and numeracy 
(see United Nations Development Programme). This increases the likelihood that 
they have the basic capability to evaluate financial products. Finally, Dutch 
households are risk-averse given that they take the second place worldwide in the 
amount of income they spent on insurance premiums. We can therefore expect 
familiarity with the basic mechanics of insurance products.58 Evaluated as a whole, 
this leads us to believe that decision maker traits, especially confidence, are an 
important factor in insurance decisions. Before presenting the empirical evaluation, 
we continue with a discussion of the data and the derivation of our measures. 
 
 
5.3 Data description and measurements 
  
We use data from the DNB Household Survey (DHS), which is sponsored by 
the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and administered by CentERdata. CentERdata is an 
institute affiliated to Tilburg University and specialized in the collection and 
dissemination of datasets used in socio-economic research. The DHS started in 
1993 and is yearly administered among a representative sample of 2,000 Dutch 
households. It contains a wide variety of information on household characteristics 
such as income and employment status as well as psychological constructs. 59 
Participation takes place on a voluntary basis and involves no monetary 
compensation. CentERdata recruits participants by phone and keeps the panel 
representative of the Dutch population to limit attrition bias.  
An advantage of the DHS is that households can fill out the survey at home 
via internet, where they have all relevant information with respect to their finances 
such as mortgages, insurances and account balances available. This reduces 
reporting errors, while the absence of an interviewer reduces response-biases 
(Duffy et al., 2005). In order to reduce the impact of reporting errors, income and 
wealth related variables are winsorized at 10 percent of their distribution. Imposing 
the eligibility criteria for insurance on our dataset, we obtain a sample of 3,069 
                                            
58 A Dutch household has on average eight different policies. Excluding mandatory insurance policies, Dutch 
households come in second on the world-ranking with respect to the amount they spend on insurance policies, 
after the Swiss.  
59 See Van Rooij et al. (2011) and Guiso et al. (2008) for other applications of this dataset. 
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newly originated mortgages between 1995 (when NHG mortgage insurance become 
available) and 2009 that are suitable for the analysis. 
 
 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
We show an overview of sample statistics for insured and uninsured 
households, including t-tests for the equality of means between them in Table 5.1. 
Definitions of the control variables are reported in Table II.1 in Appendix II.  
Households in the insured-group have a LTV-ratio that is on average 12 percent 
higher than those in the non-insured sample and this is significant. Part of this 
difference is explained by the proportion of first-time home buyers in the insured 
subsample. They often include transaction costs and notary fees in their mortgage 
because of limited wealth. This is also supported in the descriptive statistics as the 
percentage new entrants to the homeownership market is higher for the group that 
has mortgage insurance (14 percent) than the non-insured group (9 percent) and this 
difference is significant (p=0.000).  
Furthermore, it appears that differences in interest-rates are insignificant, 
with the group-means being only 5 basis points apart. This seems inconsistent with 
insured households receiving a rate-discount as was previously discussed. However, 
as LTV-ratios are significantly higher for the insured group, it is likely that 
households would have to pay an even higher interest rate in the absence of 
mortgage insurance. Interest-rates therefore actually reflect a discount on a risk-
adjusted base.  
Demographically, uninsured households are more often retired (19 percent), 
older (50.1 years old) and higher educated (15.4 percent holds a university degree). 
The wealth-distribution shows that households with mortgage-insurance are 
significantly more likely to be in the third quartile, while those that are uninsured 
are more likely to be in the top quartile.60 This appears to be consistent with the 
theory that external insurance is less appealing for wealthier households as they are 
able to ‘self-insure’ (Ganderton et al., 2004; Gollier, 2003).   
 
 
 
                                            
60 Wealth is defined as the sum of all assets (checking- and savings accounts, savings plans, life-insurance, 
employee-sponsored savings plans) minus all liabilities (debt) analogously to Van Rooij et al. (2011). As wealth 
and income increased over the sample period, the quartiles are computed year-by-year to account for trending.  
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Table 5.1 ■ Sample descriptive statistics 
This table shows weighted means and standard deviations (SD) for the complete sample split into 
households that did and did not insurance their mortgage. T-test assumes equality of variances conditional 
on a F-test. Data are from the DNB Household Survey and cover all eligible mortgages originated between 
1995 and 2009. Variable definitions are contained in Table II.1 in Appendix II. 
 
 
 
5.3.2 Description of overconfidence measures 
 
The empirical literature distinguishes broadly four alternatives to 
operationalize and measure overconfidence: hubris, overoptimistic self-evaluations, 
miscalibration, and attribution bias. Overconfidence in the form of hubris is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘better-than-average’ effect. A well-known example of 
hubris is found in the assessment of driving skills. Svenson (1981) shows that 
individuals overrate their skill if asked to compare their skill level relative to a 
group. The majority indicates their skill level to be above the group-average, while 
realistic assessments imply that about fifty percent of the respondents are to be 
expected to rate themselves below the group-average. 
Related to hubris are overoptimistic self-evaluations (Greenwald, 1980), 
with the difference being that self-evaluations typically do not involve performance 
judgments with reference to a peer-group. Typically, this type of bias is 
characterized by a discrepancy between an individual’s self-rated level of skill 
Mean SD N Mean SD N t-statistic p-value N
Mortgage characteristics
Interest-rate 5.42 1.14 1978 5.47 1.18 824 -1.15 0.124 2802
Interest-only mortgage 0.43 0.50 2121 0.21 0.41 910 11.69 0.000 3031
Endowment mortgage 0.07 0.26 2121 0.13 0.34 910 -5.35 0.000 3031
LTV 0.77 0.27 2147 0.89 0.23 922 -11.85 0.000 3069
Demographic characteristics
New entrant 0.09 0.28 2147 0.14 0.35 922 -4.47 0.000 3069
Retired 0.19 0.39 2133 0.07 0.26 920 8.45 0.000 3053
Self employed 0.02 0.13 2133 0.02 0.13 920 -0.10 0.459 3053
Higher vocational 0.30 0.46 2131 0.33 0.47 920 -2.05 0.020 3051
University 0.15 0.36 2131 0.12 0.32 920 2.39 0.008 3051
Male 0.89 0.31 2133 0.87 0.34 920 1.99 0.022 3053
Married 0.79 0.41 2133 0.74 0.44 921 2.93 0.001 3054
Age 50.11 14.12 2131 42.54 12.03 920 14.19 0.000 3051
Children 0.37 0.48 2147 0.43 0.50 922 -3.44 0.000 3069
Median income 0.60 0.49 2144 0.59 0.49 922 0.56 0.287 3066
Double median income 0.10 0.30 2147 0.07 0.25 922 2.97 0.001 3069
Wealth
Quartile 1 0.30 0.46 2147 0.29 0.45 922 0.80 0.209 3069
Quartile 2 0.09 0.29 2147 0.10 0.30 922 -1.18 0.117 3069
Quartile 3 0.27 0.45 2147 0.34 0.48 922 -3.90 0.000 3069
Quartile 4 0.33 0.47 2147 0.26 0.44 922 3.80 0.000 3069
Non-insured households Insured households t-test for equality in means
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versus the level that is objectively obtained from example test results (Johnson et 
al., 2006). Further, it is documented that men overestimate and women 
underestimate their performance on tasks, especially when those are in the 
masculine domain, such as finance (Barber and Odean, 2001; Byer, 1990). It is also 
found that individuals are less accurate in evaluating their own than their peer’s 
skill (John and Robins, 1994). By and large, this literature shows that the 
overconfidence bias in assessments is highest for a male respondent that evaluates 
his own skill in the masculine (e.g. finance) domain. 
 Thirdly, it is found that people overestimate the precision of their knowledge, 
leading to ‘miscalibration’. Typically this bias manifests itself in too narrowly 
estimated confidence intervals by respondents. (Deaves et al., 2009; Biais et al., 
2005). For example, participants are asked to predict a value-range such that an 
actual value will fall within the predicted range 90 percent of the time. 
Miscalibrated individuals predict intervals that are too narrow, such that the actual 
value will fall outside their predicted interval more than 10 percent of the time. It is 
also documented that miscalibration is not confined to areas or tasks where 
respondents are known to have limited expertise, but also emerges in domains 
where they are knowledgeable. 
    Finally, individuals tend to take too much credit for their contributions to 
positive outcomes in the past, known as attribution bias (Barber and Odean, 2001; 
Miller and Ross, 1975). An individual learns about his ability through the outcomes 
of his actions, which is either a success or a failure. Overconfidence arises in this 
case if an individual attributes successes to his ability while failures are attributed 
to bad luck (Gervais and Odean, 2001).  
It should be noted that different types of overconfidence do not exclude each 
other (Daniel et al., 1998) and that the presence of one type of overconfidence is 
not a sufficient condition that other types are also present (Acker and Duck, 2008; 
Glaser and Weber, 2007). Overconfidence is a relatively stable personal 
characteristic (Jonsson and Allwood, 2003; Klayman et al., 1999), although the 
level of overconfidence is expected to decrease with age and/or experience as 
people become better able to assess themselves (Gervais and Odean, 2001). 
Moreover, men are in general more overconfident about their abilities than women, 
especially when tasks are in the domain of finance (Barber and Odean, 2001; Beyer 
and Bowden, 1997; Lundeberg et al., 1994; Prince, 1993). 
To identify whether the demand for mortgage insurance is affected by 
overconfidence, we develop two indicators.  
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Our first indicator is constructed from self-evaluations using a two-stage 
approach similar to the one adopted by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009). In the first 
stage, we observe the respondent’s self-assessment of financial knowledge 
(Appendix I). We assume, as discussed above, that these scores partially reflect the 
true level of financial ability and partially contain an under- or overestimation. To 
parse out a measure for overconfidence, we regress these responses on objective 
determinants of financial literacy and obtain the residuals as a proxy for 
overconfidence. This proxy is included in the second stage model that explains 
insurance adoption.   
Measurement of financial literacy is a rapidly developing field on its own, 
but empirical evidence indicates that in general financial literacy relates closely to 
wealth, education, income, participation in financial markets, and financial 
experience (Calvet et al., 2011; Van Rooij et al., 2011; Goetzmann and Kumar, 
2008). As these characteristics are observed in the data, we estimate the following 
model for respondent i in year t, on aforementioned variables and demographic 
controls:  
 
݈݂ܵ݁ − ܽݏݏ݁ݏݏ݁݀ ݂݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ ݈݅ݐ݁ݎܽܿݕ௜௧ =
           ݂(݈݅ݐ݁ݎܽܿݕ − ݀݁ݐ݁ݎ݉݅݊ܽ݊ݐݏ, ݀݁݉݋݃ݎܽ݌ℎ݅ܿ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ)௜௧ + ߝ௜௧               (5.1) 
 
The residuals of the regression (εit) contain the over- and under prediction of 
the respondents’ financial knowledge, while the fitted value corresponds to the 
‘true’ level of financial knowledge. A positive residual can be interpreted as an 
indicator for overconfidence (the response exceeds the fitted value) relative to the 
average respondent, and a negative residual as an indicator for underconfidence 
(the fitted value exceeds the response). An advantage of this approach is that the 
time difference between the insurance decision and the self-assessment is short by 
construction (less than a year). This alleviates the concern that experience 
contaminates the self-assessment as it is likely that the self-assessment reflects a 
learning-effect the longer the time between the decision and the self-assessment.  
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Table 5.2 ■ Explaining self-assessed financial knowledge 
This table shows results for a first stage OLS regression explaining self-assessed financial knowledge by 
households. Robust t-statistics are reported. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Data are from the DNB Household Survey and cover 1995 and 2009. Variable definitions are 
contained in Table II.1 in Appendix II. 
 
 
Results of the first-stage regression are reported in Table 5.2. Our sample 
shrinks by almost 800 observations to 2252 observations because the self-
assessment data is missing. Coefficients for income (reference category are 
households with income below the median level), marital status, and participation 
in financial markets are highly significant with their signs according to 
expectation.61 The insignificance of other control variables and low R-squares raise 
concerns about the adequacy of the specification. We examine the sensitivity of the 
specification in Section 5.4.2, but note here that our explanatory power and results 
are similar to those obtained in comparable studies (Van Rooij et al., 2011; 
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009). Although this measure is noisy, it typically biases 
second stage coefficients downwards, thereby working against us finding any effect. 
If our measure relates to an overconfidence trait and if insurance decisions are 
indeed affected by overconfidence then we expect the mean residual to be positive 
for the non-insured and male subgroups.62 Inspection of the residuals over time 
                                            
61 Participation in financial markets is computed as a dummy equal to 1 if households hold at least one of the 
asset classes stated in Appendix I and zero otherwise. 
62 Uninsured versus insured (0.013 versus -0.031, p = 0.007); men versus women (0.013 versus -0.105, p = 
0.003). 
Dependent variable: Self-assessed financial knowledge
Coefficient t -value
Holding financial assets 0.311*** [9.62]
Self employed 0.069 [0.55]
Higher vocational 0.026 [0.81]
University 0.036 [0.83]
Married 0.150*** [4.10]
Age -0.011*** [-10.00]
Children -0.124*** [-3.62]
Median income 0.044 [1.38]
Double median income 0.177*** [2.76]
Wealthquartile 2 -0.013 [-0.23]
Wealthquartile 3 -0.017 [-0.40]
Wealthquartile 4 0.024 [0.54]
Constant 2.411*** [22.56]
Number of observations 2252
Adjusted R2 0.094
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does not reveal a particular pattern, which agrees with the literature that 
overconfidence is a stable trait (Jonsson and Allwood, 2003; Klayman et al., 1999). 
As a second indicator, we measure the household’s inclination towards 
spending (see Section 5.6, Appendix I). Consumer spending relates to consumer 
sentiment, which is typically defined as the household’s confidence in the past and 
future development of the economy (Van Raaij and Gianotten, 1990). Wilcox 
(2007) and Ludvigson (2004), show that these sentiment indicators are able to 
explain growth in consumption of services and non-durable goods. Households 
exhibiting more confidence about their future prospects are arguably more likely to 
spend current income, rather than save for precautionary reasons. The poles of the 
answer-scale are rather extreme: with a ‘1’ indicating that the household wants to 
spend all his money directly, while a ‘7’ indicates that the household wants to save 
as much as possible. We therefore expect this indicator, albeit it not exactly similar 
to self-overconfidence, to show a similar pattern as our overconfidence indicator: 
households willing to aggressively spend their income are less likely to insure their 
mortgage; because they are less concerned that an adverse event will occur (it 
decreases precautionary behavior). Of course these effects need to be adjusted for 
the level and volatility of current and future income and spending needs (e.g. 
children’s education) which we capture with control variables for labor market 
position, age, household composition and level of education. 
Given a level of household confidence, differences in insurance rates might 
reflect varying degrees of risk aversion. We therefore include a proxy for risk 
aversion in all analyses which we construct from six survey questions (see 
Appendix I). The statements intend to reveal how willing the household is to make 
risky investments. Scores on the third, fifth and sixth item were reversed and 
subsequently added to one resulting scale ranging from 6 (very risk tolerant) to 42 
(very risk averse).  
 
 
5.4 Multivariate analysis 
 
The dependent variable is measured as a dummy equal to one if the mortgage 
is insured and zero otherwise, so the multivariate analysis is performed with a logit-
model. The regression includes control variables for the risk profile of the 
household through the level and volatility of household income (self-employment 
and retirement status), level of indebtedness (loan-to-value ratio), ability to self-
insure (wealth quartiles), and risk aversion. These factors capture the risk exposure 
which typically increases in the LTV-ratio (Qi and Yang, 2009) and volatility of 
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income, and typically decreases in wealth as those households are better able to 
sustain an adverse shock and self-insure. Furthermore, we control in the regression 
for gender, age, level of education, marital status, household composition, region, 
and year effects through the inclusion of dummy variables. We include the 
mortgage balance as a proxy for the price of the policy and add dummies for the 
type of originator to control for supply side heterogeneity. 63  All models are 
estimates using household-weights to ensure representativeness for the population 
and report heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.  
 
 
5.4.1 Mortgage insurance adoption 
 
Table 5.3 shows evidence in favor of our hypothesis that overconfidence 
(Model (1)) and spending propensity (Model (2)) reduce the likelihood of mortgage 
insurance adoption. Moreover, Model (3) reveals, perhaps not surprisingly, that 
both measures are separate explanations for mortgage insurance adoption. However, 
we find as hypothesized that they both influence the decision in the same direction 
and that both have an economically sizeable effect. A one standard deviation 
increase in household overconfidence (spending propensity) decreases the 
likelihood of insurance by 11 percent (12.7 percent).   
Again, similar to Table 5.2, many control-variables are insignificant, but the 
multiple F-test at the bottom of Table 5.3 confirms that their explanatory power is 
jointly significant. Risk aversion is insignificant in all models, raising concerns that 
the measure might not adequately elicit the true risk aversion parameter of the 
household. Guiso and Sodini (2012) review the literature and compare whether 
qualitative and quantitative risk preference measures yield similar results. They 
conclude that both have predictive power for financial choices.   
                                            
63 In the Netherlands, mortgage lending is highly concentrated within banks, with the 5 largest banks accounting 
for over 80 percent of the mortgage market. 
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Table 5.3 ■ Insurance adoption and the impact of overconfidence 
This table shows results for a logit-model. Panel A includes only mortgage and demographic characteristics, 
while Panel B augments the model with confidence measures. Data are from the DNB Household Survey 
and cover mortgages eligible for insurance originated between 1995 and 2009 except Model (7) which 
includes observations from 1998 or later. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***,**,* indicates 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variable definitions are contained in Table II.1 in 
Appendix I. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overconfidence -0.217** -0.253** -0.244** -0.231** -0.210* -0.191*
[-2.18] [-2.41] [-2.32] [-2.07] [-1.84] [-1.65]
Spending propensity -0.091* -0.099* -0.102* -0.180*** -0.191*** -0.204***
[-1.68] [-1.71] [-1.73] [-2.65] [-2.74] [-2.83]
Mortgage balance -0.293* -0.302* -0.227
[-1.77] [-1.79] [-1.28]
Originator: bank -0.218 -0.194
[-1.36] [-1.19]
Originator: insurer -0.427 -0.376
[-1.35] [-1.13]
Risk aversion 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.0024
[1.25] [0.90] [0.40] [0.54] [0.42] [0.35] [0.20]
Interest-rate 0.053 0.094 0.114* 0.123* 0.085 0.066 0.085
[0.83] [1.44] [1.72] [1.85] [1.11] [0.83] [1.04]
LTV-ratio 1.690*** 1.528*** 1.847*** 2.007*** 2.415*** 2.303*** 2.279***
[5.68] [4.87] [5.69] [6.04] [5.99] [5.71] [5.54]
Interest-only mortgage -0.840*** -0.851*** -0.867*** -0.850*** -0.819*** -0.837*** -0.874***
[-4.98] [-5.15] [-4.85] [-4.78] [-4.18] [-4.26] [-4.37]
Endowment mortgage 0.175 0.021 0.025 0.055 0.366 0.398 0.371
[0.79] [0.10] [0.10] [0.23] [1.33] [1.44] [1.35]
Retired -0.204 -0.031 -0.051 -0.042 -0.089 -0.036 -0.021
[-0.79] [-0.12] [-0.19] [-0.15] [-0.28] [-0.11] [-0.06]
Self employed 0.223 0.433 0.217 0.286 0.470 0.466 0.535
[0.48] [0.97] [0.45] [0.58] [0.90] [0.88] [0.99]
Higher vocational 0.193 0.118 0.190 0.246* 0.462*** 0.495*** 0.420**
[1.38] [0.86] [1.30] [1.66] [2.69] [2.82] [2.31]
University -0.416** -0.298 -0.365* -0.311 0.0688 0.102 0.122
[-2.06] [-1.55] [-1.67] [-1.41] [0.28] [0.40] [0.48]
Male -0.085 -0.222 -0.180 -0.142 -0.273 -0.295 -0.369
[-0.36] [-0.97] [-0.74] [-0.57] [-1.03] [-1.09] [-1.32]
Married -0.446** -0.525*** -0.466** -0.490** -0.543*** -0.487** -0.463**
[-2.40] [-2.89] [-2.40] [-2.46] [-2.59] [-2.30] [-2.12]
Age -0.018** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.032***
[-2.44] [-3.56] [-2.97] [-2.87] [-3.49] [-3.50] [-3.28]
Children -0.042 0.014 -0.032 0.019 0.171 0.189 0.098
[-0.27] [0.09] [-0.19] [0.11] [0.89] [0.96] [0.49]
Median income -0.503*** -0.370** -0.545*** -0.556*** -0.707*** -0.738*** -0.744***
[-3.24] [-2.42] [-3.25] [-3.30] [-3.77] [-3.86] [-3.75]
Double median income -1.006*** -0.922*** -1.015*** -0.994*** -1.234*** -1.157*** -0.866**
[-3.49] [-3.16] [-3.32] [-3.23] [-3.43] [-3.13] [-2.23]
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
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However, households face other non-insurable background risks such as 
health and income risk that can affect their risk aversion (Guiso et al., 1996). Risk 
aversion might therefore be collinear with age and employment status leading to 
the insignificance. If these variables proxy for health and income risk, we expect 
risk aversion to become significant once we exclude them. Unreported results show 
that this is not the case. Risk aversion is marginally significant with the expected 
sign if the overconfidence proxies are excluded. 
In line with common intuition, we find that the LTV-ratio has a positive and 
highly significant effect on insurance adoption. Mortgage insurance becomes more 
valuable when more debt is taken out keeping the amount of collateral constant. 
The negative effect of the interest-only dummy reflects that those mortgages are not 
always eligible for insurance (see Section 5.2.2).64  
We also find a negative age effect, consistent with older households having 
smaller mortgages and having accumulated more wealth and home equity. 
Moreover, married households are less likely to insure their mortgage despite the 
divorce risk. However, these couples also enjoy diversification of unemployment 
risk and higher levels of income, thereby reducing the need for insurance.65 We 
examine this income diversification hypothesis in more detail in Section 5.4.2. The 
net worth of households is generally insignificant, except for Model (2), where 
households in the second and third wealth quartile were found more likely to insure. 
This seems counterintuitive assuming that wealthier households can take more risks 
                                            
64 Hybrid mortgages are reported as two separate mortgages in the survey. Mortgages are classified by type 
based on the type reported for the first mortgage, which can be an interest-only mortgage. 
65 The average difference in annual household income between singles and couples in our sample is 3000 euro. 
Table 5.3 continued
Wealthquartile 2 -0.227 0.091 -0.096 -0.110 -0.025 0.026 0.180
[-0.79] [0.34] [-0.32] [-0.36] [-0.07] [0.07] [0.49]
Wealthquartile 3 0.379* 0.547*** 0.294 0.303 0.455* 0.455* 0.585**
[1.74] [2.94] [1.26] [1.28] [1.75] [1.69] [2.05]
Wealthquartile 4 0.275 0.528*** 0.263 0.290 0.310 0.355 0.465
[1.24] [2.81] [1.12] [1.23] [1.21] [1.33] [1.63]
Constant -1.617** -2.477** -1.795** -2.130** -0.257 1.214 0.611
[-2.05] [-2.23] [-2.09] [-2.36] [-0.18] [0.91] [0.46]
Yeardummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1663 1788 1543 1539 1313 1278 1206
Pseudo-R2 0.146 0.144 0.154 0.160 0.202 0.205 0.207
Log-Likelihood -851.7 -897.5 -777.5 -767.9 -612.3 -593.9 -560.1
Chi2-statistic 201.8 220.6 205.1 220.5 239.0 235.4 229.3
Joint test control 
variables (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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themselves. However, if wealthy households have other risky assets in their 
portfolio besides their property (Guiso and Sodini, 2012; Campbell, 2006), than 
mortgage insurance can serve as a cheap external alternative to hedge part of the 
overall risks (Grace et al., 2004).   
Heterogeneity in local conditions such as for example price appreciation- 
and unemployment rates are found to affect the probability that default occurs 
(Archer et al., 2002) and can therefore alter the insurance decision. We include 
region dummies in Model (4) to test for this effect, but find that the (unreported) 
coefficients are insignificant and the main results unchanged. 
Finally, we include the initial mortgage balance in Model (5) as a proxy for 
the before-tax cost of insuring. We further append the specification with two 
dummies for the type of originator of the mortgage (reference group is ‘other 
originators’ which are primarily pension funds) to examine the impact of supply 
factors (Model (6)).66 In Model (7) we analyze only post-1998 observations to 
account for low general awareness during the earlier years the policy was available. 
All these extensions leave our main results unchanged, but we do find that adoption 
rates decrease as insurance premiums increase (Model (5)).  
In Table 5.4, we continue by analyzing whether new entrants to the 
homeownership market – defined as households that did not own their previous 
house – affect our results.67 A negative sign for new entrants is indicative that they 
are either unaware of the risk or of the existence of mortgage insurance, compared 
to experienced households. If new entrants hold an undiversified portfolio tilted 
towards real estate, a positive effect may be expected if they insure their exposure 
to real estate. Model (1) includes a dummy for new entrants and an interaction term 
with overconfidence (Panel A) and spending propensity (Panel B), but none of 
these hypotheses receives empirical support. In unreported analysis, we find that 
these results are also robust to multicollinearity with respect to age. 
 
  
                                            
66 We also estimated the models with lender fixed-effects which is a more refined control for the supply side, but 
our results are unaffected to this alternative specification. 
67 This excludes the possibility that the household switches from homeownership to renting and subsequently 
back to homeownership. However, households in the Netherlands are very unlikely to be active in the rental 
market again, once they become homeowners.   
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Table 5.4 ■ Analysis of insurance adoption 
This table shows estimation results for the logit-model. 'New entrant' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
household if new on the homeownership market. 'Price expectations' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
household expects that his/her property will appreciate over the next two years.  Panel A shows results for 
overconfidence (OC), Panel B for spending propensity (SP) and Panel C for both measures.  Data are from 
the DNB Household Survey and cover mortgages eligible for insurance originated between 1995 and 2009. 
Constant term is included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***,**,* indicates 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variable definitions are contained in Table II.1 in 
Appendix II.  
 
Panel A model with Overconfidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overconfidence -0.253** -0.446 -0.212** -0.247**
[-2.37] [-1.40] [-2.13] [-1.98]
New entrant 0.157
[0.73]
New entrant*OC 0.398
[1.31]
Male*OC 0.261
[0.78]
Married*Male 0.816
[1.30]
Price expectations -0.262
[-1.50]
Control variables (see Table 5.3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1659 1659 1659 1155
Pseudo-R2 0.151 0.150 0.150 0.170
Log-Likelihood -842.3 -843.3 -842.8 -591.8
Chi2-statistic 211.1 211.5 212.0 191.9
Panel B model with Spending propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spending propensity -0.089* -0.337** -0.104* -0.091
[-1.88] [-2.27] [-1.87] [-1.38]
New entrant -0.208
[-0.27]
New entrant*SP -0.076
[-0.50]
Male*SP 0.272*
[1.71]
Married*Male 0.746
[1.18]
Price expectations -0.249
[-1.51]
Control variables (see Table 5.3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1783 1783 1783 1213
Pseudo-R2 0.148 0.149 0.148 0.164
Log-Likelihood -887.9 -886.8 -887.6 -616.0
Chi2-statistic 230.2 230.1 230.9 195.5
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
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As argued in Section 5.3.2, evidence suggests that men and women exhibit 
different degrees of overconfidence, with men being more overconfident on 
financial decision tasks. To test this hypothesis, Model (2) in Table 5.4, includes an 
interaction term between gender and overconfidence (Panel A) and spending 
propensity (Panel B), but no evidence is found that the effect of overconfidence is 
larger for a male decision maker. The marginal effect of spending propensity is 
about one fifth in size for males (-0.065 = -0.337 + 0.272) compared to females (-
0.337).  
In Table II.2 of Appendix II (Section 5.7), we rerun the analysis for gender-
based subsamples. The coefficients indicate that among men overconfidence is 
significant in decision making, while for women the spending-measure is 
significant. These results might be indicative of different ‘money’-styles between 
men and women (Prince, 1993). However, one should not read too much in the 
results for the female subsample because of the low number of observations. Future 
research could shed more light to what extend decisions are affected by gender-
based differences, because the evidence so far is not conclusive (see also Deaves et 
al., 2005). 
It is also conceivable that couples influence each other’s financial decisions, 
thereby reducing the explanatory power of individual traits in the decision making 
process. Barber and Odean (2001) argue, assuming gender being a reasonable 
proxy for overconfidence, that married males should be less affected by 
overconfidence then single men. We test for this effect by including an interaction 
Table 5.4 continued
Panel C model with Overconfidence and Spending propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overconfidence -0.244** -0.244** -0.250** -0.275**
[-2.32] [-2.31] [-2.37] [-2.11]
Spending propensity -0.102* -0.102* -0.108* -0.100
[-1.73] [-1.73] [-1.82] [-1.40]
New entrant 0.159
[0.71]
Married*Male 0.941
[1.48]
Price expectations -0.252
[-1.41]
Control variables (see Table 5.3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1539 1539 1539 1088
Pseudo-R2 0.160 0.160 0.161 0.176
Log-Likelihood -767.9 -767.6 -766.9 -548.6
Chi2-statistic 220.5 221.4 224.3 188.3
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
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term between gender and marital status but, although it has the expected sign, it is 
insignificant in all specifications (Model (3)).  
Finally, we consider the impact of price expectations on mortgage insurance 
adoption. Decision makers that expect property prices to increase, expect a lower 
risk of becoming underwater. Model (4) in Table 5.4, includes a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the household expects their property to appreciate in 
value over the next two years and zero otherwise (see Appendix I for the original 
survey question). Although having the expected negative sign, the effect of the 
expectation variable is insignificant in all models.  
 
 
5.4.2 Robustness checks 
 
In this section we analyze the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
specifications of our model. The decision to insure a risk is depending on the 
household’s exposure to it. Therefore, we examine the sensitivity to alternative risk 
proxies in Table 5.5. The loan-to-value ratio measures the amount of debt relative 
to the underlying collateral, but is not necessarily a good indicator of risk if it is a 
high-income household (Archer et al., 2002) or one with a well-diversified 
portfolio.  
We define two alternative risk indicators based on income: the loan-to-
income ratio (LTI) and debt-coverage-ratio (DSR). LTI is measured as size of 
mortgage divided by yearly income, while DSR is defined as mortgage expenses 
over income. Both measure the affordability of the mortgage for households, by 
taking into account the income available to serve mortgage obligations. Replacing 
the LTV-ratio by the LTI-ratio in Model (1) or DSR in Model (2) does not 
materially alter previously reported results: overconfident households are still less 
likely to insure although the effect is only marginally significant. Spending 
propensity loses significance in the presence of income-based risk proxies. The 
coefficients on LTI/DSR ratios have the proper sign: an increase in mortgage 
obligations relative to income raises the likelihood of obtaining mortgage insurance. 
From a diversification perspective, we expect that higher relative exposure to 
real-estate risk increases the likelihood of insuring. Therefore we compute a 
‘mortgage-wealth’-ratio defined as mortgage debt to net worth plus mortgage debt. 
A value equal to one indicates that the household’s portfolio consists entirely out of 
real estate (mortgage debt) and a value close to zero implies that there are 
substantial amounts of other assets. We use the mortgage liability instead of the 
property value because the mortgage liability is the exposure covered by mortgage 
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insurance. Model (3) shows that including this proxy does not lead to different 
conclusions with respect to the overconfidence effect. The mortgage-wealth ratio 
has the expected sign as households with more real estate assets are more likely to 
have mortgage insurance.. 
We also add alternative proxies for (future) income-risk and income 
diversification. A permanent employment contract increases income stability as 
termination of a permanent employment contract is costly to employers. 
Households where one or both of the spouses have a permanent contract are less 
likely to face adverse income shocks and have greater certainty about their future 
income path, thereby reducing the need to purchase mortgage insurance. In Model 
(4) of Table 5.5 we include a dummy equal to one if the respondent has a 
permanent employment contract. The results show that this variable has little effect 
in explaining insurance decisions. Our overconfidence hypothesis continues to 
receive empirical support, while the spending variable becomes marginally 
insignificant. This latter result is expected as spending and savings behavior are 
correlated to expectations about future income and the volatility thereof. Model (5) 
includes a dummy equal to one if also the respondent’s spouse has paid 
employment. This dummy captures the diversification of income risk as it is less 
likely that both partners lose income at the same time, but we do not find that this 
materially affects our result.  
Finally, we examine how robust our results are against the inclusion of 
control variables for marital stability. In Model (6) we control for the number of 
years the households has been married while in Model (7) we include dummy 
variables for the number of children living at home. It is argued that both longer 
marriages and having more children raise the stakes of getting divorced. A divorce 
normally leads to a loss of income and can trigger payment problems. Hence, we 
expect that lower divorce risk creates lower demand for mortgage insurance, and 
this is indeed what our results suggest. Note that we exclude the respondents age in 
Model (6) to avoid multicollinearity 
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Table 5.5 ■ Robustness analysis of insurance adoption 
This table contains robustness analysis for the insurance adoption model. 'Loan-to-income' ratio is 
measured as total mortgage debt over yearly household income (Model 1). 'Debt-service ratio' is defined as 
yearly mortgage payments over household income (Model 2). 'Mortgage-wealth-ratio' is defined as 
mortgage debt over net wealth plus mortgage debt (Model 3). 'Permanent contract' is a dummy that takes 
the value 1 if the respondent has a permanent employment contract (Model 4). 'Spouse income' is a dummy 
that takes the value 1 if the respondent’s spouse has paid employment (Model 5). 'Years being married' is 
measured as the survey-year minus the year of marriage (Model 6). The children dummies indicate the 
number of children that are living at home (Model 7).  The data are from the DNB Household Survey and 
cover mortgages eligible for insurance originated between 1995 and 2009. Constant term is included but 
not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. Variable definitions are contained in Table II.1 in Appendix II. 
 
We construct our measure for overconfidence as the residual of a regression 
explaining self-assessed financial literacy. Therefore we now examine the 
sensitivity of the results against alternative specifications for this regression 
model.68  
                                            
68 We also replicated all analysis in this paper using residuals obtained from an ordered-logit model. In general 
our results remain similar, and in some cases become even stronger compared to the OLS-results.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overconfidence -0.198* -0.195* -0.186* -0.178* -0.241** -0.500*** -0.241**
[-1.86] [-1.80] [-1.69] [-1.72] [-2.31] [-3.15] [-2.28]
Spending propensity -0.081 -0.067 -0.168** -0.072 -0.102* 0.022 -0.103*
[-1.38] [-1.14] [-2.57] [-1.25] [-1.75] [0.28] [-1.76]
Loan-to-income-ratio 0.038
[0.79]
Debt-service-ratio 1.050
[1.63]
Mortgage-wealth-ratio 0.549
[1.22]
Permanent contract dummy 0.160
[0.91]
Spouse income dummy 0.167
[1.15]
Years being married -0.043***
[-3.27]
Dummy # of Children = 1 0.052
[0.22]
Dummy # of Children = 2 0.214
[1.09]
Dummy # of Children = 3 -0.512*
[-1.76]
Dummy # of Children >= 4 -0.507
[-0.57]
Control variables (see 
Table 5.3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1460 1449 1313 1539 1539 957 1539
Pseudo-R2 0.131 0.130 0.173 0.137 0.157 0.197 0.163
Log-Likelihood -746.8 -734.7 -634.7 -788.5 -770.2 -417.5 -764.2
Chi2-statistic 192.4 183.2 223.1 208.2 219.6 153.5 229.8
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
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Table 5.6 ■ Analysis of alternative specifications for financial knowledge 
This table shows results for first stage OLS regressions explaining the self-assessment of financial 
knowledge by households.  Robust t-statistics are reported. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. Data are from the DNB Household Survey and cover mortgages eligible for 
insurance originated between 1995 and 2009. Variable definitions are contained in Table II.1 in Appendix 
II. 
 
 
In Model (1) of Table 5.6, we include continuous measures and second-order 
polynomials for income and age. Financial literacy might be a non-linear function 
of age and income, for example because literacy increases at a decreasing rate with 
age due to cognitive aging (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). The results in Model (1) 
lend some support for this explanation although the first order coefficient for age is 
insignificant. The coefficients for income are a bit puzzling: the first order effect of 
income is negative while the second order effect is positive. This seems to suggest 
that financial literacy is a decreasing function of income, inconsistent with prior 
findings.   
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Age -0.031*** -0.012*** [-4.08] [-8.04]
Age^2 0.001*** [2.69]
Household income -4.206*** [-3.33]
Household income^2 0.209*** [3.40]
Peers income 16K-28K 0.097 [1.15]
Peers income >28K 0.047 [0.51]
Peers highschool 0.183*** [3.31]
Peers college/university 0.165** [2.50]
Holding financial assets 0.300*** 0.283*** [9.25] [7.07]
Self employed 0.070 0.062 [0.56] [0.39]
Higher vocational 0.027 0.011 [0.85] [0.25]
University 0.019 -0.029 [0.44] [-0.46]
Married 0.033 0.06 [0.73] [1.09]
Children -0.111*** -0.104** [-3.19] [-2.36]
Median family income 0.004 [0.12]
Double median income 0.168** [2.05]
Wealthquartile 2 0.031 0.049 [0.57] [0.64]
Wealthquartile 3 0.002 0.079 [0.05] [1.34]
Wealthquartile 4 0.034 0.135** [0.77] [2.26]
Constant 24.03*** 2.032*** [3.71] [11.70]
Yeardummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 2252 1397
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.111
Coefficients t -values
Dependent variable: Self-assessed financial knowledge
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Table 5.7 ■ Analysis using alternative overconfidence measures 
This table shows results for a logit-model. The confidence measures are obtained as the residual of the 
regressions of Model (1) and (2) in Table 5.6. Data are from the DNB Household Survey and cover 
mortgages eligible for insurance originated between 1995 and 2009. Constant term is included but not 
reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. Variable definitions are contained in Table II.1 in Appendix II. 
 
 
One explanation for this effect is that households assess their financial 
knowledge with respect to different categories of financial products. For example: 
lower-income households rate their knowledge as being high because they only 
consider mortgage products and no other financial assets such as stocks and bonds. 
Higher-income households rate their knowledge lower because they are aware of 
their limited knowledge with respect to other financial assets (e.g. stocks). This 
difference leads to a lowering of their rating relative to the low-income group.  
Financial literacy of households can also be affected through interaction with 
peers, defined as close friends of the household, because they can learn from them 
or copy their actions. In Model (2) of Table 5.6, we include measures for education 
and income levels of peers (reference categories are education below the high-
school level and income below 16.000 euro per year) to proxy for their level of 
financial sophistication.  The coefficients indicate that peer-education has indeed a 
significant effect on self-assessments while proxies for the income of peers are 
insignificant. This is indicative of a spill-over effect from the peer’s education level 
to the respondent’s self-assessed knowledge.  
Table 5.7 presents second stage results for the first (second) overconfidence 
alternative in Model (1) and (2) (Model (3) and (4)), but all coefficients for 
overconfidence and spending propensity remain similar in sign, size and 
significance.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overconfidence Alt. 1 -0.214** -0.249**
[-2.14] [-2.36]
Overconfidence Alt. 2 -0.225* -0.247**
[-1.94] [-2.11]
Spending propensity -0.100* -0.150**
[-1.71] [-2.21]
Control variables (see Table 5.3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1663 1543 1118 1109
Pseudo-R2 0.146 0.154 0.124 0.126
Log-Likelihood -851.8 -777.6 -594.9 -587.1
Chi2-statistic 202.8 205.6 142.2 140.3
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
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5.4.3 Alternative explanations  
 
This section tests for a number of alternative hypotheses that are consistent 
with our findings. First, households that face complex financial decisions are likely 
to seek advice prior to or during the purchase of a financial product (Bhattacharya 
et al., 2012; Hackethal et al., 2012). If financial advice alters household behavior 
than omitting financial advice from the model biases the results. This option is 
examined in Table II.3 (contained in Section 5.7, Appendix II). It is important to 
note that advisors do not receive (additional) compensation for selling insured 
mortgages. The financial advisor can create awareness of the insurance product and 
correct biases in risk assessments of households. However, reception of (credible) 
advice might also enforce overconfidence of households if it confirms their prior 
thoughts (e.g. confirmation bias) (Willis, 2008). Model (1) to (3), reveal that there 
is a negative effect of financial advice on the likelihood of insurance adoption. If an 
advisor corrects a biased risk assessment of a household than a positive effect is 
expected, but it is possible that advisors were as unaware of the risks in the housing 
market as the households they advised. Another explanation is that households fail 
to act according to what is advised to them because of a lack of trust (Bhattacharya 
et al., 2012), or because they think that the policy being sold to them is overpriced. 
We lack data to examine which of these alternative hypotheses holds, but our 
results are robust against inclusion of the advisor. Moreover, we do not find that 
financial advisors alter the effect of overconfidence as the interaction terms in 
Model (4) and (5) are insignificant.  
In Section 5.4.2, the education level of peers was found to affect self-
assessed financial knowledge. It is also conceivable that the interaction with peers 
affects the decision making directly (see Hong et al., 2004). In Table II.4 of 
Appendix II, we show that this is not the case and although we do not directly 
observe whether the household’s peer is a homeowner, it is documented that both 
income and education are positively related to homeownership (Lauridsen and 
Skak, 2007).  Combining the result of Table 5.6 and Table A.4 suggests that 
learning from peers influences the perceived level of financial knowledge rather 
than the decision process directly. However, the exact role of peer interaction in 
decision processes asks for additional research.   
We continue by examining the financial situation of the household and its 
perception thereof on the insurance decision. We test for financial literacy (Van 
Rooij et al., 2011), precautionary savings motives (Dynan, 1993), liquidity 
constraints (Cole et al., 2012), industry of employment (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 
2009), and perceived control over future outcomes (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008; 
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Baumann and Sims, 1978) in Table II.5. All of these factors are potential 
explanations for insurance adoption. We use the fitted value of the regression in 
Table 5.2 as a proxy for financial literacy in Model (1) of Table II.5 but find no 
significant result.  In Model (2) we include a proxy for precautionary savings 
motives. However, overconfident households still remain less likely to insure, 
although spending propensity becomes insignificant. This result is not surprising as 
spending propensity and precautionary savings are two sides of the same coin.69 
The current liquidity position might be an important consideration in financial 
decision making if decision-makers are primarily concerned with the present.  
Inclusion of a dummy variable that equals 1 if the current budget-situation of the 
household is tight (e.g. if it is liquidity-constrained) and zero otherwise does not 
affect our previous findings as is shown in Model (3) (see the Appendix, Section A 
for the exact questions). Similarly, we do not find support that perceived control 
over future outcomes in Model (4) and (5) affects mortgage insurance decisions. It 
should be noted that statistical power is weakened by the reduced sample size. 
Finally, we consider whether the industry where the respondent is occupied 
matters. Employment in the financial sector can increase risk awareness and 
familiarity with financial products. We determine the sector of employment based 
on the pension fund in which the respondent participates, since this choice is not 
voluntary in the Netherlands. A dummy variable equal to one is included in the 
regression if a respondent participates in a bank’s pension fund and zero 
otherwise.70  The inclusion of this dummy is insignificant and leaves our main 
results quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged: confident households and those 
with a higher inclination towards spending are still less likely to insure their 
mortgage irrespective of being employed in the financial industry. Again our 
sample decreases significantly, thereby reducing statistical power. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
We analyze the demand for mortgage insurance. Mortgage insurance covers 
wealth risks from mortgage-financed homeownership. These risks emerge when 
households are liable for repayment of a shortfall in case of default. We document 
                                            
69 The question for precautionary savings puts emphasis on the motive to save for future unforeseen events.  This 
also implicitly captured by the spending-measure, but its more aggressive wording makes it a better proxy to 
elicit confidence. Including both measures separately yields significant results consistent with expectations.  
70 Unfortunately, we do not observe data for employment in other sectors of the financial industry such as 
insurers and brokers.  
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that overconfidence is able to explain adoption rates. Overconfidence biases a 
household’s risk assessment and reduces the likelihood that it takes precautionary 
action. The effect is sizeable as a one standard deviation increase in overconfidence 
decreases the likelihood of mortgage insurance adoption by 11 to 13 percent. Our 
results are robust against various functional forms and alternative explanations.  
The implications of the results in this paper are twofold. From an academic 
perspective, one could argue that households should receive more information or 
education on financial matters. This is intended to raise risk awareness and 
reducing overconfidence thereby enabling them to make informed (insurance) 
decisions. However, the effectiveness of such a policy is debatable when 
households have limited capability to process information (Willis, 2008). Moreover, 
the precise influence of peers and financial advisors on the decision process asks 
for additional research. Understanding these issues is much needed as the 
responsibility for financial planning and decisions is increasingly delegated to 
households with governments reducing their intervention in retail markets. The 
increasing availability of panel data and the development of protocols to measure 
behavior allow for more insights in the decision process of households.  
From a practical perspective, our results provide input to the question 
whether policy makers should make mortgage insurance mandatory. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, adoption rates in the Netherlands rose to levels over 90 
percent in 2011.  Financial regulators started warning originators for being too 
generous in their underwriting behavior for mortgages. Consumer authorities are 
worried about the financial risks many households face, because of their debt 
overload. Apparently, the wake-up call caused by deteriorating (housing) market 
conditions proved to be an important trigger for both households and originators to 
demand and/or require insurance. This also points to a limitation of our study, as 
our data covers large a stable or booming housing and labor market. The changing 
economic prospects altered the interplay between the supply and the demand side 
of the mortgage insurance market. As mentioned before, since 2011 the supply-side 
is predominantly affecting insurance adoption rates as lenders started requiring it. 
This indicates that the behavioral explanations provided in this paper are only part 
of the story and that the policy recommendations are dependent on the economic 
climate and institutional background. 
This brings us to a question that remains open: do households and mortgage 
originators collectively default towards non-insurance again in stable economic 
times? If this is the case, than the government could enforce it as an industry 
standard in mortgage lending (as in the U.S.) through the bodies that oversee and 
regulate the financial markets. Another way to raise adoption-rates is selling 
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insurance policies in bundles. However, cross-selling is prohibited in many 
countries including the Netherlands, thereby making this strategy infeasible. It also 
impedes the freedom of households to purchase insurance products on a stand-
alone basis thereby tailoring their insurance-portfolio to their own needs and risk 
preferences. 
Finally, we analyze insurance behavior in a unique setting. Besides the many 
advantages that it has for our study, one can argue to what extend our results 
generalize to other contexts and insurance products. Given the limited amount of 
survey evidence and heterogeneity in insurance products and markets, this question 
is largely an empirical one. Compared to the documented behavior of households 
with respect to insuring for disaster-type (flood and earthquake insurance) and 
income risks (see Cole et al., 2012), it seems that the adoption of mortgage 
insurance is affected in a similar way due to similar reasons. Consequently, we 
expect our results to generalize to different policies in a context where the decision 
to insure is voluntary and where pricing of the policy is actuarially fair.  
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5.6 Appendix I Data description 
 
 
Self-assessed financial knowledge 
Statement:  
“How knowledgeable do you consider yourself with respect to financial matters?” 
 
Answer scale:  
1. not knowledgeable  
2. more or less knowledgeable 
3. knowledgeable 
4. very knowledgeable 
 
Spending propensity 
Statement: 
“Some people spend all the money that they receive. Other people want to have 
some reserves. Can you indicate on a scale of 1 to 7 what you do with your money 
after you paid for food, rent and first necessities of life?”   
 
Answer scale: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I want to save as much  I want to spend all my 
money as possible   money immediately     
 
Holdings of financial assets 
Questions: 
1. “Did you, on 31 December [year], have investments with MUTUAL FUNDS? 
Do not include investments in growth funds, investments (shares, bonds) in 
companies, or insured saving (i.e. saving through a life-insurance) here.” 
2. “Did you, on 31 December [year], have any BONDS and/or MORTGAGE 
BONDS? Do not include bonds through mutual funds here. These have 
already been reported on.” 
3. “Did you, on 31 December [year], own any SHARES? Do not include shares 
of your own private limited company here, nor bonds through MUTUAL 
FUNDS. These have already been reported.” 
4. “Did you, on 31 December [year], have one or more PUT-OPTIONS?” 
5. “Did you have any written PUT-OPTIONS outstanding on 31 December 
[year]?” 
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6. “Had you, on 31 December [year], bought one or more CALL-OPTIONS, 
FALCONS, or WARRANTS?” 
7. “Did you have any written CALL-OPTIONS, FALCONS or WARRANTS 
outstanding on 31 December [year]?” 
 
Answer scale for each item:  
1 = yes, 0 = no 
 
Risk Aversion  
Statements: 
1. “I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed 
returns, than to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible 
returns” 
2. “I would never consider investments in shares because I find this too risky” 
3. “If I think an investment will be profitable, I am prepared to borrow money 
to make this    investment” 
4. “I want to be certain that my investments are safe” 
5. “I get more and more convinced that I should take greater financial risks to 
improve my financial position” 
6. “I am prepared to take the risk to lose money, when there is also a chance to 
gain money” 
 
Answer scale for each item: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally disagree   totally agree 
 
House price expectations 
Statement: 
“Do you expect your own house to increase, decrease or remain stable in 
value, the next two years?” 
 
Answer scale: 
 1. increase  
 2. stay more or less the same  
 3. decrease  
 4. don’t  know 
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Financial Situation 
Statement: 
 “How do you assess the financial situation of your household at the 
moment?” 
 
Answer scale: 
 1. debts are increasing  
 2. need to draw upon savings  
 3. it is just about manageable  
 4. some money is saved  
 5. a lot of money can be saved  
 
Locus of control 
Statements: 
1. ”Saving money and making thoughtful investments are the most important 
factors to become rich” 
2. “The chance of me becoming rich is predominantly driven by my own skill” 
3. “People who are careful with their financial situation are the ones who stay 
rich” 
4. “Generally, it is my own fault if I become poor” 
5. “I am normally capable of protecting my own interest” 
6. “Whenever I got what I want, this is predominantly because I worked hard 
for it” 
7. “My life is determined by my own actions” 
8. “There is little one can do to protect himself against poverty” 
9. “Becoming rich has nothing to do with being lucky” 
10. “In monetary terms, there is not much you can do when you are poor” 
11. “It is not also wise for me to save money, because a number of things has to 
do with (bad) luck” 
12. “Becoming rich or poor is predominantly a matter of fate” 
13. “Only those who inherit or win money can become rich” 
 
Answer scale for each item: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally disagree   totally agree 
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5.7 Appendix II Additional analysis 
 
Table II.1 ■ Control variables definitions 
 
 
  
Variable name Definition
Mortgage balance The mortgage balance in Euros at time of origination
Originator: bank Dummy equal to 1 if the mortgage lender is a bank
Originator: insurer Dummy equal to 1 if the mortgage lender is an insurance company
Interest-rate Yearly interest rate percentage at time of origination
LTV-ratio Ratio of mortgage debt to property value at origination
Interest-only mortgage Dummy equal to 1 if the mortgage is an interest-only type
Endowment mortgage Dummy equal to 1 if the mortgage is an endowment type
New entrant Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has not owned his previous residence
Retired Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is retired
Self employed Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is self-employed
Higher vocational Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has completed higher vocational education
University Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has completed university education
Male Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is male
Married Dummy equal to 1 if the repondent is married
Age Age of the respondent in years
Children Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has one or more children
Below median income Dummy equal to 1 if the annual household income is below the median household 
income
Median income Dummy equal to 1 if the annual household income is between median and double 
median household income
Double median income Dummy equal to 1 if the annual household income is more than twice median 
household income
Wealthquartile 1 Dummy equal to 1 if household wealth is in the first quartile of the distribution
Wealthquartile 2 Dummy equal to 1 if household wealth is in the second quartile of the distribution
Wealthquartile 3 Dummy equal to 1 if household wealth is in the third quartile of the distribution
Wealthquartile 4 Dummy equal to 1 if household wealth is in the fourth quartile of the distribution
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Table II.2 ■ Insurance adoption analyzed by gender subsamples 
This table shows results for a logit-model. Model (1) and (2) analyze the impact for the subsample of 
respondents that are male and Model (3) and (4) for females. Data are from the DNB Household Survey 
and cover mortgages eligible for insurance originated between 1995 and 2009. Robust t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variable 
definitions are contained in Table II.1 in the Appendix. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overconfidence -0.192* -0.401
[-1.82] [-1.27]
Spending propensity -0.052 -0.511**
[-0.92] [-2.45]
Risk Aversion 0.010 0.004 0.074* 0.090**
[0.99] [0.41] [1.69] [2.18]
Interest-rate 0.070 0.148** -0.207 -0.245
[1.04] [2.21] [-0.86] [-1.15]
LTV 1.420*** 1.216*** 3.099*** 3.298***
[4.36] [3.57] [2.90] [4.07]
Interest-only mortgage -0.800*** -0.770*** -1.391* -2.067***
[-4.42] [-4.30] [-1.80] [-2.58]
Endowment mortgage 0.220 0.084
[0.97] [0.38]
Retired -0.252 -0.028 -1.070 -0.528
[-0.91] [-0.10] [-1.03] [-0.55]
Self employed 0.267 0.269
[0.58] [0.60]
Higher vocational 0.099 -0.017 1.172* 1.216**
[0.67] [-0.12] [1.91] [2.02]
University -0.718*** -0.732*** 3.793*** 4.129***
[-3.20] [-3.36] [3.21] [4.19]
Married -0.379* -0.494** -0.553 -0.450
[-1.91] [-2.53] [-0.41] [-0.29]
Age -0.025** -0.037*** 0.047 0.055
[-2.98] [-4.44] [1.26] [1.47]
Children -0.138 -0.095 -0.438 -0.262
[-0.87] [-0.61] [-0.33] [-0.18]
Median income -0.582*** -0.512*** -0.227 -0.146
[-3.45] [-3.06] [-0.48] [-0.30]
Double median income -0.989*** -0.929***
[-3.32] [-3.09]
Wealthquartile 2 -0.195 0.126 -1.253 -0.417
[-0.64] [0.44] [-1.24] [-0.47]
Wealthquartile 3 0.369 0.522*** 0.166 0.845
[1.59] [2.62] [0.18] [0.96]
Wealthquartile 4 0.303 0.578*** 0.270 1.087
[1.29] [2.91] [0.31] [1.30]
Constant -1.620* -1.731* -5.315 -6.096***
[-1.70] [-1.71] [-1.33] [-2.75]
Yeardummies Yes Yes No No
Number of observations 1478 1572 176 208
Pseudo-R2 0.147 0.151 0.323 0.395
Log-Likelihood -746.7 -766.9 -80.14 -84.8
Chi2-statistic 173.9 192.4 38.5 51.2
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
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Table II.3 ■ Mortgage insurance adoption and the involvement of financial advisors 
This table shows results for a logit-model. 'Financial advisor' is a dummy-variable equal to 1 if households 
make use of professional financial advisors in their decision making process. Model 4 and 5 contain 
interaction terms between Financial advisor (Fin. Adv) and Overconfidence (OC) and Spending propensity 
(SP) respectively.  Data are from the DNB Household Survey and cover mortgages eligible for insurance 
originated between 1995 and 2009. Constant term is included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variable 
definitions are contained in Table II.1 in the Appendix. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overconfidence -0.247** -0.272** -0.276**
[-2.35] [-2.48] [-2.23]
Spending propensity -0.135** -0.123** -0.115
[-2.28] [-2.05] [-1.64]
Financial advisor -0.331** -0.289** -0.359** -0.324** -0.628
[-2.40] [-2.11] [-2.49] [-2.34] [-1.01]
Fin.Adv*OC 0.107
[0.45]
Fin. Adv*SP -0.066
[-0.56]
Control variables (see 
Table 5.3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1599 1611 1488 1599 1611
Pseudo-R2 0.149 0.146 0.157 0.149 0.146
Log-Likelihood -821.2 -818.6 -754.8 -821.1 -818.4
Chi2-statistic 201.0 205.2 201.1 200.9 205.0
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
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Table II.4 ■ Mortgage insurance adoption and peer effects 
This table shows results for a logit-model. Peer income dummies measure the income position of the 
household's peers (Income <16K annually is the reference category) and peer education dummies measure 
the education level of the household's peers (Elementary school education is the reference category). Data 
are from the DNB Household Survey and cover mortgages eligible for insurance originated between 1995 
and 2009. Constant term is included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***,**,* 
indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variable definitions are contained in Table 
II.1 in the Appendix. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
Overconfidence -0.229** -0.244** -0.249**
[-1.98] [-2.29] [-2.13]
Spending propensity -0.149** -0.110* -0.149**
[-2.20] [-1.85] [-2.20]
Peers income 16K-28K 0.062 0.022
[0.18] [0.06]
Peers income >28K 0.040 -0.031
[0.10] [-0.08]
Peers highschool 0.187 0.368
[0.88] [1.50]
Peers college/university 0.242 0.394
[0.99] [1.38]
Control variables (see Table 5.3) Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1109 1522 1109
Pseudo-R2 0.125 0.152 0.127
Log-Likelihood -587.4 -768.3 -586.1
Chi2-statistic 140.9 200.7 142.2
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
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Table II.5 ■ Alternative explanations for mortgage insurance adoption 
This table shows results for a logit-model. 'Financial literacy' is the fitted value of the model in Table 5.2. 
'Tight budget' and 'Finance professional' (FP) are dummy variables. Model 5 and 7 contain interaction 
terms between FP, Locus of control (LOC) and Overconfidence (OC) respectively. Data are from the DNB 
Household Survey and cover mortgages eligible for insurance originated between 1995 and 2009. Constant 
term is included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***,**,* indicates 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variable definitions are contained in Table II.1 in 
the Appendix. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overconfidence -0.247** -0.238** -0.241** -0.283 -0.241 -0.539* -0.499*
[-2.34] [-2.25] [-2.28] [-1.62] [-1.16] [-1.90] [-1.73]
Spending propensity -0.105* -0.090 -0.106* -0.145 -0.147 -0.408** -0.402**
[-1.79] [-1.51] [-1.79] [-1.55] [-1.56] [-2.30] [-2.24]
Financial literacy (ŷ) -0.509
[-1.02]
Precautionary savings 0.056
[1.36]
Tight budget 0.232
[1.26]
Locus of control -0.294 -0.288
[-1.20] [-1.17]
LOC*OC -0.120
[-0.33]
Finance professional 0.787 1.161
[1.38] [1.47]
FP*OC -1.163
[-0.87]
Control variables (see 
Table 5.3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1539 1536 1539 644 644 350 350
Pseudo-R2 0.160 0.161 0.161 0.168 0.169 0.273 0.274
Log-Likelihood -767.4 -765.3 -767.1 -321.9 -321.9 -136.7 -136.4
Chi2-statistic 221.7 221.4 221.0 96.99 100.7 75.88 76.92
Dependent variable: mortgage insurance (1 = yes)
  
 
 
Chapter 6                                     
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
This dissertation contains four studies that cover aspects of homeownership 
in the Netherlands. We examine the effects of homeownership and the decision 
making process by households regarding mortgage type. Furthermore, the 
functioning of the mortgage origination process including the effect of brokers is 
studied. The last paper examines which factors characterize household demand for 
mortgage insurance. This dissertation distinguishes itself in that it provides 
empirical analysis for the Netherlands, as opposed to the existing empirical 
evidence which is largely based on the housing market in the United States.  
In the first study (chapter two), we examine the rationale for stimulating 
homeownership from a socio-economic perspective. A large literature suggests that 
homeownership creates so-called ‘positive externalities’ leading to improvements 
in neighborhood safety, residential satisfaction and outcomes of children at school. 
Using a panel dataset over the period 2000-2008, we examine whether 
neighborhoods with high homeownership-levels in Rotterdam exhibit higher levels 
of safety and residential satisfaction. The results indicate that this is indeed the case, 
although it is recognized in the extant empirical literature (Haurin et al., 2003) that 
these effects might be driven by endogenous selection of homeowners. That is, 
safer neighborhoods are more likely to attract prospective home buyers, rather than 
homeowners increasing the safety of the neighborhood. We use various techniques 
to examine the causal direction of the effect, including a difference-in-difference 
approach as well as dynamic panel data specifications, and find support for the 
proposition that homeownership induces positive effects. A natural follow-up 
question is whether these effects emerge regardless of the current homeownership-
levels in the neighborhood. More specifically, we examine whether the size of these 
externalities diminishes once homeownership-levels come higher. Specifying 
external effects as a classical production externality, we find that marginal 
increases in neighborhood safety and satisfaction become very small once 
ownership levels reach levels around 55 percent. Our findings match prior findings 
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in the U.S. market, and provide insights for the redesign of housing market policies. 
The diminishing effects of homeownership question in which range 
homeownership subsidies are effective as opposed to direct investments in 
neighborhood safety and residential satisfaction. Moreover, negative effects of 
homeownership such as a reduction in labor market mobility are also documented. 
Fruitful directions for future study are a more in-depth examination of these 
negative externalities as well as the payoff of investing in rental stability. 
Furthermore, additional research in other markets is needed to shed more light on 
the importance of contextual factors such as cultural and institutional differences 
and the generalizability of the documented effects.  
The second study (chapter three) examines the importance of risk aversion 
and financial literacy in the choice process for a mortgage type by households. 
Recent evidence shows that these factors have significant explanatory power for 
stock market participation of households (see Gerardi 2010a, Van Rooij et al., 
2011). Evidence with respect to the choice of mortgage type has not been provided 
yet, even though twice as many households are active on the housing market than 
in the stock market. In this study we fill this gap in the literature.  Using an 
extensive Dutch panel data-set over the period 1994-2009, we examine the impact 
of financial literacy and risk aversion on the choice of mortgage type that 
households make. We report that households who are less risk-averse and those 
who are more literate are more likely to choose an interest-only mortgage. Because 
mortgages constitute a significant long-term financial obligation for households, it 
is likely that they rely on financial advice during the decision-making process. We 
examine whether advice received by acquaintances or professional financial 
advisors alters our main results, but the findings remain unchanged. It is also found 
that the presence of professional advisors increases the probability that households 
choose deferred amortization mortgages. This supports the idea that advisors can 
assist households in comparison shopping and maximizing the tax-benefits of 
interest deductibility through recommending alternative mortgage products. We test 
for other factors that might influence the decision process such as learning from 
peers, experience from prior homeownership, price expectations, availability of 
mortgage insurance and the financial position of the households. Our main findings 
are robust against all of these alternative explanations. Moreover, our results 
indicate that households who purchase alternative mortgage products are in general 
also more likely to have an understanding of these products. However, the data 
does not permit us to directly examine what households know with respect to 
mortgage products, which is an interesting path for future research. Also the 
exposition of product features is likely to be essential to create understanding 
among households of mortgage features. Interesting questions to explore in future 
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work are the marketing of financial products as well as the influence and 
effectiveness of financial education programs (Willis, 2008). Finally, our analysis 
provide input for the debate on the allocation of responsibilities between 
households, lenders and financial advisors. 
The central question in the third study (chapter four) is concerned with the 
question whether there is evidence for a misalignment of interest between financial 
intermediaries and their clientele. Studies on the role of mortgage brokers in the 
U.S. show that the objectives of mortgage brokers and their clientele are not 
necessarily aligned. This occurs when they are not responsible for, or compensated 
conditional on loan performance. Moreover, commission-based pay can induce 
them to recommend and sell those products that are most profitable to them 
(Hassink and Van Leuvensteijn, 2010). There is, however, a counteracting force 
because credit risk exposure creates an incentive for the originator to monitor the 
underwriting behavior of intermediaries and screen applications. In the presence of 
reputation and credit risks, it is unlikely that they will employ different 
underwriting standards for credit that is originated through an intermediary 
compared to what they would originate directly (so-called direct-written). Using the 
loan-to-value and debt-service ratio as outcomes for the underwriting process, I 
indeed find that the general impact of intermediaries becomes insignificant once the 
model accounts for heterogeneity in underwriting among lenders. Moreover, no 
systematic violation of underwriting standards was found when intermediaries are 
involved in the origination process. Next, I examine whether the conflict is able to 
materialize if mortgages are insured without coinsurance between the lender and 
the insurer. This diminishes the incentives for lenders to monitor brokers and 
screen loan applications but I do not find evidence that lenders alter their screening 
standards. Consequently, there is no systematic effect of intermediaries on the 
outcome of the underwriting process. Proposals to alter the compensation structure 
of intermediaries, for example to hourly billing, are probably ineffective in 
reducing conflicting interests and come with their own incentive problems 
(Robinson, 2007). Also the effectiveness of broker regulation to avoid interest-
misalignments has received mixed empirical evidence (Todd and Kleiner, 2007). 
The results indicate that the regulation of lenders is more important. Moreover, the 
current absence of coinsurance between the mortgage insurer and the lender, is a 
potential source of concern and warrants a change of the structure of the insurance 
contract. Directions for future research include an examination of the factors that 
determine whether households rely on intermediaries and to what extent these 
households act in accordance with their advisors recommendations (see 
Bhattacharya et al., 2012). 
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In the final study of this dissertation (chapter five), I explore the 
determinants of mortgage insurance demand. Mortgage insurance covers repayment 
of mortgage principal in case that foreclosure proceeds are insufficient to cover the 
outstanding loan balance. In the Netherlands, mortgage insurance is provided by 
Nationale Hypotheek Garantie (NHG), which is well-known among Dutch 
homeowners. However, only 50 percent of the eligible mortgages are uninsured, 
despite the low cost of doing so. I use the DNB Household panel over the period 
1995-2009 to examine which factors explain the insurance decision. Consistent 
with economic intuition, I find that adoption rates increase with the risk exposure 
of the household. I continue by examining whether decision-maker traits have 
explanatory power. Specifically, it is tested whether overconfidence can explain 
insurance adoption rates. The first overconfidence measure is constructed from a 
regression that explains self-assessed financial knowledge of the household based 
on observable determinants. It is universally documented that individuals tend to 
overestimate their own skills (Greenwald, 1980). Consequently, I argue that the 
under- and overestimation of the households financial knowledge, obtained as the 
residual of the regression, is correlated to the overconfidence trait. The second 
measure is based on savings propensity and is taken from survey data that questions 
to what extend the household is inclined to save money for future events. The 
findings indicate that a one standard deviation increase in overconfidence decreases 
adoption rates by 11 to 13 percent.  However, in contrast to earlier findings, I do 
not find that the effect is different across gender (Barber and Odean, 2001). I test 
for an extensive array of alternative specifications and explanations, but find the 
main results to be unaffected. The findings provide a reason to change the default-
option currently offered, in which households voluntary choose to insure, towards a 
mode in which mortgages are standard insured. Directions for future work include a 
more in-depth examination of how overconfidence develops over time in 
conjunction with the business cycle. Furthermore, Dutch households are in general 
risk-averse and tend to have many insurance policies. Additional research can 
explore in greater detail the importance of contextual variables on the households’ 
willingness to insure, its risk-literacy and risk-attitude, and the way its insurance 
portfolio develops over time. 
  
 
 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
De studies in dit proefschrift concentreren zich op de Nederlandse woning- 
en hypotheekmarkt en het gedrag dat de participanten in deze markten vertonen. 
Ondanks dat hier de afgelopen decennia een groot aantal onderzoeken naar verricht 
is, heeft het merendeel van deze studies de Verenigde Staten als basis voor de 
analyse. Ondanks dat een wetenschappelijke theorie universeel van aard poogt te 
zijn, is het aannemelijk dat de postulaten die voortkomen uit bestaand vastgoed-
onderzoek niet per definitie één-op-één overdraagbaar zijn naar een andere context 
(Souza, 2005). Daarnaast is de afgelopen decennia, naar aanleiding van het werk 
door Daniel Kahneman en Amos Tversky (1979), een nieuwe stroom onderzoek 
binnen de economische wetenschap ontstaan die het handelen van actoren en hun 
besluitvorming vanuit een ander perspectief bekijkt. De gedragseconomie 
onderzoekt de psychologische aspecten van het menselijk handelen en is daarbij 
minder gericht op de vraag of dat handelen irrationeel is. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift stelt ter discussie in hoeverre er 
positieve effecten – zogenoemde externaliteiten – van eigenwoningbezit zijn. De 
discussie omtrent de hypotheekrenteaftrek en hervormingen in de woningmarkt 
behoeft een antwoord op de vraag waarom eigenwoningbezit eigenlijk 
gestimuleerd zou moeten worden. Amerikaans bewijs toont aan dat 
eigenwoningbezit een positief effect heeft op de schoolprestaties van kinderen 
(Jensen en Harris, 2008) en dat huizenbezitters meer relaties onderhouden met de 
buurt (DiPasquale en Glaeser, 1999). Wij onderzoeken of buurten in Rotterdam 
veiliger zijn en of de buurttevredenheid in die wijken hoger is als het gevolg van 
het percentage eigenwoningbezit in die buurt. Een grote methodologische uitdaging 
in dit type onderzoek is of buurten veiliger worden omdat er huizenbezitters wonen 
of dat een huishouden ervoor kiest om een woning te kopen in een veiligere buurt. 
Uit onze resultaten blijkt dat de buurtveiligheid en buurttevredenheid significant 
positief samenhangen met het percentage eigenwoningbezit. Een stijging van het 
eigenwoningbezit in de wijk met 10 procent, hangt samen met een stijging in 
buurtveiligheid van 0.6 procent en in buurttevredenheid van 0.7 procent en blijkens 
onze analyses is dit effect causaal. Een natuurlijke vraag gegeven deze resultaten is 
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of meer altijd beter is: is stimulering van eigenwoningbezit altijd wenselijk en 
effectief of is dit effect afhankelijk van het huidige niveau van eigenwoningbezit in 
de wijk? De analyse van de relatie tussen eigenwoningbezit en externaliteiten duidt 
op het bestaan van een niet-lineair verband. Het effect op buurtveiligheid en –
tevredenheid van een verhoging van het percentage eigenwoningbezit met 10 
procent, wanneer het huidige niveau 5 procent is, is tweeënhalve keer zo groot, dan 
wanneer 50 procent van de huidige bewoners in de wijk al huiseigenaar is. 
In het derde hoofdstuk wordt de hypotheekkeuze door consumenten aan de 
orde gesteld. De afgelopen twintig jaar is het aantal beschikbare hypotheekvormen 
aanmerkelijk gegroeid. Was voorheen de annuïteiten- of lineaire hypotheek de 
meest gangbare vorm, anno 2009 is meer dan 60 procent van de Nederlandse 
hypotheken een aflossingsvrije- of spaarhypotheek. Ondanks dat deze nieuwe 
hypotheekvormen voordelen bieden in termen van betaalbaarheid, zijn veel 
consumenten zich niet bewust van de risico’s die deze producten met zich 
meebrengen zoals het restschuld-risico. De vraag die aldus in dit hoofdstuk centraal 
staat is wat de invloed van financiële deskundigheid en risico-aversie is op de 
hypotheekkeuze door huishoudens. Hierbij verlaten wij de literatuur die op basis 
van theoretische modellen de optimale hypotheekkeuze analyseert (Campbell en 
Cocco, 2003) en nemen het gedrag economisch perspectief. Op basis van een 
uitgebreide Nederlandse panel-dataset, laten de resultaten zien dat financiële 
kundigheid en risicoaversie significante verklarende factoren zijn in de 
hypotheekkeuze van huishoudens. Huishoudens die in een hogere mate risico-avers 
zijn en huishoudens met geringe financiële deskundigheid hebben een 55 tot 97 
procent lagere kans om een aflossingsvrije hypotheek te kiezen. Omdat de 
hypotheek een verregaande en langdurige impact heeft op het financiële plaatje van 
het huishouden, is het aannemelijk dat advies wordt ingewonnen bij een 
hypotheekadviseur of familie. Uit de resultaten blijkt echter dat de gedragsfactoren 
een belangrijke factor blijven in hypotheekkeuze. We onderzoeken verder of 
hypotheekkeuze verklaard kan worden door eerdere ervaringen met 
eigenwoningbezit, verwachtingen met betrekking tot huizenprijzen, en de financiële 
situatie van het huishouden. Deze variabelen doen geen afbreuk aan de impact van 
financiële deskundigheid en risico aversie op de hypotheekkeuze van het 
huishouden. 
De discussie wordt vervolgd in het vierde hoofdstuk met een analyse van het 
hypotheekverstrekkingproces in Nederland. De centrale vraag in dit hoofdstuk is of 
tussenpersonen in de hypotheekmarkt acteren in het belang van hun clientèle. 
Compensatie op provisiebasis en concurrentie in de hypotheekmarkt kunnen leiden 
tot een zogenaamd agency-conflict, waarbij de tussenpersoon zijn eigen belangen 
  Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)  155 
 
boven die van zijn cliënt stelt. Indicatoren voor deze tegenstelling in belangen zijn 
het verstrekken van grotere hypotheken en aanbeveling van bepaalde 
hypotheekvormen (zoals aflossingsvrije hypotheken), omdat deze het profijtelijkst 
zijn vanuit provisie oogpunt. Er is echter een tegengestelde kracht die dit gedrag 
kan voorkomen, aangezien de hypotheek uiteindelijk acceptabel moet zijn voor de 
hypotheekverstrekker. Nederlandse hypotheekverstrekkers houden het merendeel 
(85 procent) van de hypotheken op hun balans en hebben daardoor een 
economische prikkel om het risico in deze portefeuille aanvaardbaar te houden en 
tussenpersonen te monitoren. Deze prikkel is zwakker wanneer de hypotheek 
verzekerd is omdat het kredietrisico dan niet langer door de verstrekker wordt 
gedragen. De resultaten laten zien  dat de invloed van de intermediair inderdaad 
insignificant is als het kredietrisico gedragen wordt door de verstrekker. Er blijkt 
echter geen effect op te treden wanneer de hypotheek verzekerd wordt; de rol van 
de tussenpersoon blijft insignificant. Uit de analyse blijkt dat de meeste variatie in 
uitkomsten van het hypotheekverstrekking proces toe te rekenen zijn aan 
verschillen tussen hypotheekverstrekkers onderling. In termen van regelgeving is 
het waarschijnlijk dan ook effectiever om de aandacht te richten op de regulering 
van hypotheekverstrekkers in plaats van die van tussenpersonen.  
Tenslotte wordt in het vijfde hoofdstuk de vraag naar 
hypotheekverzekeringen onderzocht. Een hypotheekverzekering keert uit in het 
geval een huishouden dat gedwongen de woning moet verkopen blijft zitten met 
een restschuld. Het restschuldrisico kan, onder voorwaarden, worden afgedekt door 
middel van een hypotheekverzekering bij de Nationale Hypotheek Garantie (NHG). 
Ondanks dat het overgrote deel van de Nederlandse huishoudens op de hoogte is 
van het bestaan van NHG, kiest (tot 2009) ongeveer 50 procent ervoor om de 
hypotheek niet te verzekeren, ondanks dat zij in aanmerking komen. De 
onderzoeksresultaten in dit hoofdstuk laten zien dat huishoudens met een hoger 
risico profiel meer geneigd zijn een hypotheekverzekering te kopen. De analyses 
tonen bovendien de rol van gedrag economische factoren aan: huishoudens zonder 
hypotheekverzekering zijn overmoediger en minder geneigd te sparen. In 
tegenstelling tot eerdere onderzoeken (Barber en Odean, 2001) is het effect niet 
verschillend tussen mannelijke en vrouwelijke beslissers. Het is aannemelijk dat 
een gedeelte van de overmoedigheid wordt veroorzaakt en versterkt door de 
gunstige economische en woningmarkt condities gedurende de analyse-periode. De 
resultaten worden niet verklaard door eerdere ervaring als eigenaar-bewoner, de 
invloed van financiële adviseurs of aanbodfactoren. Overigens is sinds de uitbraak 
van de subprime crisis in de Verenigde Staten het percentage verzekerde 
huishoudens in Nederland aanmerkelijk gestegen. 
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This dissertation contains four studies that contribute to our understanding of the
social and financial consequences of homeownership. The first study examines the effects
of homeownership on residential satisfaction and neighborhood safety. I show that
neighborhoods with higher homeownership rates are safer and that residents are more
satisfied with their neighborhood. In the second study, I provide insight into the decision
making process that households undergo when arranging mortgage financing. Specifically,
I document that those households who are either less risk averse or more financially
literate are more likely to opt for alternative mortgage products such as interest-only
mortgages. The third chapter focuses on the mortgage origination process and inves -
tigates whether provision-based compensation of financial intermediaries affects under -
writing outcomes for households. The results indicate that this, contrary to popular belief,
is not the case when mortgage lenders are exposed to default and reputational risks,
thereby providing them with an incentive to screen mortgage applications and monitor
brokers. The final study investigates the demand for mortgage insurance. Households with
recourse mortgage debt face wealth risks in case they are forced to sell their house
following an adverse income shock. The findings in this study support the hypothesis that
households eligible for insurance who are overconfident are significantly less likely to
obtain mortgage insurance.
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